In football parlance, “a good offense is the best defense.” In foreign policy, offense might mean war or lead to war. The best defense is threefold: understanding your adversaries’ long and short term goals; preparing your military and civilian systems – high tech, mining, trade, finances – to deal with those goals; and speaking clearly about the positive aspects of your own system for citizens and allies.

Ronald Reagan did all three and the Soviet Union collapsed without a shot.

This issue of inFOCUS is designed to do the first and third, while recommending steps for the Biden administration to take on the second. Yes, China is the focus, but the same steps apply to Iran and a resurgent Russia.

Journalist Claudia Rosett in our interview explains how and why the U.S. is falling short on human rights policy – and who pays the price.

For China’s long and short-term strategy, read Daniel Blumenthal and [new addition to the JPC Board of Fellows] Guermantes Lailari. Follow with Benjamin Noon and Christopher Bassler on China’s military plans for artificial intelligence, and Samantha Hoffman on big data. Keith Kellogg discusses American policy in the broad form, while Stephen Bryen and Jun Isomura get specific about U.S. and Japanese security relations with Taiwan. The U.S. battery supply chain by Nadia Schadlow, Arthur Herman, and Brady Helwig is essential reading before you buy that Tesla.

Israel’s relations with China are not the mirror of America’s relations, although both place high priority on the security of their military and civilian infrastructure. Asaf Orion and Galia Levine explain.

We haven’t forgotten the pandemic, which has led to serious changes in both the international and domestic perception of China as a “responsible stakeholder.” To understand how China responded to the onset of what we still call the Wuhan Virus, and how much of the West fostered Chinese explanations and censored the rest, read JPC Senior Director Shoshana Bryen’s frightening review of What Really Happened in Wuhan by Shari Markson.

If you appreciate what you’ve read, I encourage you to make a contribution to the Jewish Policy Center. As always, you can use our secure site: http://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/donate

Sincerely,

Matthew Brooks
Publisher
Beijing’s Grand Strategy: A Sino-centric Order

by DANIEL BLUMENTHAL

The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) long-term strategic objective is to displace the United States as the world’s most powerful country and create a new world order favorable to China’s authoritarian brand of politics, or its “socialist market economy.” While this has been China’s goal since the end of the Cold War, Xi Jinping wants to rapidly realize this grand aspiration so that he can be regarded as an equal to Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. At the same time, China’s strategic behavior is shaped by the Middle Kingdom’s peculiar version of Leninist politics that forces trade-offs that have undermined China’s strategy. It now faces slower economic growth, political turbulence, and a backlash to its aggression.

National Security Environment

Beijing’s national-security policy was fashioned in response to what it viewed as a perilous period after the fall of the Soviet Union and the rise of America’s “unipolar” moment. Under Deng, CCP leaders forged a sophisticated strategy to build up wealth and power while thwarting attempts to form a counterbalancing coalition. Under Xi, China is making strategic gains, but such a coalition is forming against him.

China’s bleak assessment of its security environment began in the 1990s. The nationwide protests of 1989, culminating in the massacre at Tiananmen Square, were regime-threatening events. Soon after came America’s lopsided military victories in Iraq and Kosovo and the rise of a new democratic nation-state in Taiwan, which solidified U.S. support for the island. The presence of a U.S. alliance close to China’s only coastline, home to all of China’s ports, became simply untenable. China saw the U.S. hand in every world event it found troubling, from the “color revolutions” in the former Soviet satellite states, to the Arab Spring that brought down dictators, to movements supporting Tibetan freedom.

In Beijing’s view, there was nothing to stop the United States from supporting Taiwanese independence. The People’s Republic of China believes that a failure to unify the “motherland” would result in its demise and acts with accordant ruthlessness. The CCP came to power having finally unified China after the “century of humiliation,” during which it lost territory and sovereignty — including its own imperial conquests, such as Taiwan — to foreign powers and underwent destructive civil wars. Its legitimacy rests on reversing that humiliation. To that end, it has stamped out “separatism” in Tibet, Hong Kong, and Xinjiang and is already drawing similar redlines on Taiwan. Just as it did not abide “foreign hostile forces” working to “forever break” Hong Kong away from Beijing’s suzerainty, the CCP has now said on several occasions that it will not allow “Taiwan separatists” working with “foreign hostile forces” to keep the island permanently separate.

Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin’s approach to dealing with the post-Tiananmen security environment was to build up China’s economy very rapidly and translate wealth into military and diplomatic power. They made a political trade-off: increasing Chinese wealth by means of foreign ideas and foreign capital in exchange for looser party controls over the economy. China became an international manufacturing hub and a country dependent on maritime trade. It built a military capable of protecting its trading interests, undermining U.S. military power, and “deterring” Taiwanese independence. Until recently, Beijing had convinced U.S. leaders that its mili-

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emphasized its “peaceful rise.” Western political and corporate leaders were eager to benefit from China’s sizeable market and — during a period of Middle East wars — to believe that China’s rise would be peaceful.

**China’s “New Left” and the Rise of Xi**

But once Deng had left the scene, China’s “new left” (extreme nationalists and neo-Maoists) attacked the reforms as weakening the party. Xi rode the wave of this new politics to become China’s leader. Since the 2008 financial crisis, Beijing’s internal and external strategy has shifted markedly. China panicked that it would lose its big export markets. It began to lend massive amounts to unprofitable state-owned enterprises (the private sector had been allowed to flourish during the reform period) and took on crushing debt. Total debt as a percentage of GDP was 139 percent in 2008 and 283 percent in 2020, according to a U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission report. The state sector now dominates the Chinese economy again, and the Party dominates the state sector. The CCP no longer tolerates looser political controls in exchange for fast economic gains. China began shifting internally from a developmental autocracy (as South Korea and Taiwan had been) into a national-security state, with internal security and short-term external gains as higher priorities than economic growth.

The end of market-based reforms was not the only trouble Beijing faced. Western political and corporate leaders were eager to benefit from China’s sizeable market and — during a period of Middle East wars — to believe that China’s rise would be peaceful.

Xi took power during a political crisis when Bo Xilai, like Xi the son of a key Mao ally, made an independent bid to succeed Hu Jintao instead of Xi. Party leaders swiftly intervened to bring Bo and his family down. Xi saw the party as split, corrupt, weak, and in trouble. As a condition of assuming power during a challenging period, Xi secured a mandate to reign harshly and singularly through Stalinist purges and Maoist re-education campaigns to enforce party discipline. He also secured support for a new, more assertive foreign policy. CCP leaders assessed that, despite domestic trouble, they faced a strategic opportunity to undermine what they saw as a U.S. in decline thanks to economic mismanagement and costly wars.

Xi announced that China had entered a “new era” of geopolitics during which it would become the global leader. As I note in my book, *The China Nightmare*, Xi said that in this new era “it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia.” Left unsaid is that if the U.S. were no longer a power in the region, China would dominate the “affairs of Asia.” Beijing would no longer hide its capabilities or its ambitions as during Deng’s rule. Xi is intent on moving China back to “center stage” in geopolitics and shaping a new “favorable environment for... building... a great modern socialist country in all aspects.”

**China’s Strategy**

Xi and other party leaders outlined four elements of China’s strategy: First, it would create new “networks of strategic partnerships” to replace the “unequal” U.S. alliance system. Often this diplomacy is referred to as “building a community of common destiny for all mankind,” with CCP leaders selling their vision of a Chinese world order as universally beneficial. Second, China would become the most technologically advanced nation in the world. Third, it would build a first-class military. Fourth, it would revivify ideological and information statecraft to subvert and weaken its adversaries. At the same time, as Sheena Chestnut Greitens noted in a statement before the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, Xi warned in 2014 that the CCP was facing “the most complicated internal and external factors in its history” and that these threats were “interlocked” and could be “mutually activated.” But in contrast to the United States, when China faces domestic problems, it
escalates international tensions, relying on foreign-policy successes to bolster support for the party. While the analogy is far from perfect, just as Mao’s foreign policy grew more radically adventure-some during the ravages of the Cultural Revolution, Xi picked fights with the U.S., India, Australia, and Europe as the Chinese economy faced enormous headwinds during the COVID-19 pandemic.

### Gains and Pushback

The results of the change in strategy have been mixed. To be sure, China has made some serious gains. It has effective control over the South China Sea. It has accelerated its military-modernization plans and thereby changed the regional balance of power and strengthened its ability to coerce Taiwan.

Moreover, during the global pandemic, Beijing demonstrated its ability to manipulate information, bend international bodies such as the World Health Organization (WHO) to its will, and bully nations to mute their criticisms of China. It has successfully wielded its market power (e.g., against Wall Street, Silicon Valley, the NBA, and Hollywood) to soften responses to its malignancy. This has resulted in continued access to U.S. capital and technology — despite Beijing’s stamping out of Hong Kong’s democracy and its continuing destruction with impunity of Uyghur, Tibetan, and other minority religions and cultures.

But Xi is also facing pushback, sometimes even coordinated international resistance. A growing number of Asian countries are willing to cooperate with the United States. Beijing is very concerned that the United States will strengthen a nascent coalition to starve it of commodities and critical technologies. (China is highly dependent on imports, from agriculture to energy to advanced technology; for example, it still relies on foreign companies for most of its high-end semiconductor needs.)

While China poses a formidable challenge to U.S. global leadership, the CCP’s near-constant political purges, darker economic prospects, and demographic problems, such as a coming old-age tsunami and not enough young people entering the workforce, mean that the U.S. still has a chance to deny the hegemony over Asia sought by Xi and to build an affirmative alternative to Sino-centrality — in short, to thwart China’s bid to create a new world order.

DANIEL BLUMENTHAL, J.D., is the director of Asian studies at the American Enterprise Institute.
The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sees advanced technology as one of the keys to victory in its challenge to global order in this century. CCP General Secretary Xi Jinping has pronounced that the world is on the precipice of a “fourth industrial revolution” centered upon artificial intelligence and autonomous technology. China is mobilizing every sector of society to contribute to the state’s grand technological ambitions in its long-term struggle against the United States.

Nowhere is this clearer than in the realm of military affairs. China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is racing to integrate futuristic technologies into its historically less-advanced military. The PLA has coalesced around a new organizing concept for how it thinks that advanced technologies will affect warfare in this century. “Intelligentization” represents China’s vision for a new revolution in military affairs. This little-known new concept is driving the PLA’s modernization efforts and signals the expansive ambitions the People’s Republic of China (PRC) has in challenging American military dominance globally.

China’s Dreams for Future Warfare

Intelligentization is the third of the PLA’s official goals in the sequence of modernization. The first is “mechanization,” which is concerned with acquiring basic weapons systems that can deliver firepower against the adversary. Chinese strategists drew powerful lessons from what they see as the apogee of “platform-centric” warfare during the Second World War, when the United States dominated with mechanized formations like carrier battle groups. They argue that this warfare lies in the “physical space.” The PLA announced that it had achieved mechanization in 2020.

“Informationization” is the PLA’s second official benchmark for military modernization. The PLA famously learned the principles of informationization during the 1991 Gulf War, when the United States demonstrated the devastating potential of a technologically-advanced military in modern warfare. It resides in the “information space,” and it tasks the military with acquiring systems that can collect and efficiently process battlefield information. After the Gulf War, the Chinese military became determined to catch up to the United States technologically and has not looked back since.

Intelligentization is the next phase of military modernization for the PLA. Chinese strategists say that it centers upon the “cognitive space” in which effective decision-making and complex thinking provides the decisive advantage. Chinese theorists think that intelligentization will represent changes as significant as those seen in the Second World War and the Gulf War, if not bigger.

Applying AI

This new type of warfare depends on the application of AI at both the operational decision-making level and for frontline combatants. Chinese strategists believe that AI will work side-by-side with commanders. One way they believe this will happen is through “battlefield perception systems” in which the computer provides the commander with possible target sets to choose from. This melding of human creativity and robotic computer power will help the PLA “realize human self-transcendence.”

With AI taking a larger role in decision-making, Chinese strategists think that future warfare will become an arms race for which the state can produce computers that have the quickest computing capacity. Wartime commanders will be armed with supercomputers that will come to surpass the decision-making abilities of the humans directing them. PLA theorists call this “algorithmic warfare.”

PLA strategists think that frontline combatants will be gradually phased out and replaced with intelligent swarms of drones that will give operational commanders complete control over the battlefield. Chinese theorists believe that drones will have the strongest impact in the air domain. They see unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs) as having two major impacts on air warfare. The first is called “swarm warfare,” wherein masses of intelligent robots overwhelm the enemy. The second, called “unmanned-manned cooperation,” envisions “mother-ship” fighters directing groups of unmanned systems. Over time, the tactical level of warfare will almost entirely be comprised of robots.

With computer-enhanced commanders perfectly directing automated robotic frontline combatants, warfare will change drastically. Chinese strategists think war will begin to resemble something akin to a video game. In this environment, PLA theorists see future warfare as prizeing psychological warfare with the operational commanders’ mental state as the decisive point of war. The PLA’s goal will be to outsmart the enemy and reduce the adversary’s will to resist.

These changes are believed to result in nothing less than a revolution in warfare as we know it. Chinese strategists say that warfare will come to resemble “mythological fiction” and that the technology of Star Wars will be available in the near future. These Chinese strategists believe whichever side can better intelli-gentize its force has the potential to leapfrog its enemies in unimaginable ways.

Achieving Ambitions with Industrial Policy

These long-term ambitions put stiff demands on a Chinese economy that still lags behind the United States in some key measures of technological sophistication. Consequently, the Chinese state is undertaking a massive program of industrial policy to arm the PLA with what it needs to intelli-gentize. Most famously, the Made in China 2025 policy prioritizes gathering global technological supply chains within the PRC. The Chinese state has already invested billions of dollars in building an indigenous semiconductor industry. China continues to steal American intellectual property on a monumental scale. These concerted efforts demonstrate just how serious the Chinese state is in achieving its envisioned leapfrog development over the United States. But PRC investments in quantum computing and drone technology are specific examples of how Chinese industrial policy connects to the PLA’s future intelligenti-zation ambitions.

Quantum Computing: Quantum computing belongs to an emerging cutting-edge group of technologies that until recently have only seemed to belong in sci-fi movies. Current computers operate on “bits,” which make calculations based on a system of ones and zeroes. Quantum computing would instead use “qubits” that could exist at any value between one and zero. This futuristic technology, then, could theoretically entail increases in calculating speed that are simply impossible to imagine. The CCP recognizes the extraordinary potential of quantum computing. It is investing billions of dollars into its development, directing the cooperation between the public and private sectors with “Military-Civil Fusion,” and drawing the greatest minds to efforts with the “Thousand Talents Plan,” among other efforts.

Drones: China has also identified drones as a key technology for development. The PRC is becoming a global leader in UAV development in both the commercial and military sectors. Its drones are famously cheaper than their American counterparts, and China produces by far more drones in the commercial sector than any other single country. Chinese drone capabilities, however, are mostly still controlled by humans.

With its rapidly advancing drone capabilities, the other side of intelli-gentization may be plausible as well. If Chinese engineers are able to increase the autonomy of their drones over time, these machines could theoretically become capable enough to operate independently of close human coordination; they could even cooperate together to create autonomous armies to the men-
an across-the-board effort that fundamentally threatens the technological edge that has been the basis of American military superiority for decades.

**Drawbacks in Chinese Thinking**

Chinese dreams of intelligentization are not without their flaws, however. Most importantly, the CCP’s vision for AI betrays the PLA’s predilection for over-centralization of command authority and top-down orchestration of military assets. With operational commanders advised by computers directing smart swarms of drones, there will be few opportunities for distribution of efforts and lower-level initiative. The principles of intelligentization fly in the face of modern visions of the much vaunted “mission command,” which prizes decentralization of authority and individual and small unit initiative. Failure from any one Chinese commander could be disastrous in an intelligentized PLA.

Additionally, it is worth keeping in mind that AI is not destined to provide all of the benefits that the PLA hopes for. All algorithms necessarily mirror the presumptions that the AI designers hold and are often limited by them. In the past, technological revolutions have precipitated kinds of changes in warfare that contemporaries could never imagine. In future warfare, AI may not be able to adjust to the new realities and inherent uncertainties of warfare in the same way that humans can.

Lastly, the elevated status of intelligentization in Chinese doctrine will more closely couple the PLA’s warfighting capabilities with China’s continued technological development. If the PRC cannot continue to introduce new military innovations to the PLA, Chinese military doctrine will float adrift. This is a possibility to take seriously. China is showing accelerating signs of a flagging economy, with the headwinds of immense debt and a heavy demographic burden, among other challenges. In addition to technological limitations, competing resource priorities may also weigh on the PLA’s intelligentization potential.

**Challenges & Opportunities for the United States**

These developments present multiple warnings and opportunities for the United States. Most importantly, the PLA might achieve its grand ambitions for an intelligentized force. In this warfare environment, the American way of war might be at severe risk. The U.S. military could find itself outmatched and unprepared in an Indo-Pacific war scenario. Of course, the United States should prepare itself for this possibility and experiment with the potential that an AI-enabled adversary could have. An AI betrays the PLA’s predilection for centralization of authority and individual and small unit initiative. Failure from any one Chinese commander could be disastrous in an intelligentized PLA.

The revolution in AI is not only crucial for China’s military. The CCP sees AI development as part of a broader “intelligent era,” with AI changing all parts of society. This era will be driven by a fourth industrial revolution that the PRC is sparing no expense to use to leapfrog over its adversaries. Chinese strategic culture prizes the role that technology plays in the development of warfare, so the CCP believes that if it can get an edge over the United States in this phase of technological development, it will capture the decisive advantage it needs in the geopolitical competition. The world may be on the verge of a new kind of warfare for which the United States is not yet ready.

**Preparing for this Century’s Military Competition**

The United States and China have entered an era of prolonged military competition. With the shadow of the PLA hanging over Taiwan, the South China Sea, and the East China Sea, it is more important than ever to understand the potentially revolutionary changes that the Chinese military envisions for itself in this century. China believes that rapid advances in artificial intelligence and autonomous systems will radically change warfare, and it is planning to make that dream a reality.

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**In future warfare, AI may not be able to adjust to the new realities and inherent uncertainties of warfare in the same way that humans can.**

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Bayport Terminal: 
The View from Israel 
by BG (res.) ASSAF ORION, IDF and GALIA LAVI

Editor’s Note: The Haifa Bayport Terminal has commenced operations. In recent years, Israeli media publications have raised concerns about the port’s operation by a Chinese state-owned company, particularly in view of the growing rivalry between China and the United States. These concerns have likewise resonated in the United States. It should be noted that since this article was written, the USS O’Kane made a port call in Haifa, possibly signaling the future intention of the U.S. Navy.

September 1, 2021, marked the official start of operations at Haifa Bayport by SIPG Bayport Terminal, registered in Israel and owned by the Chinese company Shanghai International Port Group (SIPG). The occasion, described by the CEO of the Israel Port Authority as “a historic event unmatched in several decades,” was celebrated with a modest ceremony under COVID-19 restrictions. In recent years, the port has become a symbol of American displeasure and concern to some in Israel over Chinese investments in the country. Supporters of the venture highlight its contribution to the Israeli economy, while opponents emphasize the security risks inherent in a port operated by a company from China...

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Until now, 99 percent of Israel’s trade passed through 7210 meters of quays in its seaports, including 2610 meters of container quays. In addition to the inefficiency of work teams, Israel’s outdated seaports lack adequate container capacity, as they are unsuitable for huge container ships. Haifa Port, for example, can handle ships carrying up to about 15,000 TEU (Twenty-foot Equivalent Unit, the standard unit of measurement for a 20-foot container with about 15.8 meters draught), whereas containers from Asia usually arrive in ships carrying up to 24,000 TEU and needing a draught of 17.3 meters. For a container to reach Israel, therefore, it must go through transshipment at a more advanced Mediterranean port, where the cargo is moved from a large ship to a smaller ship that is able to anchor in Israel. Alternatively, some of the cargo is unloaded in another port, to reduce its weight and enable it to anchor in the relatively shallow waters in Israel’s ports. All this lengthens the time for containers to reach Israel and increases costs, given the extra shipping time and double unloading and loading costs. According to a report from

The Importance of the New Ports

In response to these problems, the Israeli government decided to construct...
two new ports, near Haifa and Ashdod, or more specifically, two new private container terminals, each 800 meters long and 17.3 meters deep, able to receive the huge 400-meter long container ships carrying up to 24,000 TEU. These terminals, named Bayport and Southport, will operate alongside the two existing government ports. As part of the development plan, the quays in the existing ports will also be upgraded to enable them to compete with the new sites. The reform’s expected results will be extension of the container quays in Israel, significant upgrade of loading and unloading capacity of the seaports, and conversion from transshipment-dependent ports to ports that can themselves transship for other Mediterranean ports. In addition to reducing Israel’s dependence on foreign ports, the new construction can yield additional direct revenue as well as savings in time and costs for the entry of goods.

Today, Haifa and Ashdod ports handle about 3 million TEU per annum, with each receiving about half of the container ships entering Israel. With the opening of the new ports, whose capacity is expected to increase gradually, the existing ports will have a looser hold over the flow of containers into Israel. According to estimates generally accepted in the shipping industry, each of the new ports will be able to handle about 2 million TEU at maximum capacity. According to some media reports, the possibility of allowing the new ports to handle general cargo as well as containers is also under consideration.

In economic terms, the operation of the two new ports is essential for solving the problems at Israel’s ports. It will increase competition in the industry, reduce the need for container transshipment, save costs, and encourage greater efficiency in the existing ports.

National Security Considerations

Beyond the economic benefits, the media and various forums have raised concerns about Bayport’s management by a Chinese state-owned company. Primarily:
- The company is subject to an authoritarian regime, which uses “debt traps” and takes control over assets, such as Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka and Piraeus Port in Greece.
- The Chinese company could allow China’s military vessels to anchor in Israel as part of its “Military-Civil Fusion” strategy.
- SIPG might disrupt the Port’s activity in times of emergency or leverage its economic power for China’s political influence over Israel.
- The port might be used for espionage and cyber operations, including against U.S. Navy ships.

Even if the port does not embody special risks or create significant Israeli dependency on China, in the eyes of the United States, and certainly in Pentagon and U.S. Navy circles, it has become a provocative symbol of treacherous cooperation by a close ally, Israel, with America’s arch-rival, China, and therefore also a threat to the special relationship between the United States and Israel.

The severe arguments and their recurring resonance mandate confirmation of the facts. SIPG is indeed a Chinese government-controlled company, yet contrary to the allegations regarding Piraeus and Hambantota (some of which are contested), the Bayport is not controlled or owned by SIPG, and no debt is involved, since it did not lend
money to Israel. The port operator is a private Israeli company, indeed owned by a Chinese company, yet most of its employees are Israelis, apart from a few Chinese management staff.

As for concerns about disruption to port activity during emergencies or exertion of pressure on the Israeli government, the probability and severity of these risks appear to be limited: Bayport will not be owned by its operator; it is subject to Israeli law; and in emergencies the port must operate according to instructions of the Israeli security authorities, just like Israel’s other ports. If the operator does not comply with these terms, it risks committing a breach of contract and the Government of Israel will be fully entitled to replace it.

As for espionage risks, for purposes of line-of-sight observation and reception, the Bayport Terminal is no nearer to the Israeli naval base than many civilian buildings in Haifa, although its location on the water line does indeed offer the potential for gathering acoustic intelligence (signatures of vessels and especially submarines), a potential that exists in principle in transiting commercial vessels as well. The port’s eight cranes, made by the Chinese company ZPMC, are technology-rich machines equipped with sensors and communications, raising concerns that they could be used for espionage. According to the ZPMC website, the company manufactures 70 percent of the ship to shore (STS) cranes in the world, including those in the Middle East, Europe, and the United States. This year, for example, the company’s cranes were purchased by ports in San Francisco and South Carolina.

Bayport, like any strategic infrastructure close to Israel’s critical security assets, requires full and professional risk management. Limiting exposure to potential risks in the areas of security, espionage, and cyber stemming from the operation of ports by foreign companies is the responsibility of the relevant security entities: the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet), the National Cyber Directorate, the Ministry of Defense, and the Ministry of Transport’s Security Department, each in its own field. The National Security Staff should integrate all agencies involved and ensure a full and seamless long-term security response for all the relevant facilities.

**Relations with the United States**

Under the reasonable assumption that the direct risks potentially arising from Bayport’s operation can be handled prudently and responsibly by Israel’s security authorities, the most significant challenge still remains, namely, the implications for relations with the United States.

On his recent visit to Israel, CIA Director William Burns reportedly shared with Prime Minister Naftali Bennett American concerns over Chinese penetration of the Israeli economy, particularly in areas of high tech and large infrastructure projects. Before the Prime Minister’s visit to the United States, senior Israeli officials said that Bennett would present to President Joe Biden and other senior members of the U.S. administration a new Israeli policy, defining relations with China as an issue of national security while paying closer attention to American concerns than during Netanyahu’s term.

According to reports, the subject of China never came up in meetings between President Biden and Prime Minister Bennett, but lower ranks are engaged on the issue. The visit in general aimed to “reset” relations, building trust, and working on tensions and disputes between the governments through quiet communication rather than in the media. It is therefore correct that...
the subject of Bayport and its associated concerns be handled as planned in a similar professional format and in this spirit, by the National Security Staff in the Prime Minister’s Office and in the National Security Council in the White House. Mutually coordinated risk management and updates will help restore the subject to its proper dimensions, and hopefully to media coverage that is factual, professional, and proportionate.

### Conclusion

Haifa’s Bayport is a clear example of the emerging challenges in Israel’s changing strategic environment. What began with clear national needs was answered by maximizing opportunities in the global economy and the advantages of international corporations, including from China. Since the contract for the Bayport terminal was signed in 2015, a strategic “climate change” has unfolded, with Washington’s official declaration in 2017 echoing unexamined claims. Prudent policy should learn from past lessons and must focus not on hindsight but on the present and the future, and on the quality of decisions affecting projects currently on the agenda, finding the correct balance between economic needs and security needs. Israel must continue to work on strengthening its special strategic relations with the United States, while at the same time promoting fruitful and safe economic relations with China.

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If Hong Kong was breakfast, Taiwan is lunch, then what’s for dinner?

When playing any strategy game, such as Chess or Go, skilled players look ahead several moves to win. In the case of China, many Asia experts believe that Taiwan is the next country on the People’s Republic of China (PRC) target list. The PRC’s campaign may begin in the period between the Winter Olympics in China early 2022 and the next Taiwanese election in 2025, but no later than August 1, 2027—the 100th anniversary of the establishment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).

Few analysts look beyond Taiwan to other potential PRC land grabs. So, if Hong Kong was for breakfast in 2019, and Taiwan is for lunch no later than 2027, then what’s for dinner? Specifically, after it digests Taiwan, what region does PRC plan to acquire?

Key to examining where the PRC can expand is the set of opposing states. U.S. allies are listed according to their relationships with the U.S.:

Countries cooperating with China include the Islamic Republic of Iran, Myanmar, Laos, North Korea, and Russia. Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Vietnam, and Malaysia, cooperate with U.S. and China. Consequently, due to Russia, Japan, South Korea and the U.S. territories of Guam, Hawaii and other islands, China cannot expand east and northeast without risking a major war. To the southwest, China and India are at loggerheads—including minor border clashes. PRC’s remaining option for expansion is Southeast Asia and the South China Sea (SCS)—also called the West Philippine Sea (WPS) or the East Vietnam Sea (EVS).

The Nine-Dash Line & EEZs

The PRC claims 90 percent of the SCS based on “discovery” of a 1947 map that consisted of nine-dash lines. This map was updated in 2009 [see map]. The SCS is the fifth largest ocean in the world—it is 1.35 million square miles and is larger than India.

The PRC claims the SCS in contravention of rules established by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) regarding how much area a country is allowed to claim as its exclusive economic zone (200 nautical miles). The PRC has advanced its territorial claims to the SCS, and SCS countries have called the PRC’s
expansionist policy illegal. In July 2016, the Philippines won a ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague against the PRC that concluded that "[t]here was no legal basis for China to claim historic rights to resources within the sea areas falling within the ‘nine-dash line.’”

The PRC has conflicting EEZ claims against Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan.

The PRC has conflicting EEZ claims against Vietnam, Philippines, Brunei, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Taiwan. Taiwan is in part of the area included in the nine-dash line map claimed by PRC. Therefore, taking over the rest of the SCS would conclude the PRC’s initial expansion into southeast Asia creating new boundaries with the Philippines, Malaysia, Brunei, and Indonesia. The PRC’s new borders would be a short distance by sea from Singapore (only 375 miles from the nine-dash line), Cambodia (550 miles), Thailand (660 miles), and Japan.

Assuming that PRC would control Taiwan, Vietnam, and the Philippines would have the largest areas of conflicting claims with the PRC in the SCS. Vietnam claims an ocean EEZ of 538,650 sq mi. The PRC claims 70 percent of Vietnam’s EEZ (~377,389 sq mi) with their Dash Line claim. The Philippines claims an ocean exclusive economic zone that covers 874,064 sq mi. The PRC claims about 50 percent of the Philippines’s EEZ (~437,000 sq mi). The small country of Brunei would lose 90 percent of their EEZ. Malaysia would lose about 40 percent of their EEZ. Finally, Indonesia would also lose some of its EEZ to China, northeast of Natuna Island.

■ Exclusive Economic Zones

The SCS large oil and gas reserves explain the PRC’s interest in the region. For example, China claims that SCS could hold as much as 213 billion barrels of oil, or the equivalent of 80 percent of Saudi Arabia’s known reserves. Natural gas estimated reserves in the SCS are about 16 trillion cubic meters, composing a third of China’s total oil and gas resources, and equaling 12 percent of the world total reserves if they gained control of the entire SCS. The U.S. has less gas reserves than the SCS (but more than mainland China) with an estimated 13 trillion cubic meters. Chinese officials sometimes refer to SCS as their Persian Gulf.

■ Sea Lanes of Communication

Another factor that guides PRC’s expansion is commerce that transits through SCS waters—sea lanes of communication. By securing the SCS, China would prevent other states from affecting their commercial shipping lanes while holding at risk other countries’ major economic trade routes. It is the second most used sea lane in the world.

Could Vietnam be the next target of the PRC? The PRC has an 800-mile long land border with Vietnam. On 17 February 1979, the PRC forces crossed the border and invaded Vietnam. The PRC cited three reasons to justify its aggression: the Vietnamese had attacked the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia, the Vietnamese had occupied the Spratly Islands which were claimed by China, and the Vietnamese were mistreating Vietnam’s ethnic Chinese minority. The fighting ended on 16 March; both sides suffered approximately 30,000 killed, and the PLA withdrew except for 23 square miles. The Vietnamese call this war the War against Chinese Expansionism whereas the PRC called it the Defensive Counterattack against Vietnam.

Vietnam and China had border conflicts until the Soviet Union fell in 1991. Sino-Vietnamese relations improved until 2012 when Vietnam claimed Spratly Islands and the Paracel Islands as part of its territory. Conflict was exacerbated when Vietnam claimed oil and gas rights in its EEZ, and the PRC rejected
that claim. Between 2013 and the present, the PRC attacked and sunk some Vietnamese fishing boats. Vietnam is a communist country and has sought to continue good economic relations with the PRC; 22 percent of Vietnam’s international trade is with the PRC. However, Vietnam does not want to become a vassal state as they have been treated during China’s history, Vietnam’s leaders have sought to counter PRC’s influence by acquiring U.S. defense equipment.

**The Timeline Thus Far**

To avoid a direct conflict with the rest of the world, the PRC has two options modeled on Russian takeover of parts of Georgia and Ukraine in the past two decades: (1) a “sea-grab” of SCS islands either by salami tactics (a few slices at a time), or (2) many islands at one time.

One likely scenario would be for the PRC to take a few strategic islands from one of the other countries that control these islands just as it did against the Vietnamese or Philippines. Another scenario would involve a false flag operation, such as a staged action against the PLA Navy or the PRC Coast Guard or a PRC fishing vessel to instigate a “justified” reprisal. Conveniently, the swift action would involve a sweeping takeover of some or all of that countries’ islands in the SCS.

Focusing on the SCS, below is an abbreviated timeline of important events:

- 1951: PRC Premier Zhou Enlai claims the inviolable sovereignty of the PRC of the Spratly Island and the Paracel Islands in SCS
- 1974: PRC takes the Paracel Islands, Yagong Island and Crescent group reef from Vietnam
- 1988: PRC takes south Johnson Reef from Vietnam sinking three ships and killing 74 Vietnamese sailors (Spratly Islands)
- 1992: PRC passes Law on the Territorial Sea claiming most of the SCS
- 1994: PRC occupied Mischief Reef from the Philippines (Spratly Islands)
- 2009: PRC publishes an updated version of the Nine Dash Line map claiming most of the SCS
- 2012: PRC takes Scarborough Shoal from the Philippines

**American Policy**

On 11 July 2021, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken stated, “an armed attack on Philippine armed forces, public vessels, or aircraft in the South China Sea would invoke U.S. mutual defense commitments under Article IV of the 1951 U.S.-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty.” The PRC could interpret this statement by the Secretary of State as a paper promise since the Obama Administration did not interpret the treaty as covering SCS islands. The PRC tested U.S. resolve to protect the Philippines when the U.S. did not respond to the 2012 PRC taking of
Scarborough Shoal that is clearly within the Philippine EEZ. The PRC demonstrated salami style encroachment on Vietnam and the Philippines. Vietnam is more exposed to PRC aggression by the lack of a defense treaty with the U.S. Recall that the PRC seized the Vietnamese Paracel Islands in (1974), south Johnson Reef (1988), and harasses Vietnamese fishing boats and oil exploration efforts in the SCS.

If the PRC decides to take some or all of Vietnam’s or the Filipino islands in the SCS, how would they conduct the operation? The main PLA Navy and Air Forces needed can be forward deployed from Hainan Island military bases to the currently PRC occupied Spratly Islands, Paracel Islands, and possibly other locations, such as Scarborough Shoal, that will likely be militarized in the future.

**The SCS Triangle of PRC Controlled Islands**

Examining the above map, note the following regarding the three main island groups in the SCS according to their territorial claims:
- **Paracel Islands (Northeast SCS):** China, Taiwan, and Vietnam contest their sovereignty. Since 1974 China has occupied them after forcing Vietnam out.
- **Spratly Islands (central SCS):** China, Taiwan, and Vietnam claim all of the approximately 200 islands, while Brunei, Malaysia, and the Philippines claim some of them. Vietnam controls the greatest number of them.
- **Scarborough Shoal (Northwest SCS):** China, Taiwan, and the Philippines all claim the shoal; China took control of it from the Philippines since 2012.

By controlling some islands in the three strategic areas of the SCS, the PRC has the ability to expand its possessions rapidly and to protect them from interference from nearby countries and countries outside of the area.

Note: The PRC made non-binding agreements not to militarize the SCS including Scarborough Shoal with President Obama and Secretary Clinton in 2012. The PRC, to date, has abided only with its promises regarding the Scarborough Shoal. The PRC has broken promises on the SCS and violated its treaty with the UK on Hong Kong. The PRC could also break its promise to not militarize the Scarborough Shoal.

**What Happens After Dinner? Dessert**

In conclusion, the above analysis argues that after it occupies Taiwan, the PRC will attempt to take over some of Vietnam’s and the Filipino Spratly Islands. In a worst-case scenario, the PRC could seize all Vietnamese and Filipino EEZs in the Nine Dash Line area. This strategy maximizes PRC’s security and expands the sea area that they can control for its resources, as well as controls the shipping lanes. If the PRC regime decides to control the SCS, they would have to take all the remaining countries’ islands within the PRC Nine Dash Line area, such as those controlled by Brunei, Malaysia, and Indonesia.

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Even under ideal circumstances for the U.S. government, dealing with a possible confrontation with China is a problem that is, in many ways, intractable. And our circumstances are far from ideal. The U.S. economy is dangerously and closely linked to China, particularly in the high tech sector, making confrontation risky economically for both parties, but especially for the United States. China has also grown a significant military which, even though it is untested, presents a formidable problem for a status quo power such as the U.S. In addition, because of the long wars that took place in Afghanistan and in Iraq, the condition of the US Army and Air Force are, to put it mildly, considerably degraded.

Beginning with President Barak Obama’s so-called “pivot to Asia,” the Pentagon has been trying to figure out how U.S. forces would operate in the region and what would happen in a real conflict. To this end, the Pentagon has sponsored a number of war game exercises, simulations, and actual exercises to test and assess capabilities. The results have not been pretty and, unless there are some profound changes, the attitude of American military leaders is and will remain to avoid conflict with China.

To add to the malaise and depression in decision-making circles there are many voices, both inside and outside the U.S. government, that see China as a rising power with industrial punch and scientific and technological prowess that exceeds that of the United States. Areas such as cybernetics, artificial intelligence, low observables (stealth), quantum computing, swarming drones, ceramics, and advanced manufacturing. *Global Times* reports that “China’s annual research and development (R&D) spending grew 169 times over from about 14.3 billion yuan ($2.21 billion) at the beginning of the 1990s to 2.44 trillion yuan ($378 billion) in 2020. Based on exchange rate conversion, China’s total R&D expenditures overtook Japan’s in 2013, becoming the world’s second after the U.S.”

### Developments in the Region

Washington’s problem is exacerbated by three related developments – Taiwan, Japan, and regional peace and security.

The most explosive is Taiwan because China has raised the stakes over Taiwan’s future, demanding that Taiwan be formally reincorporated into China. China has carried out extremely aggressive and risky air operations in Taiwan’s declared air defense identification zone (ADIZ), forcing Taiwan to constantly scramble aircraft and the PLA-Navy has complimented the air operations by demonstrating power at sea around the island, including sea invasion exercises. To further unsettle the Taiwanese and the Americans, China has allowed its military to significantly increase its boasting about how Taiwan would be destroyed.

America has no formal obligation to protect Taiwan and even the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979 does not provide any assurance to the Taiwanese that the U.S. would come to help them. However in 1996, when China carried out an extremely threatening missile exercise focused on Taiwan and began assembling invasion forces, Washington responded by sending two aircraft carrier task forces to position between China and Japan. China pulled back from the brink. In the intervening 25 years, China has been devising ways to neutralize U.S. aircraft carriers and push the U.S. back so that coming to Taiwan’s assistance, at least by sea, has become fraught with problems.

Japan is not immediately threatened, but the Japanese know very well that Taiwan’s fate could also prove fatal to them. There is no love lost between China and Japan. In fact, the Chinese have a distinct hatred for Japan mainly related to the second Sino-Japanese War (1937-1945) that took millions of Chinese lives, military and civilian, and involved atrocities including the use of chemical and biological warfare. Japan is protected by the United States, and the U.S. has air and naval bases on the Japanese islands and Okinawa, but should Taiwan fall, Japan’s position would be more...
...should Taiwan fall, Japan’s position would be more precarious, and the Chinese would certainly push them very hard to terminate U.S. bases and other operations in Japan.

about where all this is headed, regarding with trepidation America’s apparent lack of clarity, and demonstrated unreliability, especially in the wake of Afghanistan. There are important voices in Japan saying Japan should not follow the U.S. strategic lead.

A Status Quo Power

A status quo power must maintain peace and security, which for the U.S. means demonstrating that it can and will insist on open sea lanes of communications, start with negotiations not force, and a responsible approach to interstate relations. When China illegally seized the islands and reefs in the South China Sea, the U.S. did not make threats, but began freedom of navigation exercises. However, even sailing ships past heavily defended Chinese outposts is becoming precarious, as China has chased away American ships and aircraft and may have caused damage to a U.S. submarine, a Seawolf class nuclear attack submarine, that may have been fed false sonar information leading to an accident that injured seamen and forced the submarine to the surface where it limped back to Guam (as a nuclear submarine showing up in Japan is too politically complicated). Things are not much better further north and east. For example American patrols in the Taiwan Straits consistently anger the Chinese.

What Should the U.S. Do?

American leaders can try to maintain the status quo as far as possible by continuing sea patrols, showing the flag in friendly ports and carrying out exercises with allies and friends to remind China that the U.S. intends to remain a player in the region. Unfortunately, the status quo cannot be maintained for very long in this manner, partly because China keeps growing more powerful and aggressive, partly because our allies will realign with China at least as a stopgap as America’s power fades, and partly because they cannot depend on Chinese patience.

There are tensions within China in at least two crosscutting ways: in the economy, caused by heavy speculation and corruption, something that has never disappeared in China’s history; and between an assertive military class and civilian authority that could translate into a leadership conflict unless the military is palliated. For the U.S., this can mean a breakout by Chinese authorities who decide that the best way to solve internal problems is to externalize them while, at the same time, exploiting both Chinese nationalism and ancient hatreds.

Obviously, it is in the U.S. interest to try and block a devolving situation if that is possible, but the issue is how to change the game effectively enough to push back on evolving and enlarging Chinese threats?

When the Pentagon ran its war games and simulations, its framework was always the U.S. as the single factor intervening to save Taiwan. There is some truth in looking at the problem that way because in fact, there is no other framework at present where the U.S. can ally with others to strengthen deterrence.

Unlike Europe, where NATO has been a successful counterbalance to Soviet, and now Russian power, in Asia there is no such thing. It is also significant that the strength of our partners in the region is far below what is desirable. That is what happens when the U.S. is the dominant leader regionally; the same happened in Europe (hence big countries such as Germany irresponsibly underfunded their military and underinvested in defense).

An Asia Command Structure

Japan has a tiny defense budget and almost no army (the fact that it is called a “self-defense force” is a tipoff).

Taiwan has spent less than it could have, its excuse being that the U.S. is its only source of defense equipment other than France in the past, delayed and often refused to provide front line equipment. For example, the Taiwan Navy,
Guppy-2 class U.S. diesel submarines from the 1950’s, and two ailing Dutch submarines from the mid-1980’s. One is under refurbishment this year, and another is barely operational. Taiwan is getting new F-16s which are far better than the old ones that they got from President George W. Bush in 1992 which, to the degree possible, are in being upgraded with new radars and electronics. Even its home-built F-CK-1 fighter jets were deliberately underpowered and limited in range by the Pentagon in league with the State Department.

Had the Washington been serious, it would have sold F-35s to Taiwan, built modern submarines for the ROC Navy, and provided air defense cruisers based on the AEGIS system.

There are some bright spots. With upgraded and new F-16s, Taiwan can inflict damage on the Chinese air force and sink Chinese ships if it must; Japan has F-35s that can operate as air superiority aircraft against the PLAF (China’s Air Force). The U.S. could, and should, move F-22s to Japan, because the F-22 can act as a deterrent. It is the aircraft China is trying to emulate in its stealth fighter bomber, the J-20, but is not there yet. Likewise, the U.S. can move AEGIS air defense cruisers and destroyers into a regular patrol around Taiwan, making it clear that China will have to face the latest in U.S. air defense missiles in the form of SM-3 Block IIs and SM-6s, which are interceptor missiles supported by AEGIS and by advanced radars onboard these ships.

The Missing Ingredient

The missing ingredient is a common command and control system shared by the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan. NATO’s Command Structure (NCS) is the backbone of the European alliance. It is comprised of permanent multinational headquarters at the strategic, operational, and component levels of command, distributed geographically and commonly funded. It offers the opportunity to all allies to participate in, and contribute to, the command and control of all alliance operations, missions, and activities across all military domains. It allows forward deployed forces to operate in a coordinated manner and assures that there is logistical support, adequate supplies, and reinforcements.

A key advantage of a shared command system is that ports, harbors, and airfields can be shared. This facilitates supporting Taiwan and gives the Taiwanese an option to use facilities in Japan and Okinawa. Even more important, it means that China may be able to attack Taiwan’s airfields and harbors, but China would find it far more difficult if many other facilities outside Taiwan were part of the equation, including aircraft and ships from the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan.

It is clear beyond any doubt that for the U.S. to gain a force multiplier and to have an effective way to deter China, an Asia Command Structure (ACS) starting with the U.S., Japan, and Taiwan is essential.

Can Washington Get Its Act Together?

So far, at least, the current administration has not put forward a coherent policy on China; previous administrations didn’t either. All were kicking the can down the road, permitting American industry to make money in China, and hoping business would somehow deter China from hasty regional military action. Even now there are voices, even in The Wall Street Journal suggesting that China isn’t really a threat – it is all just bluster.

In short, Washington is combining wishful thinking and the same failed approach that Nixon and Kissinger tried to follow toward the USSR – it was called détente, but it was not détente where the U.S. provided technology and money to the Soviets. China is expanding its nuclear arsenal and inflating its military in ways that is dangerous and threatening.

The bottom line is that voices must be raised to push the administration to see the seriousness of the danger and implement meaningful programs to push back against the danger ahead. Setting up an Asia Command Structure would be a good place to start.

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Facing China

An inFOCUS interview with CLAUDIA ROSETT

Claudia Rosett is a former staff writer and editor for The Wall Street Journal and a Foreign Policy Fellow at the Independent Women’s Forum. She has contributed to The New York Times, The Weekly Standard, and other publications, and has testified before the U.S. Senate and House. Her work has focused China and Hong Kong, North Korea, Iran, and the UN. She received an Overseas Press Club Citation for Excellence in recognition of her on-the-scene reporting of the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989. In 1994, she broke the full story of North Korean labor camps in the Russian Far East, reporting from the camps. inFOCUS Quarterly Editor Shoshana Bryen had the privilege of speaking with her recently.

inFOCUS: Let’s start with Hong Kong. No one even mentions it much anymore, but what can you tell us about what’s happened there? Was the Apple Daily raid a turning point?

Claudia Rosett: The raid was one more in a long line of abuses. China has effectively stripped away the rule of law and the rights and freedoms that it promised to Hong Kong under treaty with Britain in 1984. That’s all gone. Even before the protests of 2019 there were problems, including the kidnapping of Hong Kong book sellers who were offering books the Chinese Communist Party cadres wanted banned. China had been grinding Hong Kong down for some time, but it was the threat of a legal amendment that would have allowed extradition of Hong Kong citizens to China that sparked the huge protests of 2019, which then turned into protests more broadly about the deprivation of liberties.

In mid-2020, while the world was preoccupied with the coronavirus pandemic, China struck back, dealing a mortal blow to Hong Kong’s freedoms by imposing a “National Security Law” that, in effect, empowers the administration to criminalize any form of dissent or pretty much any behavior, they dislike. This includes activities that in Hong Kong previously qualified as normal, such as free assembly and free speech. Elections to the legislature were postponed for a year, while pro-democracy lawmakers were run out of office, some arrested, and a system already tilted toward Beijing’s flunkies was tipped to the point of no return. Pro-democracy books have been pulled from schools and library shelves, Hong Kongers have been arrested for peacefully holding up blank placards, Apple Daily – a clarion voice for freedom – has been shut down, and its founder and publisher, democracy advocate Jimmy Lai, has been locked up in prison for activities such as attending a Tiananman anniversary vigil and “inciting” others to do so.

The so-called National Security Law was concocted in Beijing, passed in Beijing, and imposed on Hong Kong as an addition to the mini-constitution, or Basic Law, that governs Hong Kong. It starts out promising good things - respect for human rights. But then it lays down conditions both vague and draconian, supplanting Hong Kong’s long-established system of justice with conditions under which these rights are stripped away, annihilated, blurred into meaninglessness. Authorities in Hong Kong now wield vast discretionary powers, basically accountable to Beijing, not to the people of Hong Kong. They have been using these powers to sweep up a lot of the most prominent democracy advocates. There were thousands of arrests during the 2019 demonstrations for democracy, and it just keeps rolling on, silencing major voices for freedom and basic rights; jailing, threatening and driving some into exile.

It’s a very bad sign that China is joining the executive body for Interpol. China claims people living abroad can offend the National Security law without ever setting foot in Hong Kong, and has issued arrest warrants for a number of people in places as far afield as Washington and London. That isn’t about “national security,” but about the Communist Party trying to ensure that nobody, anywhere, does anything Party doesn’t want them to do.

For many years, Hong Kong’s pro-democracy activists would come to Washington and ask Congress, the State Department and the White House to support them in their requests and demands for the freedoms and democratic representation that China had promised as terms of the 1997 British handover. Under the National Security Law that is now treated as criminal. In fact, one of the first arrest warrants they issued was for someone originally from Hong Kong, but now an American citizen working and living in Washington. What if someone who might have done something the Communist Party of China didn’t like in relation to Hong Kong travels to, say, Russia, to the Middle East, or to any place that might be inclined to help China’s communist regime?

One more very important thing about this law is that it established that China’s internal security services would operate in Hong Kong. That had been going on, covertly, for a long time, but it became an open part of the procedure. You now have the People’s Republic of China, the Communist Party, directly involved in running security services in Hong Kong.

F: We in the United States saw all of this. If you wanted to see
it, you could see it. What has the U.S. done to help?

CR: The U.S. has said a number of things. Laws were passed and penalties levied to try and hold China accountable for Hong Kong. The U.S. stripped Hong Kong of its special trade status and did various other things to express unhappiness.

But there was very little backup. For President Biden, the first big moment should have been the first big meeting that Secretary of State Tony Blinken, and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, had in March, in Alaska, with China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, and a high ranking member of the communist party. Blinken and Sullivan began by raising perfectly valid concerns about China – the genocide in Xinjiang, the abuse of Hong Kong, and so on. China bit back ferociously with a torrent of propaganda, accusing the U.S. of being an old, washed up, defunct relic whose time was past, and a dreadful place to be.

Apparently, our envoys hadn’t anticipated this. They really didn’t do much to rebut it, let alone turn the tables on China’s regime and its atrocious treatment of its own people.

Then, under President Biden, there was America’s humiliating retreat from Afghanistan in August. That sent a signal to China that they really don’t need to pay a lot of attention to what we say, threaten, or promise to defend. For all the valor of our military, they saw us, under Washington’s orders, turn and run.

IF: Do the Chinese take their cues from where we leave, they come?

CR: That’s a good way to put it. But it’s not only where we actually leave. They also look for where we are weak, where they can push or gain ground. We’re seeing this playing out all over Africa right now. They want the resources, they want the votes at the UN, they want influence where it’s easy to get. They’re an immensely corrupting influence in places where corruption is already a big problem. And they have no scruples about buying up a despot who can give them quick access to influence.

The Timetable

CR: China is looking for anything anywhere: diplomatically, territory, anything. And, while there is debate over exactly what triggered the timing in Hong Kong, Xi Jinping clearly has a timetable and he’s proceeding at speed. With Hong Kong, he didn’t want this uppity, free enclave of people who understood how democracy works and demanded it. He dealt with that.

The protests were brought on in 2019 by threat of an extradition law, but then came the National Security Law – that process was already in the works. Everything is framed as helping provide safety and stability for people. We just heard that same phrase from U.S. Defense Secretary, Lloyd Austin – I cringe because when China says that, it means conquest. When we say it, what are we talking about? We don’t have right now a real vision and plan.

The Uyghurs

IF: One place China doesn’t have to rely on somebody else’s forbearance to make inroads is in Xinjiang. Why did the government choose genocide for these people?

CR: China, since the communists took over, has a horrible history of camps, of places where they just “disappear” people. They call it the Laogai, and when they send somebody there, it’s just as horrendous as you might think. Think Gulag Archipelago; China has that, and they have for a long time. With the Uyghurs, in particular, there are two things.

One is, Xinjiang occupies what China’s Communist Party regards as an important node in building the Belt and Road project – the big trade (and debt-trap) network that Xi Jinping initiated in 2013, a year after he became General Secretary of the Communist Party, the year he took the title of President. While it might seem fanciful right now, China is building ports in places like Pakistan, in Cambodia. They want to bring trade up and in and out of Western China.

Xinjiang is potentially a hub. It’s rich in resources. It connects to Central Asia. We think of it as way out there somewhere, but China sees it as a place it wants
to hook up with other footholds abroad. For that, Beijing doesn’t want a population that’s going to make trouble.

The other main reason is that the Communist Party does not want any challenges to power, and that means no latitude for other ideologies, religions, anything that might challenge one-party rule. They’ve been persecuting Falun Gong for decades now.

Officially, they pay lip service to things like the Catholic church, but it’s a front. And Uyghurs don’t worship the communist party, they worship a Muslim God. That’s not permissible.

There was the pretext in the beginning about terrorism emanating from the Islamic world. It is, of course, a real problem. But China translated that into, “We’re going to just destroy this whole ethnic and religious culture.” That’s what’s going on in Xinjiang. Because it’s within their borders, they can easily do it and it’s very hard for people to document exactly what’s happening.

That’s the bottom line. China’s Communist Party is neutering anything that might challenge its power, and in Xinjiang, that means genocide. They’re rubbing out the Uyghur culture, and killing and imprisoning Uyghurs as they do it, to do it. In Hong Kong, they are destroying a great culture of freedom.

And look at the rest of China, the part that would seem to be the privileged part of China, Han Chinese. Remember what we saw last year when the virus broke out in Wuhan. They were welding people into their homes. They had a lockdown of a kind we have not even begun to imagine.

Liu Xiaobo, China’s Nobel Laureate died in 2017. He spent the last years of his life in prison, paroled only because he was dying of cancer. For what did he win the Nobel prize? For saying there should be pluralism in China.

It goes back to Mao, but Tiananmen in 1989 is what Americans remember. Protesters were asking for a greater say in their government, for more accountability. They built a Statue of Liberty – Lady Liberty. The Chinese Communist Party brought in the army to kill them.

**iF: What should the United States do?**

**CR:** First we have to recover faith in ourselves. We’re a great country. We’ve done amazing things. The post-WWII Pax Americana was extraordinary, but it is fading away. The withdrawal from Afghanistan was a devastatingly dangerous event. The message was, we would not stand up for people we’d backed – for our allies, for our principles. That we’ll just cut and run.

We need to reverse that. The question is how do you build on one thing to get to the next?

The immediate issue is the Iranian nuclear program. It’s imbecilic to think that this is going to be resolved diplomatically at a negotiating table in Vienna or anywhere else. It won’t be.

What the Iranians have experienced for decades at this point is that we don’t really hurt them except with sanctions and they’re good at getting around sanctions and China is very good at helping them. It boils down to Iranian oil for Chinese money and wares, including weapons.

There is a desperation with the Biden administration to get back into what was always a terrible nuclear deal. And it wasn’t ever going to stop Iran from getting the bomb. At most, it was going to defer the problem until

President Obama left office in 2017.

**The Olympics Games and the NBA**

**iF:** The administration has announced a diplomatic boycott of the Olympic games. What happens when you get to the Opening ceremony and the U.S. flag isn’t there? Will Xi see that as an affront to himself and to China?

**CR:** To go to the Olympics, to do anything that helps China’s celebration of itself as hosting the Olympics, is a bad idea. They should never have been awarded the Olympics in the first place and these winter games should have been taken away when evidence came out of genocide in Xinjiang. They should have been taken away with what happened in Hong Kong, with China’s disappearance of its outspoken star tennis player Peng Shuai, with any of the tell-tale horrors that provide a window on Xi’s communist rule.

China’s propaganda endlessly proclaims that China is ascendant, the rising power, the model of development, the way of the future, and then denounces America. They’re doing it in spades right now. The idea is to have a milestone and say, “China has now hosted both the summer Olympics (in 2008) and now the winter Olympics. China is the power at the center of the 21st century universe.”

And the US Olympic Committee is still planning that our athletes will go and compete. We should be out of there entirely. Everything and anyone we send to underwrite or compete in those Olympics dignifies them. These are not the Olympics that you grew up with, unless you lived through the 1930s and saw the Nazi Olympics in Berlin.

**iF:** In 1936, we didn’t know the full extent of what was coming next. In this case, we know much more much earlier.

**CR:** These will be a very strange Olympics.
in any case. China is not allowing foreign spectators, only Chinese mainlanders. So, this is Xi Jinping’s party, he controls the scene. We shouldn’t be there.

Of course, it is the decision of the US Olympic Committee, but President Biden and his team have a lot of clout. They have the bully pulpit. Even at this late date, I’d like to see the Biden administration pressuring the International Olympic Committee to move the Olympics from Beijing.

They delayed them a year in Japan over the virus. There’s a far stronger case for the IOC to say, “We find brutal repression at least as repugnant and dangerous as the virus that came out of Wuhan. We’re going to move these Olympics, or at least delay them till the day China has a government worthy of hosting them.”

That would require the fall of the Communist Party, but okay. Wait until then and THEN have the Olympics in China.

The Disappeared

**iF:** Peng Shuai disappeared – so have other people.

**CR:** Anyone who becomes in some way a rival or a threat or a problem for China’s ruling communist party tends to disappear. We saw this happen with In 2017, with a Chinese tycoon staying at the Four Seasons hotel in Hong Kong. He was simply picked up in the middle of the night by Chinese security and disappeared. They rolled him out of the Four Seasons hotel.

Jack Ma, a Chinese tycoon who ran the immensely famous, successful Alibaba was taken down after he gave a speech critical of China’s financial regulators.

Anytime someone creates or runs something that gets so big that it’s a threat to the central control of the communist party, they choke it off. The Chinese ride hailing service, Didi, was just brought to heel. It’s like a mob boss, only with nuclear weapons, running a country of 1.4 billion people.

Remember there was a Chinese official running Interpol in 2018. China abruptly “disappeared” him. They summoned him back China, and sent Interpol a message that he would not return.

The Military Requirement

**iF:** Would an economic alliance – something like the TPP that includes the United States and our Asian allies – make the Chinese nervous and thereby be good for us?

**CR:** Yes. Something, anything, that basically gathers up friends of the United States and says, “We’re going to have a framework for cooperating, and China is not part of it.” But behind it you need military muscle to enforce anything you set up diplomatically. The rise of a totalitarian, malign China has gone beyond the point where diplomatic deals and trade deals alone are likely to make the changes we seek.

We need deterrence, which means a military well beyond what the Biden administration is funding and building. We need to be looking at what we do to ensure that they know we have a defense and a response. We need to rebuild our military so that China understands it is unlikely to outgun us. We need to be able to fight a two front war if we need to. Then trade deals would have a much greater chance of success.

The AUKUS [Australia, United Kingdom, U.S.] alliance is the best thing the Biden administration has done, though just a start. The U.S. and Britain will work with Australia to develop and build an Australian nuclear submarine fleet, to coordinate with our military forces. This is a very good idea, though the announcement was badly handled by the administration, which offended the French by failing to mention to them that they’d lost their deal to supply Australia with diesel-powered submarines.

We already have submarines patrolling the Pacific – American submarines – but China looks at Australia, a resource-rich sparsely inhabited continent, and licks about eco-fuels and uniforms.

China is building hypersonic missiles, which it tested this summer. These are missiles designed to defeat U.S. air defenses. We need to be looking at what we do to ensure that they know we have a defense and a response. We need to rebuild our military so that China understands it is unlikely to outgun us. We need to be able to fight a two front war if we need to. Then trade deals would have a much greater chance of success.

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CR: Yes. If we are not a strong presence in the Western Pacific, Japan doesn’t have much backup. Japan sits on the front line, sometimes called our unsinkable aircraft carrier. And Japan is a democracy. That was one of the great outcomes of victory in World War II. Japan is looking with great alarm as China has been jockeying over Japanese islands that China claims.

The Japanese are an important, powerful, major ally, and we should be coordinating with them, and with Taiwan. Japan has a very strong interest in the defense of Taiwan, which is part of the island chain that China is just trying to overrun. And anything we can do to coordinate with Taiwan, Japan, Australia, countries that really have something to bring to the defense of a free world order, the better. It’s immensely important.

**Conclusion**

**iF:** If our goal was to make China feel brittle and feel insecure about its future – we know about their food problems and debt issues – what could we do to encourage the Chinese to feel that life for them is not going to be the yellow brick road?

CR: Many Chinese know how bad things are. China’s overall economy is a big mess, if you take a close look. We read, depending on how you measure it, that they are outstripping the United States. In fact, among the 1.4 billion people, just under a hundred million are members of the Communist Party, and they do pretty well. For most of the rest, life is not so good.

Per capita income in China is nothing remotely close to our own. If you really want to see income inequality, look to China. They have miserable poverty there. Not as miserable as it was after Mao begged the country with communist collectives, that’s clear. But most mainland Chinese have neither wealth nor freedom.

Important point: one of the most vital riches for human beings is freedom. Some economic freedom was developing in China under Deng Xiaoping’s reforms, but under Xi, even that is being drained away. They now have a social credit system in which the government uses technology to monitor and measure everything that they do. There is surveillance everywhere. Everything gets tracked.

What can be done is something that the Trump administration, to its credit, was doing quite well, especially during its last two years. There was a series of speeches from Trump officials exposing China’s failings and deceptions in real detail. Spectacularly good speeches about China’s pilfering, looting, spying – that led to shutting down the Chinese Consulate in Houston – subverting world trade systems, coopting universities, corroding legal systems. They all pointed out how dangerous China was becoming.

One of the most obnoxious statements to come out of the Biden administration was White House Press Secretary, Jen Psaki saying in response to a question about China’s testing of a hypersonic missile, “We welcome stiff competition.” That is treating a very serious threat as if they were making better sneakers.

It is one of the reasons no one from America should be going to the Olympics. We should be saying, “Here’s how bad it is.” People in China will get to hear about that. There are ways. People around the world will hear about it.

**iF:** Could there be a revolution against the Chinese government?

CR: I would not bank on it, nor would I write it off.

There’s tremendous unhappiness inside China. You see protests every so often. For instance, there was a big protest in Wuhan, in the summer of 2019 just few months before the virus emerged. They were protesting the installation of huge waste incinerators. But China’s authorities have brutal ways of shutting these down. The Tiananmen slaughter of 1989 is the standout example, but the repression carries on, in so many ways, off camera. China’s communist rulers do not scruple to kill, imprison, brutalize, and silence people in order to block any hint of dissent. Will there be a rebellion deposing communist party? Don’t bank on that. There are people writing thrillers these days that posit a coup in China. I’m not so hopeful.

China’s communist regime is preparing for war, and pursuing a course ever more likely to ignite it. Terrible to consider, but that looks a lot more likely right now than a revolution inside China that could succeed in overthrowing 72 years of communist tyranny – though I do believe many of China’s people privately desire greater freedom.

**iF:** The world looked equally threatening in the late ‘70s. And then Reagan was elected. We never thought Soviet communism was going to collapse. But it did, without a shot.

CR: If we get leadership in America that approaches China the way that Reagan approached the Soviet Union, there is a chance that you could bring down the communist party of China. But it would take determination, backbone, and perseverance by the United States.

**iF:** Claudia Rosett, Thank you.
Large-scale Chinese and Russian naval forces carried out their first joint sea patrol and exercise October 17-23, 2021. It included maneuvers and live-fire drills in the Sea of Japan and Western Pacific. It had a joint naval ship formation that included 10 Chinese and Russian warships and six carrier-based helicopters. They navigated more than 1,700 nautical miles around Japan from north to south through two Japanese straits. It seemed to declare the Free and Open Japanese Straits and the West Pacific via the Free and Open Indo-Pacific.

Chinese maneuvers forced Japan’s Air Self-Defense Forces (Air-SDF) to scramble more than one hundred times in October, an indication of how closely the Taiwan crises are related security of Japan.

Taiwan and Japan

Taiwan is Japan’s nearest neighbor both geographically and psychologically, and the increasing pressure by Beijing on Taiwan is influencing critical areas of Japanese national security thinking. The Taiwan Strait is 81 miles (130 km) wide. However, the westernmost inhabited island of Japan, the Yonaguni Island, is located only 67 miles (108 km) off the east coast of Taiwan. In Beijing’s attempt to attack Taiwan, the People’s Liberation Army (PLAA) would likely pass through Japanese international waters such as the channel of the Yonaguni Island and the Miyako Strait between Okinawa and Miyako Island to besiege Taiwan.

Furthermore, China would need to try to secure its command of the sea and air in those straits to attack Taiwan from its east coast side to block relief. Even today, the PLA’s fleets, including its aircraft carrier Liaoning and several fighters, bombers, and ISR aircraft, constantly pass the Miyako Strait – like lobbyists passing up and down K Street in Washington – just under the nose of U.S. forces in Okinawa. They also navigate often through the international water between Taiwan and Yonaguni Island.

Japan supports Taiwan as much as possible on the civilian side, including having sent a more than 4.5 million doses of COVID-19 vaccines on six air transports. Taiwan repaid the gift with 1,000 oxygen enrichers and 10,000 pulse oximeters to Japan. The President of the Republic of China (Taiwan), Tsai Ing-wen, called it, “The circulation of goodwill between Taiwan and Japan.” In addition, the Japanese government has said it would fully support Taiwan’s application for membership in the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), which Beijing is also trying to enter. Believing Taiwan should also be a member of international organizations, the Japanese House of Councilors unanimously passed the resolution to support Taiwan participating in World Health Organization (WHO) in June 2021.

Crisis of the Alliance

The wavering of the U.S. administration on the issue of Taiwan is creating confusion in this growing alliance, however, and more critically, sending the wrong message to Beijing. Japanese security policy on the emergency of Taiwan assumes the operation of U.S. Forces protecting Taiwan. Since Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) are not permitted to engage in acts of war under the Constitution of Japan, the JSDF’s function at the crisis will be focused on logistics, ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), and relief/rescue support of U.S. operations.

The question of increasing Japan’s defense budget is perpetual, as it is in most democratic countries, and is generally under pressure from the U.S. to purchase more American equipment. Clearly, a well-equipped JSDF will be a deterrent to the PLA, but it is deterrence without rights of belligerency, an odd concept for Americans. The Japanese Constitution says, “No army, navy, air force, or another war potential will ever be authorized, and no rights of belligerency will ever be conferred upon the States.” It follows, then, that the Japanese defense budget is a pledged cost of the alliance with the U.S. Even so, Japan-JSDF shouldn’t hesitate to suggest activities to the U.S. regarding what roles and operations they can undertake.
It is estimated that 70 percent of the people would be evacuated from Taiwan if Beijing attacked the island. It would be critical for Japan to receive some of them, including their business, industries, and financial institutions, to allow them to continue their lives and business activities. One of Japan's considerations would be the establishment of an ROC provisional government in Japan. The National Palace Museum, located in Taipei, has a permanent collection of nearly 700,000 pieces of ancient Chinese imperial artifacts and artworks, making it one of the largest of its type in the world. The collection encompasses thousands of years of Chinese art history from the Neolithic Age to the modern. As Chiang Kai-shek did when he escaped to Taiwan in 1949, those collections should be under shelter outside Taiwan, protected from Beijing's violence – in Japan.

**Beijing’s Two Aims – Taiwan and the Western Pacific**

There are two reasons for Beijing’s determination to unify Taiwan with the mainland. First, to complete the revolution of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), ending the fight against Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Party of China (NPC), that has been militarily dormant since 1949.

Theoretically, the PRC is under the guidance of the CCP. Therefore, what Beijing’s Constitution called “One country, two systems” should be understood by other countries as “One party, two systems.” However, today, almost seventy-three years after the ceasefire, ROC is an independent and undoubtedly democratic state. It is conceptually a part of China but not part of the CCP or the mainland of China’s superordinate concept of Beijing. The people of Taiwan do not belong to Beijing or the CCP. Even so, Beijing is enormously annoying to it.

Second, Beijing might seek to control the Western Pacific. This is the more critical issue for Japan. Beijing will seek hegemony in the Pacific west of Hawaii, so-called the Third island chain. The CCP’s dream is to divide west and east of the Pacific between China and the U.S.

**Dividing the Seas**

Beijing’s three fleets, the North Sea Fleet (NSF) in Qingdao, East Sea Fleet (ESF) in Ningbo, and South Sea Fleet (SSF) in Zhanjiang, are best understood by looking at the island chains. The First Island Chain is principally comprised of the Kuril Islands, the Japanese Archipelago, the Ryukyu Islands, Taiwan, the northern Philippines, and Borneo, and those include the South China Sea, within the Nine-Dash Line, as well as the East China Sea west of the Okinawa Trough. The First Island Chain is the Great Wall against Chinese sea power.

The defense of Taiwan does not only support Taiwan’s security from Beijing. If we lose Taiwan, it means a possibility that the U.S. will lose the West Pacific. It should be recognized as one of the more critical strategic meanings of Taiwan. If Beijing takes Taiwan, it will get free access to the West Pacific from the east coast of Taiwan. It will have a mega impact on the strategy of the U.S. and its alliance. One of the core interests of Beijing is to open the great wall to the NSF and the ESF to control the West Pacific.

Even now, there are some Chinese activities in Okinawa and Beijing’s unlimited expansionism might actually claim the island one day. It would want to run the US Fleet out of Okinawa to complete its command of sea and air at the Miyako Strait for free access to the Western Pacific.

**History of ROC**

Taiwan has been tossed about between China and Japan for several centuries. With the treaty after the First Sino-Japanese War, the island became a dependency of Japan. The Republic of China was initially founded on the mainland on January 1, 1912, by Sun Yat-sen, following the Xinhai Revolution. The Nationalist Party of China (NPC) has been in existence since 1921, longer than the CCP. Sun Yat-sen became the first leader of the NPC in 1919 and was the provisional first president of the ROC and the first leader of the Kuomintang.

Therefore, he was the "Father of the Nation" in both ROC and PRC, especially the "Forerunner of the Revolution" in
PRC for his instrumental role in overthrowing the Qing dynasty during the Xinhai Revolution. Sun is unique among 20th-century Chinese leaders for being widely revered in both mainland China and Taiwan.

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In 1945, Taiwan was placed under the Republic of China (ROC) and in 1949 the ROC government moved there when Mao Zedong captured the mainland.

Grand Wisdom and Virtue

Grand Wisdom (the Goddess Sophia) and Virtue as moral excellence are the most strongly emphasized principles of innate disposition as a sovereign in the Orient, and Chinese Emperors and leaders have been required to have those senses since ancient times. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party, seems to be an outstanding and capable apparatchik of the CCP and a crafty schemer. However, he appears to lack the disposition of a great leader like Sun Yat-sen, Mao Zedong, and even Deng Xiao Ping.

Xi Jinping seems to be the contemporary “Father of the Nation” with attaining the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” or “the Chinese Dream” as he said in 2012, taking solid measures in many directions both internally and externally, on land and at sea. But it appears he doesn’t have the philosophical leanings and virtues of Sun or Mao. Expansionism without philosophy is just “Wolf Warrior Diplomacy.”

The CCP approved a resolution on its history and achievements by the 6th General Secretary of the CCP’s 19th Central Committee (6th General Secretary) on November 11, 2021. It appears to be a further consolidation of the authority of Xi Jinping with the cult of personality. And it looks like a self-affirmation that is far from a summary of the party’s 100-year history.

Reflecting on the tragedy of the Cultural Revolution (1966-76) due to the excessive concentration of power in Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping stipulated in a historic resolution of 1981 that “any form of the cult of personality is prohibited” in the party code. However, at a press conference on November 12, 2021, CCP officials justified the “cult of personality” and added, “General Secretary Xi gives a lot of people hope, and has not embarrassed the core of the party. ‘The People’s Leader,’ has become the supreme commander of the PLA, the era has requested him, history has chosen him.”

Even before that, in 2019, Chun Han Wong, a staff reporter for The Wall Street Journal, wrote, “In party parlance, honorifics are tokens of power and the title of lingxiu, or ‘leader,’ is most closely associated with Mao, who was known as the ‘great leader.’”

Xi emphasized at a roundtable discussion on November 12, 2021, “The world faces the emergency that has not experienced past one 100 years. We meet the key period to realize the great revival of people of China.” It is normal for a leader to stir up crises to help him lead the people, but Xi in fact faces difficult situations in every respect, including party politics.

There is no absolute monarch in the CCP. If Xi seeks to be such a monarch, the CCP might face the same fate as the Communist Party of the Soviet Union in 1991. The history of China has always been vicissitudes with endless intra-party strife and infighting. And leadership without virtue is barbarous. The West should be considering life post-Xi Jinping and post-the CCP. The misfortune of Xi Jinping will be he has not a prominent partner like Zhou Enlai.”

Beijing is escalating its tone of crisis more emotionally, nervously, and runs the risk of overreaction. Our “breath of air” vague messages that make the candle flicker will simply send the wrong message to them. The allies – Japan, the United States, and others – should send a clear message to Beijing that the critical situation on Taiwan and in the West Pacific that the CCP has caused will, in turn, cause catastrophic damage to the CCP regime.

Steps for the Future

In Northeast Asia, there are three military giants: the U.S., Russia, and China; and three economic giants: the U.S., China, and Japan. There are, however, sometimes considerable differences in perception between the U.S. and Asia, such as Japan, Taiwan, China, and even North Korea, which was not so during the era of the Pax Americana. At present, Northeast Asia faces difficulties with its security as China expands its influence, and intertwined relations in the region. It is essential to the region’s security and stability to consider its economic development by establishing a regional economic development institution, including Mongolia, Russian Far East, and North Korea.

Japan should take the initiative and take more of its role and responsibility for resolving the differences in perception among the allies, perhaps holding a practical tabletop exercise between the U.S. Forces, JSDF, and Taiwan Forces. And it will also be an essential work of Japan to mediate between the U.S. and North Korea, a separate subject, but critically important to American security as well. Japanese diplomacy shouldn’t be an accompaniment to U.S. policy, but an independent, complementary position. It will be required of Japan to strengthen its diplomacy.

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China: Inside and Out inFOCUS 27
Powering Innovation: Advancing America’s Battery Technology

by NADIA SCHADLOW, ARTHUR HERMAN, and BRADY HELWIG

Changing consumer preferences and government policies point toward widespread future adoption of electric vehicles (EVs). Advanced lithium batteries are the primary power source for EVs. Unfortunately, China dominates today’s battery supply chain, from the extraction and processing of critical minerals like lithium to the production, packaging, and recycling of battery cells. In today’s era of great power competition, control of the supply chains for advanced technologies such as lithium batteries will have a direct impact on national power. Advanced battery technology will go a long way toward determining economic leadership in the EV market. The automobile industry is one of America’s largest manufacturing sectors and accounts for some 3 percent of U.S. GDP.

But EVs and advanced batteries also have important military applications. EVs will function as mobile energy nodes on the battlefield, providing power for unmanned systems, communication links, electromagnetic warfare systems and more. These capabilities will help the U.S. military conduct more decentralized operations in contested regions. Beijing long ago predicted the strategic shift from fossil fuels to renewable energy sources and, in response, has spent years tightening its grip on the supply chains for this critical technology.

The U.S. must develop a national battery strategy that:

• Makes and encourages investments in mining, processing, battery production, and recycling. Given the strategic importance of batteries and their inputs, government support is necessary to build a robust American battery industry. Policymakers should leverage diplomatic and economic tools to work with friendly countries to ensure a sustained source of critical minerals, plus offer incentives for domestic mining and processing firms, cathode and anode manufacturers, and battery producers.

• Drives innovation in mineral substitutes, next-generation battery technologies, and manufacturing methods to minimize supply chain vulnerabilities and leapfrog Chinese suppliers. The U.S. must develop alternate battery chemistries to substitute for costly or scarce minerals, boost R&D for next-generation battery technologies and increase funding for improved manufacturing techniques for lithium-ion batteries.

• Uses DOD tools to strengthen the supply chain for military batteries, with a goal of putting new capabilities in the field. DOD must employ its policy tools to secure the supply chain for military-grade batteries, which are built to more extreme specifications than commercial versions.

• Invests in workforce development and talent programs across the supply chain. The U.S. should cultivate domestic battery talent by investing in educational opportunities, supplemented by foreign expertise where necessary.

Understanding the Supply Chain

The United States controls only a tiny fraction of the advanced battery supply chain. China dominates much of the mining and processing of critical minerals as well as cell manufacturing and battery assembly. These bottlenecks grant Beijing significant strategic leverage; given the CCP’s penchant for economic coercion, it is not difficult to imagine how China could weaponize the battery supply chain against the United States. The battery supply chain begins with the production of critical minerals, such as lithium and cobalt. Key metals must be extracted from mines, then chemically processed and refined in special facilities. These refined minerals are then used to create battery cells. Once cells are produced, they are combined to form modules, which are then wrapped into battery packs—a process that takes place in dedicated “megafactories.”

The last stage of the battery supply chain, recycling, comes about during the end-of-life cycle. Critical minerals make
up between 50 and 70 percent of the cost of an EV battery.

Currently, the United States lacks the capability to produce and refine many of these minerals, while China remains the leading global producer. In 2018, the U.S. Geological Survey released a list of thirty-five mineral commodities considered critical to the economic and natural security of the United States. That list includes most of the minerals considered critical to the production of lithium-ion batteries: cobalt, lithium, manganese, and graphite.

**Cobalt**: Under the CCP’s “Go Out” investment strategy, China has sought to secure critical minerals from around the world for its rapidly growing EV industry. This is evident in the global competition for cobalt production. Cobalt is one of the most potentially problematic inputs for lithium-ion batteries, as production is concentrated in politically unstable regions: almost 72 percent of the mined production of cobalt comes from the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). This is problematic due to humanitarian concerns, as reports suggest that child labor is still used in some Congolese cobalt mines.

While very little cobalt mining occurs domestically in China, Chinese companies have acquired stakes in foreign mines, particularly in the DRC, as well as Papua New Guinea and Zambia. Eight of the fourteen largest cobalt mines in the Congo are now Chinese-owned, accounting for more than half of the country’s output. Thanks to the equity positions Chinese companies have acquired in foreign mines, “Go Out” policy activities have reduced China’s reliance on cobalt imports from 97 percent to 68 percent.

In addition to investing in the foreign mining of cobalt, China dominates the upstream processes of cobalt supply. Cobalt must be chemically processed and refined before it can be used to make batteries. In 2019, China accounted for 82 percent of the chemical processing and refining of cobalt supply. Just three Chinese firms are responsible for 46 percent of the world’s total output.

**Lithium**: Lithium consumption for batteries has increased significantly in recent years, and as the world transitions toward EVs, demand for the mineral is expected to spike. A recent report from McKinsey & Company anticipates a 340 percent increase through 2050, with 79 percent of growth projected to come from battery demand. Today, most lithium mining is concentrated in Latin America and Australia; however, Chinese companies acquired mining operations in these countries to the point where they control much of the supply.

Chinese mining giant Tianqi Lithium, for instance, owns a 51 percent stake in the world’s largest lithium reserve, Australia’s Greenbushes mine. Ganfeng Lithium, another Chinese mining giant, completed a deal in 2019 to secure 50 percent of one of the world’s largest high-grade reserves at Mt. Marion mine in Australia. As a result of these efforts, China now holds direct or indirect control over 70 percent of the global lithium supply. Once mined, lithium, like cobalt, must be processed and refined in specialized facilities. China is also the dominant player in this step, refining 59 percent of the world’s lithium in 2019.

The U.S. has the potential to develop a lithium supply chain.

One American company, Albemarle, is among the world’s largest lithium companies and owns the only operational lithium mine in the United States. While sources of lithium are relatively abundant in North America—the U.S. has the fourth-largest reserves in the world—there are significant barriers for American companies associated with its extraction.

Many of these challenges are environmental and political: in January 2021, for instance, a second domestic lithium mine site was approved by the Trump administration, but it has faced stiff resistance from organized camps of environmental protesters and activists. Another hurdle is the lithium refining process: processing facilities are not only expensive, but they are also extremely energy-intensive, making it difficult for U.S. companies to set up domestic operations.

**Other Materials**: Other minerals necessary for lithium-ion EV batteries include graphite, manganese, and nickel. Graphite makes up the anode material in most lithium-ion batteries, but China dominates all aspects of this supply chain.
The United States has no choice but to reciprocate. Given the importance of batteries as a source of geopolitical leverage, as a crucial enabler of next-generation defense concepts, and as the key to competition for economic leadership in the EV industry, breaking Chinese bottlenecks in critical mineral production and battery manufacturing must be a strategic imperative for the United States. To break free of Chinese leverage, American policymakers must communicate and implement a national battery strategy that builds a domestic supply chain for advanced batteries, but this strategy must be approached through the lens of geopolitics. Such a strategy should include the four steps:

1. Provide U.S. government support for critical mineral mining and processing, battery and cell production, and battery recycling.

2. Offer additional U.S. government funding to boost innovation in cobalt- and graphite-less chemistries, next-generation batteries, and manufacturing techniques for lithium-ion batteries through targeted investments.

3. Create DOD initiatives to secure the supply chain for military-grade batteries, and

4. Invest in workforce and talent development programs.

Whether the United States can successfully implement and resource this strategy is another matter. Ultimately, this may be a question of will—establishing a more resilient battery supply chain will require years of sustained effort from dedicated policymakers. If the U.S. intends to win the battery race, re-framing energy policy as another front in the U.S.–China strategic competition is a crucial first step.
China From Inside the Trump White House

An inFOCUS interview with LTG KEITH KELLOGG, USA (Ret.)

LTG Keith Kellogg, USA (ret.) served as National Security Advisor to VP Mike Pence, and as Executive Secretary and Chief of Staff of the National Security Council in the Trump administration. He is the author of a new book, War by Other Means: A General in the Trump White House. inFOCUS had an opportunity to speak with him in December.

inFOCUS: Since in the 1970s, the U.S. has considered China a potential partner in the world; a responsible stakeholder, and we’ve done all kinds of things to help them. Was that a good idea? Is it something that changed over time?

Kellogg: Long answer to a short question, when it started it was probably a pretty good idea. But as time went on, we should have modified how we did business with them. It wasn’t until Donald Trump realized that they really had an economic hammer over us, limiting our economic responses, that we said, “Okay, this is the way they really are.”

That was compounded by what happened with COVID, when they were not open with us. We asked them many times to be open with us, to let us get into the Wuhan Institute of Virology, from which, frankly, there was at least an inadvertent release (of the virus). It was just a closed shop.

iF: Was there an element of watching the Chinese deal with their own people in the early days of COVID that made the administration unhappy about China?

Kellogg: Yes on that one. When it first started to break, Matt Pottinger, Deputy National Security Advisor to the president, came in. He’d been a Wall Street Journal reporter in Wuhan years ago when SARS first broke out. He told the president, “They’re not telling you the truth. They’re lying through their teeth about what’s going on.” He said, “Look, something’s happened at the Wuhan Institute of Virology, the BSL4 lab. They’re quarantining a city four times the size of London, using their military to do it. They’re creating and developing and manufacturing hospitals on a 24 hour basis and forcibly putting people in them. They’re not talking to us about it.”

At the same time, Bob Redfield, who is the CDC director, said he couldn’t even get hold of anybody in the Chinese CDC, which is important is because we were at the time trying to contain it. If we had realized what was happening, we could have gone to mitigation fairly fast.

The president got really frustrated with President Xi, so he talked to him. But he was not forthcoming even when we asked him to share. The president basically said, “Okay, these people are not friends of ours.” We saw that they didn’t help us by telling us what the issues were, and the problem was.

We were actually 30 to 60 days behind, and they did it deliberately.

iF: China has a lot of people in American universities and research institutions. Is this a time that we tell them all to go home? Is this when we say, “We can’t deal with you anymore”?

Kellogg: That should be at least an option. It’s harsh and I know that. But these people - the Chinese government, not Chinese people – the Chinese government is sending us messages and we’re not responding.

So maybe one of the messages we send back is, “We are not going to let you have your students come into the United States.” It’s a penalty, and an unfortunate penalty on students.

China and Taiwan

iF: In your military view, are we prepared for things that the Chinese might decide to do either in Taiwan or the Japanese straits or anywhere else? How are we doing militarily?

Kellogg: Great question. People forget that President Jimmy Carter abrogated the defense treaty with Taiwan on his own, and then Congress had to pass the Taiwan Relations Act, which allowed us to send them defensive materials for the country. But there is no defense treaty with Taiwan now.

Right now we could take actions to help the Taiwan government out, to make sure that they have a defensible island. But it’s not as easy as people may think. Taiwan Straits are 100 miles across. The only way China is going to get there is by using a pretty large amphibious invasion force. So, the U.S. might decide to park the USS Ronald Reagan in the middle of the Taiwan Straits for a while. Send a message to the Chinese that their provocation, their air provocations especially, into the Air Defense Identification (ADI) zone into Taiwan is unacceptable.

They put more airplanes into the Taiwan ADI in one day than they put in four-plus years of the Trump administration.
There was only one company in the world piece when people said, “it’s only the last right. The reason we sanctioned that last biggest mistakes was finishing up the there are those who think one of Merkel’s in hostage, which is why natural gas prices

Diplomatically, we could say, “Maybe it’s time we reconsider the One China Policy,” and then there’s no longer strategic ambiguity. There’s no ambiguity at all. Taiwan is a friend, it’s a democratically elected government. There are only 23 million of them, but we’re have to support them. This is a democratic nation that is considered a pariah by the UN, and yet you’ve got an authoritarian government in China that sits on the Security Council.

These overflights into ADI are not messages to Taiwan, they are to us and to the rest of the world, “Stay out of the Western Pacific, stay out of our backyard. We will make it really hard on you.” We have to stand up to that. And if we don’t, then over time they will take over Taiwan.

**Russia**

*If: In another part of the world, but in the same context, Russia now holds Europe’s energy supplies hostage. Is that the way they’re going to keep Europe out of Ukraine? Maybe the Europeans don’t want to deal with it because they’re concerned about it being cold in January? More messaging?*

**Kellogg:** That’s a fair assessment. In fact, there are those who think one of Merkel’s biggest mistakes was finishing up the Nord Stream II pipeline. I think that’s right. The reason we sanctioned that last piece when people said, “it’s only the last 20 miles” was that it was the hardest piece. There was only one company in the world that could do that deep work in the pipeline. So, we sanctioned it. So, they stopped. But now that they’ve got it, 80 percent of the natural gas coming into Germany comes out of Russia. And that’s being held hostage, which is why natural gas prices are so high in Germany now. They also cut out Ukraine, which used to be the transit point for natural gas that came through Russia. Now they get nothing. Russia is using it as a lever because that’s how Putin works, and he’s smart.

There’s also a military piece. Europeans just don’t want to stand up to the Russians any more than they do the Chinese. Putin knows that. And he is going to see that the United States is not going to stand up for Ukraine either, even though the Europeans want us to.

**If: What’s the degree of military cooperation between Russia and China?**

**Kellogg:** I don’t see that much. They’ve signed an agreement, but they’re very different countries with different leadership and governing styles. Their common thread is President Biden. They’re trolling Joe Biden. Trump kept them off guard by picking up the phone and calling them and he would actually separate them out. He’d call Putin and he was always very cordial with Putin; he also knew who he was dealing with. And would call Xi, and he would both keep them in but wouldn’t let them get together. Now they’ve gotten together because they both know that there’s a weak link and the weak link is the president. Putin and Xi are different, but they’re very similar in how they make decisions. And they’re very, very ruthless.

**Punishment as Policy**

*If: You wrote in your book about the US strike on the Syrian air base after they crossed our red line on chemicals, and also the strike on Soleimani. It was punishment as policy: you do something bad; you pay a price. Can that work in places that have serious military capabilities such as China or Russia, or does it just invite retaliation that’s going to lead us to an actual war?*

**Kellogg:** You have to ask yourself, “When we start going up the escalation ladder, where do we get off?” It might mean we’re going to go to war. But you have to make sure your adversary understands they’re going to pay an enormous price if they go to war, and we’ll pay a price too. But if this is where you want to go, you go.

One thing Donald Trump did was escalate so hard that a lot of people outside the White House said, “We have no idea where this guy’s going to do.” And that was exactly the response we wanted. We wanted Khomeini to think, “I’m next.” And he was. We told him, “We are coming after you next if we have to.” When we took out the airfield after Syria used sarin gas, Assad was next on the list. And he knew that. If you do that, they say, “Well, maybe I don’t want to go there, because he’s willing to pay a price.” You have to make a very hard, conscious decision and have the will to follow through.

**If: They have to believe that you will do the next thing.**

**Kellogg:** We did that with Trump, and it made everybody step back a bit. But I’d remind everybody that he was the first president in 28 years that did not start a major war. People said, “I don’t want to get in a fight with this guy.”

When the Russians were in Syria, they used a mercenary group called Wagner, run by one of Putin’s buddies. Three to four hundred of them crossed into an area where we were operating. We picked up the phone and told the Russians, “You’re encroaching on U.S. territory.” They said, “No, no, it’s not us.” So, we just unloaded on them. We killed over 200 Russians. We told the Russians, “Well, you said ‘It wasn’t you.’”

We sent a very, very strong message to Putin, “Don’t screw around with us because we’re going to make you pay a price.”

**Putting China on Notice**

*If: When you look at China now, not attaching this to politics, but as you look at the region now, what do you think the United States ought to be doing*
to put the Chinese on notice?

Kellogg: The first is economic, and that’s where we push back. The second is military. You’ve got to show the military response and it doesn’t have to be direct gun-tube-to-gun-tube. That’s the reason I mentioned parking the USS Ronald Reagan in the Taiwan Straits. You have to push that. You can’t afford to give up Taiwan, because once you give up Taiwan, the entire Western Pacific is wide open to what’s happening.

You’ve got the economic piece, you have the military piece, you have the cultural piece. You mentioned, earlier, sending Chinese students home.

And you have to get world opinion with you, which is why we should have held China accountable for the Wuhan virus. We were pretty darn sure it came out of there. They’re responsible. You need to have them pay a price and push back on them in every way you can. And hopefully you bring world opinion with you when you do that.

The Uyghurs are a cultural piece to me. And I’m shocked that the Muslim nations of the world haven’t risen up and pushed back on the Chinese, given what they’re doing in those camps. If it’s not genocide, it’s close to it. And nobody’s holding them accountable because they see China as having more strength than the United States. They say, “Why should I hitch my horse to your cart when I’m not too sure what you’re going to do?”

Kellogg: I don’t like using the Olympics in politics. I think it’s unfortunate. I was never in favor of what Carter did with the Moscow Olympics. The fact is the games should never have been put in China, but once they did it, I don’t want to penalize our sports men and women. I think it’s apples and oranges when you’re talking about the NBA and the Olympic sports. The NBA is taking a very active stance as a professional organization and most of their stuff is being made in China – plus the broadcast rights.

Concluded

Kellogg: Ours is a great nation. Our people are the heart and soul. I always remember reading the three words to the preamble of the Constitution, “We, the people.” And the strength of our nation is the people of our nation. We are really good and resilient. Sometimes I’m not too sure our government is as good and as resilient as the people. Too often, our government almost seems to say, “We’re going to get along, hold hands, and sing kumbaya.” No. We are a powerful nation, and we can use that power for good.

Kellogg: General Kellogg, thank you.
In June, media reported that TikTok’s U.S. privacy policy was updated to say the company “may collect biometric identifiers and biometric information as defined under U.S. laws, such as faceprints and voiceprints.” TikTok’s new policy also states it may “share all of the information we collect with a parent, subsidiary, or other affiliate of our corporate group.”

This poses enormous challenges for U.S. policymakers, ones that go to the heart of data collection in a globalized world. TikTok’s parent company is Beijing-headquartered ByteDance – one of China’s technology giants that specializes in artificial intelligence and machine learning-enabled social media platforms.

It is standard practice for global companies to acknowledge, via their privacy policies, that user data may be transferred, and when transferred, governed by foreign laws outside of their own jurisdiction. Chinese companies are not exceptional in this way. But what is exceptional is the way the Chinese Communist Party-state has used such laws – and other tools – to give it ultimate influence over digital technologies and the flow of data.

**Without Consent**

ByteDance’s own privacy policy says it will share data without the subject’s prior consent if “the data relates to national security, national defense, public security, or public health” or to “meet the requirements of relevant laws, regulations, procedures, and judicial proceedings.” The very definition of activities that allegedly harm national security is arbitrary at best in China. It effectively boils down to what the state wants, the state gets.

Such expectations are not abnormal for Chinese companies. They are the rule.

The Trump administration’s efforts to ban TikTok made headlines in 2020 – but the focus was on the wrong place. Discussion centered around whether the Chinese government could apply pressure on TikTok to censor or influence content in the United States. But the biggest worry should have been how TikTok’s data could be fed back into the data ecosystem being built by the Chinese government.

**China’s Data Ecosystem**

For the Chinese government, the global data it seeks can be harvested from multiple source types and through various means. An obvious source is malicious cyber intrusions—like the January 2021 Microsoft Exchange hack allegedly perpetrated by Chinese security agencies. But data can also be sourced from less visible and far more normalized means of data collection, which leverage legitimate downstream data access through digital supply chains.

Most obviously, data (such as location data) can enable the surveillance of specific individuals, like the Pegasus spyware found to target data from phones of “lawyers, human rights defenders, religious figures, academics, businesspeople, diplomats, senior government officials and heads of state.” But it also targets what is still a relatively isolated group of people.

Less obvious are examples like Global Tone Communication Technology (GTCOM), which is the subsidiary of a Central Propaganda Department-controlled conglomerate. It collects data through the machine translation products it offers – which are embedded in solutions provided by globally recognizable companies like Huawei. For GTCOM, “real-time listening and interpretation of cross-language data” helps it support China’s state security objectives by enabling “image recognition on top of text and voices” that can

...the biggest worry should have been how TikTok’s data could be fed back into the data ecosystem being built by the Chinese government.
Broad Collection of Personal Data

Technology companies from both the United States and China have a dominant presence across all key layers like software applications, storage and software infrastructure, hardware, and carrier infrastructure. The difference between the two is largely in the way China conceives of the data’s usefulness, which goes beyond traditional intelligence collection, as well as the ways China accesses data that extends into the normal operations of Chinese-based companies with a global presence.

Most of the 27 companies tracked by the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s (ASPI) recently relaunched Mapping China’s Tech Giants project are heavily involved in the collection and processing of vast quantities of personal and organizational data—everything from personal social media accounts to smart cities data to biomedical data.

Data applications like TikTok collect can be valuable for a number of reasons, such as for sentiment analysis tracking public feeling about particular events or issues. With this information, the data from platforms like TikTok not only reveals what messaging is effective or ineffective for particular demographics but also how effective it is, in the same way as U.K.-based political consulting firm Cambridge Analytica used the data of 50 million Facebook users to influence the 2016 U.S. presidential election—and, allegedly, the Brexit referendum.

Similarly, data can support a state in carrying out policies, including repression of marginalized groups. A Reuters investigation recently found that genomics company BGI Group used globally acquired data from its prenatal tests to run analysis, including for a study to detect mental illnesses that singled out repressed Tibetan and Uyghur minority groups.

China’s 2021 Data Security Law

China’s new Data Security Law, enacted in June, established that in China, data will be collected, stored, and processed in a manner that’s consistent with the party state’s paramount security concepts and objectives. As described in a new ASPI policy report I worked on, “Mapping China’s Tech Giants: Supply chains & the global data collection ecosystem,” the party’s Central State Security Commission is directed under the Data Security law to oversee “decision making and overall coordination on data security work, and researching, drafting and guiding the implementation of national data security strategies and relevant major guidelines and policies.”

This law applies not just to domestic data-handling activities but also to data-handling activity taking place “outside the territory of the PRC.” If those
activities are seen to “harm the state security, the public interest, or the lawful rights and interests of citizens” and organizations of China, they are to be pursued for legal responsibility “in accordance with law.”

Hong Kong authorities have already charged U.S. citizens and U.K. residents under the law for Hong Kong pro-democracy activities.

The Chinese authorities have not been shy about applying such laws related to national security globally. Hong Kong’s new state security law, enacted in June 2020, illustrates this. It criminalizes separatism, subversion, terrorism, collusion, and support for any of those activities by anyone in the world no matter where they are located. Hong Kong authorities have already charged U.S. citizens and U.K. residents under the law for Hong Kong pro-democracy activities.

In an age where information warfare and disinformation campaigns occur regularly across social media platforms and are among the greatest threats to social cohesion, data that is about public sentiment is as strategically valuable as data about more traditional military targets.

A Western Response

Western states urgently need an effective long-term framework for dealing with data security risks emerging from China and global operations of Chinese companies.

No assurances from any individual China-based company – no matter how loud or compelling they may be – can mitigate the political, security, and supply chain risks that now come with operating in China. The Chinese Communist Party has absolute power over China-based companies, which its laws – including the 2021 Data Security Law, 2015 National Security Law, 2016 Cybersecurity Law, and 2017 National Intelligence Law have reinforced. For companies that host massive amounts of data, especially data that originated from other parts of the world, including the United States, the risks are now even greater. Recent scrutiny of businessman Jack Ma and his company Alibaba as well as the investigation into ride-hailing app DiDi Chuxing further reinforces the party state’s willingness to exercise its power to rein in China’s technology giants and force them to adhere to the party state’s interests.

The order calls for evaluating risks of applications, such as TikTok, and if undertaken with careful consideration, it offers a more long-term and much needed policy reset.

Western policymakers are starting to adjust to this reality. The Biden administration, for example, issued an executive order in June protecting Americans’ sensitive data from foreign adversaries. The order calls for evaluating risks of applications, such as TikTok, and if undertaken with careful consideration, it offers a more long-term and much needed policy reset. The administration also revoked an executive order made by former U.S. President Donald Trump that banned WeChat and TikTok but did not go into effect after a series of court defeats.

The Biden administration has taken an important and necessary step. This is not a softer stance; it is shifting the focus away from individual companies and apps and, instead, is placing policy emphasis on the problems that stem from the companies’ operating environments.

This reset does not mean companies like TikTok will face less scrutiny. Instead, it points U.S. policy toward seeking out systemic risk rather than isolated cases of single firms, moving on from the short-term and unsustainable game of whack-a-mole that so many governments have played with Chinese technology companies, including in dealing with 5G and issues with Huawei.

The onus shouldn’t fall on governments alone. As I’ve argued in “Mapping China’s Tech Giants: Supply chains & the global data collection ecosystem,” organizations must know and assess the value of their data. They must also determine the value of that data to any potential party in their supply chain that may have access to it or that might be granted access. Risk needs to be understood in a way that keeps up with the current threat landscape, in which otherwise innocuous data can be aggregated to carry meaning that can undermine a society or individuals.

Samantha Hoffman, Ph.D., is a senior analyst at the Australian Strategic Policy Institute’s International Cyber Policy Centre. Reprinted with permission from www.ForeignPolicy.com
Chalk up one enormous, smashing political victory for President Joe Biden and his administration: the imposition of mask and vaccine mandates on the American people in defiance of a number of judicial rulings has moved the discussion of COVID-19 away from what it is, how it got here, who covered it up, and who paid the price.

China has disappeared from the conversation.

Demonstrations, resignations, aggravation – accompanied by inflation and empty shelves – have wiped out discussion of Chinese culpability and American complicity. The World Health Organization (WHO) and scientists who participated in Chinese Gain of Function (GOF) research and then claimed to be neutral observers; media censorship of dissenting voices on behalf of the institutions promoting the natural origins theory; and where American money went and for what purpose are, apparently, old news. How much did antipathy toward President Donald Trump influence the media’s insistence that the virus had a natural origin, and its censorship of any other viewpoint? Apparently, a lot.


BIG disclaimer here: there is a lot of dense science all across the book. Although Markson makes most of it intelligible to lay readers, you don’t have to understand all of the science to understand the big picture. An index would have helped us flip back and forth to descriptions, people and incidents that are important, but separated by pages and chapters.

### It Happened in Wuhan

Chinese doctors and researchers knew something was wrong in November 2019. Dr. Wang Lei pinpointed,

> The moment when the denial of human-to-human transmission truly became a farce. When dead bodies were piling, left to decay for days in hospital corridors and on trucks, because Chinese health authorities refused to officially record any deaths. The bodies were for them nothing more than a logistical problem.

Dr. Wang knew it was a new coronavirus but was forbidden by the government to discuss the diagnosis. Dr. Ai Fen was right behind him and so was Dr. Zhang Jixian.

Chinese chat rooms and organizations were on it. And in late December, Marjorie Pollack and Larry Madoff of the Program for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (Pro-MED) in the U.S. were digging deep. Countries and organizations asked WHO for information. On December 31st, China acknowledged that there was pneumonia in Wuhan – and then swept social media sites of all references to “unknown Wuhan pneumonia” and similar phrases. On January 2nd, the Wuhan Institute of Virology’s (WIV) Director General wrote to her employees:

> By order of the National Health Commission, all relevant information concerning the outbreak, testing, as well as data results and conclusions from experimental treatments should not be published on social media and should not be disclosed to the media (including official media), partner organizations (including technical service companies).

On January 26th, the Chinese military took over the institute. China specialist Miles Yu believes, “The negligence at China’s biolabs, especially the WIV, was so dangerous that the PLA [Chinese military] dispatched a general to take over the facility soon after the outbreak in Wuhan.” Scientists began disappearing shortly thereafter.

But the chaos was just getting started. Chapter Four, “Chaos,” and Chapter Six, “Last Train to Wuhan,” detail the mess – the disappearance of brave journalists and doctors who tried to get the word out. Don’t forget Chen Qiushi, who snuck into the closed city and disappeared after his Wuhan video was viewed more than 1.5 million times. Remember Li Zehua, Fang Bin, Xu Zhiyong, Xu Zhangrun, and friends Cai Wei, Chen Mei, and Tang...
Hongbo, Zhang Zhan, and an estimated 897 others who were punished by April 2020 for challenging Xi’s official propaganda. The organization Chinese Human Rights Defenders called China “the biggest prison in the world for journalists, with at least 120 detained or missing.”

They are among the heroes.

In a later chapter, “The Missing,” the Spanish-based human rights NGO Safeguard Defenders describes residential surveillance as “mass state-sanctioned kidnapping” and “enforced disappearance.” “Using data from court verdict cases posted to the Supreme Court database, we estimated that at least 28,29,000 people were placed into Residential Surveillance at a Designated Location by the end of 2019 since the system came into effect in 2013.”

Former MI6 chief Sir Richard Dearlove says of those who enter residential surveillance, “They’re either killed or they end up in…the equivalent of concentration camps.”

**The White House**

While Markson calls the White House “chaotic” in the early days, there were American officials with an appreciation of the severity of the virus, including Secretary of State Mike Pompeo and his experts Daniel Pottinger and Miles Yu, Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar, and National Security Advisor Robert O’Brien. President Trump looks pretty good. The President’s decision to play “good cop” in an effort to maintain relations with Chinese Communist Party chief Xi Jinping was reasonable, particularly as he was simultaneously stopping traffic from Wuhan to the U.S. while the media called him a racist.

Not surprisingly at this point, Anthony Fauci looks pretty bad. And Peter Dazcek and *Lancet Magazine* should pay some terrible price for an absence of even minimal ethical standards, publishing what they called a definitive letter about the natural origins of COVID while neglecting to mention that most of the signatories were financially and professionally tied to virus research in Wuhan. Markson names signatories and their conflicts of interest.

**Lab Origin Discussion Roadblocks**

Markson points out that much of the discussion of the possible lab origin was shut down precisely because Trump and Pompeo thought it might be a reasonable avenue of investigation. The media’s view of Trump was a driver in quashing not only the lab origin theory but also journalists and scientists who wanted a broader investigation. Ditto any conversation about treatment in advance of the emergence of a vaccine. This is a huge indictment of “mainstream” journalism – and not only in the U.S.

The story of Australian scientist Nikolai Petrovsky is chilling in more than one way. Petrovsky had spent more than 35 years researching and developing pandemic vaccines – including for Ebola, avian flu, Japanese encephalitis, West Nile virus, and against the SARS and MERS coronaviruses. His goal in this case was to find the transmission path of SARS-CoV-2 from animals to humans. If he knew which animal host the coronavirus had infected before transmitting it to humans, it would be instrumental in designing a vaccine. In March 2020, he uploaded to a supercomputer the genetic sequence from bats, cats, dogs, pangolins, mice, civets, monkeys, hamsters, ferrets, horses, tigers, cattle, and snakes as well as humans. Petrovsky was shocked by the result.

Humans came out at the very top of the list. That was not what we were expecting, as the animal host from which the virus had been transmitted should have been at the top of the list….data suggested the SARS-CoV-2 spike protein had uniquely evolved to bind and infect cells expressing human ACE2.

He told his partner, LaTrobe University Professor David Winkler, “Please don’t think I’m crazy or a conspiracy theorist, I’m truly not, but basically, I’ve formed a conclusion that we can’t exclude the possibility that what these results might be telling us is that this could be a man-made virus.” But when Petrovsky went to a “pre-print server” to publish his paper, the server managers rejected it as “too hot.” Petrovsky said:

> The paper was clearly being seen as going against the prevailing scientific political orthodoxy. They said the paper should be peer-reviewed first, but this was nonsense as the whole point of pre-press servers is to make papers available before peer review. Obviously…the scientific community had already decided that only research suggesting a natural origin should be allowed to see the light of day.

Chapter 7, “Scientists Speak Out,” details the international group of scientists who pushed for open discussion of multiple theories – in other words, real scientists. Read their names, because like the names of Chinese scientists and doctors – they should not go unmentioned, even though, happily, they remain at liberty. Richard Ebright of Rutgers University, virologist David Baltimore, physicist Richard Muller, Roland Wiesendanger of Hamburg University, Israeli geneticist Ronen Shemes, Dr. Steven Quay, geneticist Yuri Delgin, and Professor David Relman, among others.

But, although many scientists did not think Petrovsky was crazy, and although many shared his concern for open discussion, everything from *Nature Magazine* to *Lancet* strove to keep their voices from being heard. Only in 2021 did groups of professors and doctors make headway, and it was June 2021 before *Nature Scientific Reports* actually published Petrovsky’s paper, perhaps because the Trump administration was gone.

**Gain of Function**

Gain of Function research takes center stage in “The Scientists who
Knew.” Again, the specifics of the science are dense, but suffice it to say that long before the COVID outbreak in November 2019, a great many scientists argued that “the benefits of GOF” were “minimal at best” and they could “far more safely be obtained through other avenues of research,” Steven Salzberg of Johns Hopkins School of Medicine’s Center for Computational Biology wrote in 2015. He was seconded by others. In fact, NIH funding for GOF research had already been “paused” by the Obama administration.

One who objected to the pause was virologist Ralph Baric – who was working at the time with Zhi Zhengli, the Bat Woman at the Wuhan Institute for Virology. Not surprisingly at this point, Fauci argued that GOF benefits outweighed the risks. “The same research that international scientists said should be banned, Fauci described as ‘important.’”

GOF funding restarted in 2017 – with no public debate. Fauci had one meeting with the Office of Technology Policy before the CDC restarted funding subgrants to WIV. Health Secretary Alex Azar, it appears, only found that out in 2021, when he was long out of office.

That should be a line of inquiry by itself – who does what with American funds and the imprimatur of the CDC and NIH?

Lessons for the Future

The good news is that throughout the U.S. government, there were individuals who caught on early and were dogged in their pursuit of the truth, including lab theory, bioweapons possibilities, the dangers of GOF, and the inability of China to be a constructive partner. Aside from Secretaries Pompeo and Azar, the State Department’s Tom DiNanno and senior subject matter expert Dave Asher led a “Covid working group” investigation “to get to the bottom of where COVID-19 originated – be it from a bat cave, a lab lead, or worse, a WMD accident. We looked at why China had covered up its propagation and why elements of the U.S. government appeared highly complicit.”

The bad news is that as vaccines were developed, deaths receded, and treatments have begun to emerge, the real push to know more has almost disappeared. While the American public view of China has become decidedly more negative, and the Pentagon is taking steps in the Pacific to enhance the American/Western position, the White House appears more interested in mask and vaccine mandates – pressures on American citizens. Markson is, herself, decidedly pessimistic:

The world is still in the dark about the precise turn of events that sparked this pandemic, and this of course leaves the world vulnerable to whatever comes next. There is still no evidence that the United States and other Western nations are any more prepared for a future pandemic than we were before this global catastrophe, with gain of function experiments still largely left unchecked. The failures of the scientific community, intelligence agencies, international bodies and large sections of the media have all left the world a less secure and less safe place to live.

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For more than 250 years, Americans haven’t talked much about ideology. Until recently, we relied on government mainly to protect our broad national interests, not to tell us what to think or how to be. Limited government and personal freedoms were baked into our governing framework. And our foreign policy has been largely transactional, conceeding points to reach a deal. Until we can’t.

But what if a deal isn’t what China or Iran seek?

Miles Yu, a former State Department policy planning expert on China, told an audience that the problem with China is... China!

China’s military buildup is defensive in its own eyes, requiring the surveillance state and the disappearance of Chinese scientists, journalists, and medical information from Wuhan. It requires the crushing of Hong Kong, the recapture of Taiwan and genocide against the Uyghurs. To keep the population quiescent and warm, China announced 43 new coal-fired power plants, making a mockery of “climate czar” John Kerry’s abandonment of the Uyghurs in the hopes of finding agreement on emissions.


How can a largely transactional country deal, then, with ideologically driven adversaries? First, recognize the difference. Then, work with allies to stymie the most malign behaviors of totalitarians, both politically and economically. Reduce the role of Chinese “students” and scientists in American institutions. Compete directly on technology and rare-earth mining. Protect ourselves and our allies. Restore the U.S. Navy. Bring Taiwan into a coordinated relationship with Japan. Restore America’s short-lived energy independence by reopening the Keystone Pipeline and supporting changes in energy policy—including the role of nuclear energy.

Finally, say what you mean. America’s Declaration of Independence posits that, “All men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.” America’s founding principles of individual liberty and limited government have guided us and improved us for centuries and inspired millions around the world. The Goddess of Democracy from Tiananmen Square wasn’t a random statue.

With that understanding, let’s proceed accordingly.