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News of Palestinian RocketsPoll: Palestinians Support Rocket Attacks Against Israel
by Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/217/poll-palestinians-support-rocket-attacks-against
Palestinian Public Opinion Poll No (28) With Abbas Regaining Some of his Popularity and Hamas losing some of its popularity, and despite widespread support for a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, an overwhelming majority of Palestinians opposes a ceasefire that does not include the West Bank or does not stipulate an immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt 5-7 June 2008 These are the results of the latest poll conducted by the Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research (PSR) in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip between 5 and 7 June 2008. This period witnessed the declaration by the President of the Palestinian Authority (PA) Mahmud Abbas of his desire to renew dialogue with Hamas. It also witnessed continued closure of the Rafah border crossing despite Hamas's attempt to open it. Indirect negotiations between Hamas and Israel on a ceasefire failed to produce agreement while the threat of a possible Israeli invasion of the Gaza Strip escalated further. Total size of the sample is 1270 adults interviewed face to face in 127 randomly selected locations. Margin of error is 3%. This press release covers domestic Palestinian issues; issues related to the peace process and Israeli-Palestinian relations will be covered in a separate joint Palestinian-Israeli press release. For further details, contact PSR director, Dr. Khalil Shikaki, or Walid Ladadweh at tel 02-296 4933 or email pcpsr@pcpsr.org. Table of contents: 1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions 2) Ceasefire, the One-State Solution, and the Peace Process 3)Conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the Future trend Main Findings: Findings indicate a limited decline in the various indicators of Hamas's power in the second quarter of 2008 compared to the first quarter of the year. Decline can be seen in the popularity of the movement, the popularity of its prime minister Ismail Haniyeh, and in the percentage of those who describe Haniyeh's government as legitimate. By contrast, Mahmud Abbas's popularity and the positive evaluation of his performance increase compared to his standing in the first quarter of this year. Moreover, positive evaluation of conditions in the West Bank increases as feelings of safety and security improve. A majority believes that the recently deployed Palestinian security forces have succeeded in enforcing law and order in the areas of their deployment in the West Bank; this is particularly true in the Nablus and Jenin areas. As expected, the largest percentage believes that Abbas is more able than Hamas's government in reaching a peace agreement with Israel. But surprisingly, the largest percentage believes that Abbas is also more able than Hamas's government in forcing Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians. The changes in the second quarter of 2008 might have been the result of two developments: Abbas has taken the initiative away from Hamas when he gave the green light for a resumption of dialogue with Hamas and Hamas has failed in moving forward any of the issues it championed during this period. These issues included the opening of the Rafah border crossing and forcing Israel to agree to a ceasefire with the Islamist group. In the first quarter of this year, Abbas and his government, headed by Salam Fayyad, were seen by the public as impotent in confronting Israel's policies such as settlement construction and the increased restrictions on movement. By contrast, Hamas was seen as successful in breaking the siege on Gaza and in retaliating against Israel by carrying out two major armed attacks inside Israel, such as the suicide attack in Dimona and the attack at Merkaz Harav religious school in West Jerusalem. The measures taken by Hamas in the first quarter of 2008 managed to present the Islamist group as successful in confronting Israel at a time when Abbas and his government were seen as lacking the initiative. Findings also indicate that an overwhelming majority of Palestinians supports a ceasefire agreement between Hamas and Israel. But this support disappears if the agreement is to be restricted to the Gaza Strip and does not include the West Bank or if it does not stipulate the immediate opening of the Rafah crossing to Egypt. Findings also show stability in the Palestinian position regarding a permanent settlement along the lines of the Clinton Parameters or the Geneva Initiative with a minority support of less than half of the public. Finally, findings indicate that the idea that says that the two state solution is becoming difficult to achieve and that it is better for the Palestinians to embrace a one state solution where Palestinians and Jews would be equal is unacceptable to the majority of the Palestinians; indeed, only a little more than a quarter support it while the majority continues to support the two-state solution. 1) Domestic Palestinian Conditions
The Gap between the standing of PA President Mahmud Abbas and Hamas's Prime Minister Ismail Haniyeh has increased to 12 percentage points in favor of Abbas. If new presidential elections are held today, and the only two candidates were Abbas and Haniyeh, the former would receive the support of 52% and the latter 40%. This finding represents an increase in the popularity of Abbas which stood at 46% last March compared to 47% for Haniyeh. If the competition was between Marwan Barghouti and Haniyeh, the former would receive 61% to Haniyeh's 34%. Level of non-participation in the presidential elections would reach 39% if the competition was between Abbas and Haniyeh and 27% if the competition was between Barghouti and Haniyeh. Satisfaction with the performance of Abbas reaches 46% in this poll (compared to 41% last March). Moreover, 33% (compared to 30% last March) say the performance of Fayyad's government is good or very good and 38% say it is bad or very bad. By comparison, 37% (compared to 39% last March) say the performance of Haniyeh's government is good or very good and 35% say it is bad or very bad. Findings indicate that 45% (compared to 49% last March) believe that Haniyeh should stay in office as prime minister while 47% say he should not. By contrast, 42% (compared to 38% last March) say Fayyad's government should stay in office and 51% say it should not. 29% say Haniyeh's government is the legitimate Palestinian government and 31% say Fayyad's government is the legitimate one; 7% say both governments are legitimate and 28% say both are illegitimate. Three months ago, 34% said Haniyeh's government was legitimate while 29% said Fayyad's was legitimate. Moreover, the gap between Fateh and Hamas increases from 7 percentage points last March to 12 percentage points in this poll. If new parliamentary elections are to take place today, Hamas would receive 31% (compared to 35% last March) and Fateh would received 43% (compared to 42% last March). Perception of personal and family security and safety increases in the West Bank from 32% last March to 40% in this poll. But the percentage of personal and family security and safety in the Gaza Strip is higher than in the West Bank as it reaches 49% (compared to 46% in Gaza last March). In this regard, 57% say that the deployment of the Palestinian security forces in some cities and towns in the West Bank has succeeded or somewhat succeeded in enforcing law and order while 34% say the deployment has failed to do that. Belief in the success of the security deployment is greatest in the areas of Nablus and Jenin (87% and 81% respectively) followed by Tulkarm (77%), Qalqilia (65%), Ramallah (59%), Bethlehem (57%), Hebron (50%), and Jerusalem (47%). When asked about their perceptions regarding the true purpose of the deployment, 35% said the purpose was to enforce law and order, 28% said it was to disarm the resistance forces, and 23% said it was both, the enforcement of law and order and the disarming of the resistance forces. While only 23% give a positive evaluation of the status of democracy in the Gaza Strip under the Hamas government, the percentage for the West Bank under Fayyad's government is higher (33%). Moreover, while only 5% describe the overall conditions of the Palestinians in the Gaza Strip as good or very good, the percentage for the overall conditions in the West Bank is higher (25%). A majority of 77% believes that corruption exists in PA institutions that are under the control of PA president and his government and only 14% believe there is no corruption in PA institutions. Among those who believe corruption exists in the PA, 60% believe this corruption will increase or remain the same in the future. Moreover, a majority of 59% describes PA handling of the case of the smuggling of mobile phones in the car of the former PLC Speaker of the Palestinian parliament as a cover for corruption while only 28% describe it as an example of fighting corruption. About half of the Palestinians (49%) say that the PA under Mahmud Abbas is more able than Hamas's government under Ismail Haniyeh to reach a peace agreement with Israel while only 15% say the Hamas government is more able to do so. Moreover, 41% believe that the PA under Abbas is more able than Hamas's government to force Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians while only 25% believe Hamas's government is more able to do so. Even if the choice was between Abbas and Marwan Barghouti, Abbas comes on top with 31% while only 28% believe Barghouti would be more able than Abbas to force Israel to make more concessions to the Palestinians. Belief that Abbas is more able than Hamas to force Israel to make concessions can be seen both in the West Bank (40% to 24%) and the Gaza Strip (44% to 27%), but is more evident among women (45% to 23%) compared to men (37% to 27%), among supporters of the peace process (48% to 22%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (19% to 40%), among illiterates (48% to 18%) compared to those who hold a BA degree (31% to 27%), among those who intend to vote for Fateh's list (64% to 11%) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas's list (31% to 53%). 2) Ceasefire, the One-State Solution, and the Peace Process
Findings show that 78% support and 21% oppose a ceasefire agreement with Israel. But support decreases sharply to 23% if the agreement is to be restricted to the Gaza Strip and exclude the West Bank. Moreover, support drops further to 20% if the agreement does not include the immediate opening of the Gaza Crossings, especially the Rafah crossing to Egypt. Opposition to a ceasefire agreement that does not include the West Bank is high both in the Gaza Strip (78%) and the West Bank (74%). The same is true if the agreement does not stipulate the opening of the crossings, reaching 80% in the Gaza Strip and 78% in the West Bank. Findings indicate that 38% believe that a one-state solution (one based on the establishment of a unified state that includes Israel, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip whereby Palestinian Arabs enjoy equal rights as Israeli Jews) is more difficult to achieve than a two-state solution (one in which a Palestinian state is established next to the state of Israel). But a similar percentage (36%) believes the two-state solution is more difficult to achieve, and 25% believe that the two solutions are equally difficult to achieve. Regardless of its difficulty, 58% say they prefer the two-state solution while only 27% prefer the one state solution. 10% prefer other solutions. Support for the two state solution compared to the one state solution increases in the West Bank (58% to 25%) compared to the Gaza Strip (56% to 31%), in rural areas (61% to 23%) compared to cities (57% to 28%) and refugee camps (50% to 36%), among supporters of the peace process (63% to 26%), compared to those opposed to the peace process (40% to 32%), among the illiterates (65% to 21%) compared to holders of BA degree (52% to 25%), among those who are certainly willing to buy a lottery ticket (75% to 17%) compared to those who are certainly unwilling to buy a lottery ticket ( 49% to 25%), among refugees (58% to 25%) compared to non-refugees (58% to 28%), and among those who intend to vote for Fateh's list (68% to 25%) compared to those who intend to vote for Hamas's list (46% to 30%). Support for a permanent settlement along the Clinton Parameters and the Geneva Initiative remains stable with a minority support of 46% and 52% opposition. A majority of 63% supports the article on borders and territorial exchange and a majority of 56% supports the article on end of conflict. Only a minority supports all other articles: 28% support a state without an army, 38% support the Jerusalem compromise, 41% support the refugee compromise, and 38% support the security measures. Findings also indicate that 56% support and 43% oppose a mutual recognition of Israel as the state of the Jewish people and Palestine as the state for the Palestinian people after the two sides reach an agreement on all other issues of permanent settlement including Jerusalem and refugees. Moreover, 73% would support and 26% would oppose reconciliation between the two peoples after reaching a peace agreement. 67% support and 28% oppose the Saudi initiative which calls for Arab recognition of Israel and normalization of relations with it after its withdrawal from all occupied Arab territories and the establishment of a Palestinian state. Support for the Roadmap reaches 50% and opposition 47%. Findings indicate that the overwhelming majority (81%) prefers a comprehensive and permanent settlement that ends the conflict while only 15% prefer an interim settlement that leads to the establishment of a Palestinian state but postpone other issues such as refugees. Findings show a pessimistic outlook dominating Palestinian expectations regarding the peace process. 66% believe that chances for the establishment of a Palestinian state in the next five years are low or non existent and only 30% believe the chances are medium or high. Moreover, 76% believe that the negotiations launched by the Annapolis Conference will fail and only 16% believe they will succeed. 75% believe that it is impossible these days to reach a permanent settlement with the current Olmert government while only 22% believe it is possible to reach an agreement with it. These percentages are similar to those we found during the past six months. For all of this, 68% believe that meetings between Abbas and Olmert are not useful and should be stopped while only 27% believe they are useful and should continue. Support for armed attacks against Israeli civilians inside Israel drops from 67% last March to 55% in this poll. Moreover, support for launching rockets from the Gaza Strip against Israeli towns and cities such as Sderot and Ashkelon has dropped from 64% last march to 57% in this poll. Finally, 32% believe that serious progress in Syrian-Israeli peace talks or reaching a peace agreement will contribute positively to Palestinian-Israeli negotiations, but 26% believe that such development would constitute an impediment in Palestinian-Israeli negotiations and 35% believe such progress will have no impact. 3) Conflict in Lebanon between Hezbollah and the Future trend
Findings show that a majority of 52% view Hezbollah's armed control over West Beirut in August as legitimate and 36% view it as illegitimate. Despite the fact that the Lebanese parties have reached an agreement in Doha to settle their differences, 45% of the Palestinians expect a return to civil war in Lebanon, this time between Sunnites and Shiites as a result of the Hezbollah behavior and the conflict between Hezbollah and the Future trend while 44% do not expect that. If civil war between Sunnites and Shiites erupts in Lebanon, 37% expect the Shiites under the leadership of Hezbollah and Amal movement to win it, 18% expect the Sunnites under the leadership of the Future trend to win it, 29% expect neither side to win it, and 16% do not know who would win it. As to which side they will support if civil war erupts, 34% say they will support the Sunnites under the leadership of the Future trend, 21% say they will support the Shiites under the leadership of Hezbollah and Amal movement, and 35% say they will support neither side. Support for Sunnites vs. Shiites increases in the Gaza Strip (45% to 14%) compared to the West Bank (28% to 26%), in refugee camps (43% to 14%) compared to cities (36% to 19%) and rural areas (29% to 26%), among supporters of the peace process (36% to 22%) compared to those opposed to the peace process (32% to 23%), among those who describe themselves as religious (37% to 20%) compared to those who describe themselves as somewhat religious (33% to 22%), among holders of BA degree (37% to 17%), compared to illiterates (20% to 32%), among those working in the public sector (44% to 15%), compared to those working in the private sector (33% to 23%), among those who certainly refuse to buy a lottery ticket (38% to 17%) compared to those who certainly accept to buy a lottery ticket (33% to 29%), among refugees (36% to 17%) compared to non refugees (33% to 24%), and among supporters of Fateh (44% to 18%) compared to supporters of Hamas (37% to 26%). 5-7 June 2008
Source: Palestinian Center for Policy and Survey Research Related Topics: Palestinians receive the latest by email: subscribe to the free jewish policy center mailing list Comment on this item |
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