Hussain, who was born and raised in Beirut, Baghdad, and Baalbek and whose new book The Arab Case for Israel was recently published, traced the arc from Israel’s 1982 invasion, through the stillborn May 17, 1983 peace agreement killed by Hafez al-Assad’s militias, to Israel’s UN-certified withdrawal in 2000 and Hezbollah’s October 8, 2023 decision to open a second front “in support of Gaza.”

A Buffer Zone and a Yellow Line

The IDF now controls 55 depopulated Shia villages in a strip calibrated to the roughly six-mile range of Hezbollah’s shoulder-fired, guided anti-tank missiles, weapons that proved especially lethal to Israelis during the 2023-2024 fighting, Hussain said. The IDF calls it a “forward defensive position.” Roughly half a million displaced Lebanese Shia are now “living as displaced people in tents in Beirut and Mount Lebanon.”

Unlike Israel’s security zone of the 1980s and 1990s, he stressed, there will be no Lebanese population to govern and no cover for Hezbollah ambushes. Anyone crossing what both sides call “the yellow line” is “taken out.” Hussain pointed to the IDF killing of a Hezbollah “journalist” who crossed the line as proof Israel intends to enforce it.

Talking Past Each Other in Washington

Last Thursday produced the first direct Lebanon-Israel talks since 1983, with the two countries’ ambassadors meeting in Washington alongside the U.S. ambassador to Beirut and Secretary of State Marco Rubio. But the two delegations “are talking past each other,” Hussain said. Lebanese President Joseph Aoun and Prime Minister Nawaf Salam frame the talks as a vehicle to “stop the war and get our territory back” and say little about disarming Hezbollah. Israel’s position is that disarmament is the predicate for peace.

Hussain nevertheless praised the Aoun-Salam government for rejecting French and Spanish proposals that Lebanon be folded into the Iran ceasefire, and for a March 2 cabinet resolution instructing the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) to disband Hezbollah. Washington, he argued, has long conflated Lebanon with its Iranian occupier and should not “be doing Iran’s job for them” by refusing to engage a weak but distinct Lebanese state.

Strings Attached

The roughly $1 billion in U.S. aid to the LAF over the past decade has come with almost no conditions, Hussain said, and the LAF commander is “a corrupt guy who’s in Hezbollah’s pocket.” He argued Washington should tie future assistance to measurable benchmarks and to a change in combat doctrine that still designates “the Israeli enemy” rather than the illegally armed Hezbollah as the army’s principal adversary. “We let them get away with saying one thing in English and something else in Arabic,” he said, urging that the U.S. “call them out” and impose “KPIs and benchmarks.”

Drawing the lesson from Oslo, Hussain said both the Gaza peace plan — UN Security Council Resolution 2803 — and any Lebanon deal must specify “the sequence of order” so that territory, reconstruction, and economic aid follow, not precede, disarmament. The Gaza plan is “stuck at point four” because Hamas will not disarm, he noted, and Lebanon risks the same frozen outcome.

Optimism, Qualified

Hussain said he is more optimistic than his host because Israel has designed its posture so that stalled talks do not force an Israeli retreat. “No one now can pressure Israel to withdraw,” he said. On Iran, he predicted that a sustained U.S. oil blockade will force Tehran to shut in wells within roughly 20 days, costing half a million barrels per day of production “forever” and bringing the regime to terms. “Gaza is — we’re over the finish line. Lebanon, we’re near the finish line. Iran, we’re not there yet, but we’re getting there.”

This AI-generated summary may contain errors.

A U.S.-Israeli ground raid on Iran’s nuclear sites at Isfahan and elsewhere is under active discussion to seize more than 400 kilograms of highly enriched uranium that aerial bombardment alone cannot neutralize, David Weinberg told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on March 12. Weinberg, a government relations and foreign affairs specialist at the Misgav Institute, said the absence of American heavy strategic bombers over Iran’s nuclear plants during the current campaign was itself telling. “Something more needs to be done about the stockpiles,” he said. “You can’t just leave this as a loose end.”

Weinberg spoke from the Israeli home front as the country entered its second week of direct war with Iran under Operation Epic Fury. He described an Israeli home front absorbing punishing Iranian strikes while maintaining overwhelming public support for the war. More than 46,000 missile and attack drone alerts had sounded across the country, he noted, with 18 Israelis killed, 2,300 wounded, and 3,400 civilians made homeless. He singled out Iranian cluster munitions—carried by more than half of the incoming missiles—as particularly devastating, citing one strike earlier in the week that scattered destruction across 16 sites and killed two Israelis. Roughly 35 percent of the population lacks access to a bomb shelter.

Despite the toll, Weinberg said polling showed well over 80 percent of Israelis supported extending the war “until a more decisive crushing of Iran and its offensive abilities is achieved.” He described families locked down at home for a second week, dashing into shelters day and night, and noted wryly that Israeli entrepreneurs had produced apps calculating total shelter time and the statistically safest moment to risk a shower. His own app, he said, logged more than 20 hours in shelter across some 60 alerts in the previous week.

Gaza, Hezbollah, and the Northern Front

Weinberg stressed that Gaza remained a significant confrontation front even as attention shifted to Iran. More than 50 percent of the territory is under Israeli control, he said, with Hamas entrenched in the remainder, including Gaza City—the one major area Israeli forces had not operated in intensively over the past two years. He expressed deep skepticism about the Trump administration’s plan for international investment and peacekeeping forces in the territory, and doubting international troops would succeed in disarming and demilitarizing the enclave.

Meanwhile, Hezbollah had launched 200 missiles into Israel the previous night, and Weinberg predicted that “even if the war with Iran dials down in the coming days or the coming weeks, the war with Hezbollah is just beginning.”

The Regional Chessboard

Turning to the broader region, Weinberg identified a “radical Sunni axis” of Turkey and Qatar as a significant strategic threat to the Jewish state, warning that confrontation with that axis could come in the years ahead. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had placed himself squarely on Iran’s side, he observed, and threatened to seize parts of northern Syria and move against the Kurds. “Somebody’s going to have to put Erdogan in a box,” Weinberg said.

On the Abraham Accords, he noted that behind-the-scenes coordination between Israel and Gulf states was “closer than ever,” but cautioned that open normalization would take time. Saudi Arabia, he argued, had scaled back from its pre-October 7 trajectory toward Israel, and he faulted the Trump administration for granting Riyadh major concessions—including a path to F-35 purchases and understandings on civilian nuclear enrichment—without conditioning them on movement toward the Jewish state. Movement with countries like Indonesia and smaller Gulf states was more likely in the near term, he added.

Trump and the Endgame

Weinberg offered a forceful defense of President Trump’s handling of Iran, calling him “this generation’s greatest generator of moral purpose.” He ticked off a series of decisions—withdrawing from the nuclear deal in 2018, the assassination of IRGC chief Qasem Soleimani in 2020, Operation Midnight Hammer the previous June, and now Operation Epic Fury—as evidence of unwavering strategic clarity. Trump had also shown domestic political courage, Weinberg added, taking on progressive critics, isolationists within his own base, and prominent voices like Tucker Carlson.

Still, Weinberg acknowledged that the war’s ceiling might ultimately be set not by ideology but by “Washington’s imperfect endurance”—economic costs, dwindling weapon stocks, and diminishing military returns. He cautioned that Iran could not be allowed to conclude that disrupting oil flows was “its passport to survival,” and argued that the spike in oil prices was, as Trump himself had said, “a small price to pay for major security advances.” The stockpile of highly enriched uranium, Weinberg stressed, made a ground operation a serious option. “Trump did say help is on the way,” he concluded. “And he meant it.”

Wurmser, a senior analyst for Middle East Affairs at the Center for Security Policy and a former senior advisor at the White House and State Department, began with Lebanon, where Hezbollah had provoked Israel by launching missiles — what he called submitting “the winning entry for this year’s Darwin Awards.” Hezbollah is not its own front, he argued, but an extension of the broader Iranian war, and Israel intends to see the fight through to the end. Northern Israeli towns remain largely depopulated, and every Israeli knows the war was unfinished.

The Sunni Threat After Iran

While the Iranian regime is being brought down, a dangerous Sunni Islamist bloc is taking shape. The new government in Damascus represents the first time Arab Islamic forces have controlled that city in a thousand years — evoking the Umayyad Caliphate of 1,300 years ago and “creating a civilizational confidence that the Turks are buying into.” Wurmser identified a strategic triad of Turkey under Erdogan, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood as the animating force, one that also maintains ties to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) through the Belt and Road initiative.

Qatar is trying to reposition itself after refusing US airspace and attempting to sabotage wartime diplomacy. Having chosen the losing side, the Qataris now want to claim credit for an American victory. Meanwhile, Tehran is deliberately stoking Sunni-Shiite tensions to frighten its own population into rallying behind the regime — a desperate strategy Wurmser said would likely fail.

Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq

Egypt is navigating between rival camps, and the long-term trajectory is troubling. President al-Sisi recognizes that the military rank and file are sympathetic to the Muslim Brotherhood, and Cairo has been drifting toward Turkey on issues from the Horn of Africa to North Africa. Egypt’s peace with Israel, Wurmser argued, has always been anchored to its desire to be part of the American alliance — a commitment that eroded under Presidents Obama and Biden but that President Trump has helped shore up by reasserting American leadership.

Jordan faces an even more immediate danger. Forces aligned with the Damascus government and the Muslim Brotherhood are fracturing the tribal structure that forms the regime’s core, pulling Iraqi tribes away from their traditional Hashemite alignment. Iraq, by contrast, may benefit from Iran’s fall: traditional Shiism could reemerge, Iranian-backed militias are being targeted by US and Israeli operations, and the 20-year Iraqi conundrum — which Wurmser characterized as an Iranian-sponsored insurgency rather than an Iraqi one — may finally see resolution.

Israel’s Post-War Horizon

Drawing a historical parallel to the United States between 1865 and 1890, Wurmser argued that Israel is entering a transformative era. The external wars that defined its first 80 years are winding down, and the country is poised for significant immigration, demographic growth, and “civilizational solidity.” He pointed to an emerging alignment of Israel, India, and Japan — “the League of Rising Ancients” — three ancient, democratic nations that have reconciled tradition with modernity, forming a strategic arc that boxes in Chinese and Turkish ambitions from the south.

The 47-year Iranian threat is nearing its end, he concluded, calling the coming resolution “almost as big as the Berlin Wall” and a major blow to China. Israel and the United States are being handed a circumstance of immense positive potential — if they are prepared to seize it.

Written with AI assistance and may contain errors. 

What happens next? Ilan Berman will discuss:

• What is the United States seeking to achieve—and what will that require?
• How stable is Iran’s internal political order, and what role could the opposition play?
• What does the regional outlook look like? Is Tehran attempting to widen the war—and what could follow?

Ilan Berman is Senior Vice President of the American Foreign Policy Council and an expert on Middle East and Iran policy. He has consulted for U.S. government agencies and written and edited several books on regional security, including Dismantling Tyranny: Transitioning Beyond Totalitarian Regimes and Taking on Tehran: Strategies for Confronting the Islamic Republic.

Cox, an adjunct professor at Cornell University Law School and a 22-year U.S. Army veteran, served seven years as a judge advocate with combat deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan. His roles included military prosecutor, federal prosecutor, brigade judge advocate, and military magistrate. That background, he said, reveals a stark “divergence” between the law as military practitioners apply it and the version the humanitarian community generates in public discourse. Military lawyers advise commanders and train soldiers — “it’s not really our job to get thoroughly involved with public discourse.” The humanitarian community fills that vacuum.

He pointed to United Nations General Assembly resolutions as a prime example. While the General Assembly offers “absolutely virtuous qualities” as a diplomatic forum, it “cannot create international law” and its resolutions carry “no legal consequence.” Yet those pursuing an anti-Israel agenda exploit resolutions accumulated since the early 1970s to “create the perception as though the United Nations has said this is law and every country now has to follow.”

On the genocide charge, Cox was direct: “The focus always has to be intent. Intent is decisive.” From Raphael Lemkin’s original formulation through the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1998 Rome Statute, intent has remained the linchpin. “It’s not like there’s a lot of destruction, but we’re not sure about the intent, but it’s still genocide. Intent is decisive.”

Israel’s expressed strategic objective has been consistent throughout: ensure Hamas no longer poses a threat and repatriate all hostages. To establish genocide, one would have to prove the actual intent is to destroy the Palestinian Arab population — not Hamas. Those advancing the allegation, he said, use a methodology “like clockwork”:

• Cherry-pick statements from select Israeli political leaders and impute genocidal intent
• Point to battlefield effects as confirmation
• Downplay or ignore evidence of mitigation measures taken to protect civilians

He cited a concrete example. When the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) identified an underground Hamas command node beneath a hospital, they “deliberately delayed the fuses of these munitions so that the munitions would penetrate through the ground and explode underneath” rather than destroy the hospital above. “If the intent were to destroy the Palestinian population in whole or in part as such, there would be no need” for such measures.

On disproportionate force, Cox provided the doctrinal standard: “An attack is prohibited if the expected incidental damage is going to be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected.” Key points:

• The assessment must be made per attack — each individual act of violence
• It requires knowledge of what the responsible personnel expected at the time
• Without that evidence, “we don’t have enough information to make a proportionality assessment”

In 22 years of service, he said, “I can’t think of a single scenario where a commander said, I expect incidental damage that’s going to be excessive, and I’m going to launch the attack anyways.” He criticized Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch for a “flawed methodology” — visiting attack sites after the fact, finding no visible evidence of military objectives, and concluding disproportionality without access to decision-makers’ intent or intelligence.

The volume of misinformation, he acknowledged, amounts to a “flood” that overwhelms the few voices committed to doctrinal accuracy. Those who understand military doctrine “are too few and far between.” The best approach: “Keep chipping away at it to create an anchor for other folks who are interested in the truth to grab onto.”

Looking ahead, there is no legal obligation to rebuild Gaza before the conflict is resolved — and sound policy argues against it. The administration’s peace plan, including the proposed International Stabilization Force (ISF), represents “a generational opportunity to completely change the nature of this conflict that has been dragging out since the late 1940s.” But the international community “is going to have to put their troops where their mouths are” and use armed force against Hamas if necessary. “If that commitment isn’t there,” Cox cautioned, “my assessment is this won’t work. It’s just going to be a piece of paper.”

This summary was created with the help of AI, it may contain errors. 

Steven Pomerantz, Assistant Director of the FBI (ret.), a veteran of federal counterterrorism and criminal investigations, joins us to provide a structured look at the issue:

• How we got here – the statutory foundation of U.S. immigration law
• Where we stand now – enforcement challenges, federal–state dynamics, and judicial bottlenecks
• What comes next – practical approaches that uphold civil rights and public safety.

Hussain grounds his analysis in economic reality. Saudi Arabia’s oil-based model, he explains, can no longer sustain a rapidly growing population amid global oversupply and depressed prices. The kingdom requires far higher oil prices to balance its budget, yet the market has not delivered. Meanwhile, high-profile diversification projects have failed to generate meaningful returns. As fiscal pressure increases, Saudi leadership has reverted to familiar political tools. As Hussain puts it, “When governments realize they cannot fix problems structurally, they revert to populism. And populism needs enemies.”

That shift, he argues, explains the resurgence of anti-American and antisemitic rhetoric across Saudi media, religious sermons, and social platforms—channels he emphasizes are tightly controlled and reflect official policy rather than rogue opinion. This rhetoric marks a sharp departure from the language of reform and regional cooperation that characterized Saudi messaging only a short time ago.

On Israel, Hussain contends that the strategic logic has changed. After Israel’s conflict with Iran weakened Tehran’s regional position, Saudi Arabia no longer views Israel as a necessary counterweight to Iranian power. That reduced threat perception weakened one of the main incentives for normalization. At the same time, he argues that Saudi leadership continues to misunderstand the nature of peace with Israel, treating it as a concession rather than a mutually beneficial economic decision. Saudi Arabia still thinks peace with Israel is a reward to Israel, they don’t understand that it’s a reward to themselves.

Several themes recur throughout the discussion:

• Economic stress as the primary driver: Oil revenues are no longer sufficient, diversification has underperformed, and fiscal pressure is growing.
• Populism as a fallback strategy: With reform stalled, leadership has turned to ideological mobilization to deflect attention from domestic constraints.
• Eroding trust in the United States: Inconsistent U.S. policy and abandoned regional partners have pushed Saudi Arabia to hedge rather than align.
• A stark contrast with the UAE: The UAE’s diversification strategy and peace with Israel are presented as a durable, working model Saudi Arabia has not replicated.
• Realignment toward Turkey and Qatar: Hussain argues that U.S. tolerance of Islamist regimes has encouraged Saudi Arabia’s ideological drift.

Throughout the webinar, Hussain repeatedly returns to the same conclusion: Saudi Arabia’s central vulnerability is economic, not military. Israel does not threaten the kingdom’s security—but stagnation does. As he summarizes, what should keep MBS awake at night is not Israel or Iran—it’s the Saudi economy.

Until Saudi leadership internalizes that reality—and recognizes normalization with Israel as an economic necessity rather than a political favor—Hussain sees little reason to expect a near-term course correction.

This summary was written with AI and could contain errors. 

While we were snowed in, we recorded this week’s JPC webinar and, assuming you are still snowed in as well, we are sending it to you today. Our guest was Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College. As an expert on Turkey and Turkish foreign policy, he discussed Ankara’s role in Syria and its broader geopolitical implications. The conversation included historical and current regional power dynamics, including Turkey’s relationships with Israel (and Gaza), Cyprus, and other Middle Eastern countries.

Grab a cup of coffee and don’t even think about shoveling for a while.

Best, Shoshana

There are two questions: First, do Americans take these threats as seriously as we should? Second, what can we do to protect ourselves and our families in our synagogues and churches?

Our guest is Dr. Stephen Bryen, a former Pentagon official and the author of Security Planning for Holy Places, a primer for keeping your community house of worship safe in increasingly difficult times.

Note: We are not going wholly domestic, however. Dr. Bryen has written extensively on the war in Ukraine, which will enter its 5th year next month, and the upheaval in Iran.

No one thinks Maduro was a good guy, but to understand both the nature of the threat he posed to free countries and the legality of American action against him, we are calling on Dr. Evan Ellis, of the US Army War College Strategic Studies Institute. Dr. Ellis has written for inFOCUS Quarterly, focusing on Latin American countries and their relationships with China and other non-Western Hemisphere actors, as well as transnational organized crime and populism in the region.

Please join us for what promises to be an exceptional program.

Join us for a discussion with Ken Timmerman, author, political analyst, and Christian Zionist, about the split in the Christian community and why, in fact, Zionism and pro-Israel advocacy are pro-American positions.

The Jewish Policy Center joined with the Energy, Growth, and Security Program of the International Tax and Investment Center (ITIC) for a panel to examine US strategy in Central Asia. JPC Senior Director Shoshana Bryen moderated the group of regional specialists who emphasized a growing and often overlooked dimension in the region’s diplomacy: its deepening relationships with Israel and new openings created by the Abraham Accords.

The panel included:

• Ariel Cohen, Ph.D. of ITIC
• Stephen Blank, Ph.D. of the American Foreign Policy Institute
• Margarita Assenova, Senior Fellow at The Jamestown Foundation, and
• Kamran Bokhari, Senior Director at the New Lines Institute

During a wide-ranging discussion of security, economics, and emerging geopolitical alignments, panelists noted that Central Asia’s five republics—Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Turkmenistan—have maintained stable diplomatic ties with Israel for more than three decades.

Cohen described the five as “culturally moderate Sunni Muslim countries” whose longstanding channels with Israel have quietly expanded since their independence. He argued that this moment offers the first serious possibility of extending the Abraham Accords beyond the Middle East into the Eurasian space. Cohen pointed to Azerbaijan’s increasingly open interest in joining the Accords and suggested that Central Asian states could follow, describing such a development as a potential “force field for prosperity, investment, and American security.”

Bokhari tied policy shifts to a “new US geo-strategy,” one that connects the Middle East, the Caucasus, and Central Asia into a single emerging architecture, with Israel playing an increasingly important role in energy, security cooperation, and technological exchange across the broader Eurasian corridor. October 7, he said, had not derailed the Accords but only delayed and reshaped the path forward. And Kazakhstan’s recent move toward joining the Abraham Accords—something many analysts believed was years away—signaled accelerating diplomatic realignment.

Assenova tied the changes as well to the countries’ realization that they were “between the Russian bear and the Chinese dragon” after Russia’s 2014 invasion of Ukraine and China’s decreased investments in its Belt and Road initiative. Determined that the way forward was to become politically and economically important, in 2015 the C-5 was established to coordinate and advance the capabilities and resources of the five countries together.

The discussion framed Israel not only as a political partner for Central Asia but also as a technological and environmental one. Cohen highlighted US–Israel leadership on water technology—an area of growing urgency as Central Asia faces shrinking glaciers, reduced inflows to the Caspian Sea, and long-term water stress. He noted that Israeli and American expertise in desalination, water recycling, and efficient irrigation fills a critical gap in regional capabilities.

Blank, emphasizing that increasing water shortages and our understanding of the dislocation and political upheaval that drought has brought to Africa, argued for “sustained bureaucratic support” from the US, including the creation of assistant secretaries for Central Asia in the Departments of Energy, State, and Treasury – as well as in the Pentagon – and close cooperation with the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).  Energy is another major driver in Central Asian planning, as European countries are increasingly turning to the region to supplant Russian energy.

This evolving alignment, panelists agreed, places cou]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/10/Screenshot-2025-11-25-at-2.27.32-PM-scaled.png US-Central Asia Relations in the Era of the Abraham Accords false no 1:06:23 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/10/29/video-israel-stood-unwavering/ Wed, 29 Oct 2025 05:26:08 +0000 8f934e9f-6754-5679-9b71-e4eb178db661 We were pleased to record a session with Jonathan Schanzer, Executive Director of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, and we are pleased to share the podcast with you.

Jonathan wrote recently, “Israel stood unwavering in the face of withering assaults, one more punishing than the next. And with help from the American president, it emerged from the fighting bruised but intact.”

The situation is not perfect, and may never be, but his assessment offers reason for optimism and suggests a path forward.

Join us for a conversation with Or Yissachar, Executive Director of the David Institute for Policy and Strategy, an arm of the Israel Defense and Security Forum (IDSF-Habithonistim).

Join us as David Schenker, Taube Senior Fellow at The Washington Institute and former US diplomat, takes us through the region to understand the resilience of the Accords and the political winds blowing through the Arab world and beyond.

Join us as former Pentagon official and security specialist Stephen Bryen brings us an analysis of China’s growing military capabilities and the geopolitical challenges Beijing presents in the Indo-Pacific region.

Hussain Abdul-Hussain, research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, walks us through the disparate threads of Lebanese politics – from the comforting and hopeful to the skeptical, cynical, and despairing.

A Crumbling but Shifting Status Quo

Hussein Abdel-Hussain cautiously celebrated what he called one of the most consequential developments in Lebanon’s modern history: the weakening of Hezbollah following the reported assassination of its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and what he described as Israel’s “crushing” of Hezbollah’s operational capabilities. This surprising turn of events has opened what he characterizes as a “window of opportunity” for the Lebanese state to reclaim sovereignty and redefine itself as more neutral and nationally focused.

Although Hezbollah and its Shia political partner Amal initially agreed to a cessation of hostilities in late November 2024, they have since moved the goalposts. Specifically, Hezbollah now demands Israeli withdrawal from strategic hilltops before it will even consider discussions on disarmament, thus reverting back to old patterns of negotiation delay and defiance—strategies previously employed by figures like Yasser Arafat.

Legal and Political Breakthroughs

Despite Hezbollah’s resistance, the Lebanese government has achieved a historic milestone. For the first time since 1969, the Cabinet passed a resolution asserting that only state institutions are authorized to bear arms inside Lebanon. This directly challenges Hezbollah’s decades-long extralegal military presence. Even more remarkably, the decision was made with Hezbollah-affiliated ministers still in the temporary caretaker government, giving the resolution additional political weight.

The Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) have been officially tasked with drafting a plan to disarm Hezbollah—a move that underscores a shift from rhetorical opposition to potential enforcement. A meeting to review the military’s disarmament plan is set, though the LAF has indicated that a full disarmament could take 15 months, well beyond the end-of-the-year deadline set by the Cabinet.

The Struggle of the Lebanese Armed Forces

The Lebanese military, although increasingly seen as the backbone of national unity and sovereignty, faces severe logistical, operational, and financial challenges. Salaries have plunged to poverty levels due to the economic collapse, and the rank-and-file soldiers struggle with basic needs—including fuel and clean drinking water. Many soldiers hold second jobs to survive, and troop numbers are insufficient to handle complex disarmament tasks.

While the United States once provided $144 million annually to support the LAF, this aid has intermittently lapsed due to political friction and has recently been replaced by funding from Qatar, which raises concerns about foreign influence.

Qatar and Turkey: External Influences and Islamist Ambitions

Abdel-Hussain expressed discomfort with growing Qatari—and increasingly Turkish—influence in Lebanon, particularly within the Sunni community in the north and in Beirut. These nations, he warned, are promoting Islamist factions aligned with the Muslim Brotherhood. This power vacuum, created by Saudi Arabia’s retreat from Lebanon since 2017, has allowed pro-Qatar and pro-Turkey candidates to gain municipal influence.

Worse yet, Turkey is replicating strategies previously demonstrated by Iran—investing in loyalist ]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/3CA0EY2.jpg Time for Optimism in Lebanon? false no 1:01:26 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/08/29/upcoming-webinar-turkey-syria-and-israel-now-what/ Fri, 29 Aug 2025 15:41:16 +0000 https://jewishpolicy.wpenginepowered.com/?p=27345 Jewish Policy Center Senior Director Shoshana Bryen hosted Professor Mark Meirowitz, a foreign policy and Turkey expert from SUNY Maritime College, for a deep dive into Ankara’s growing regional role, its involvement in Syria’s evolution, and its increasingly fraught relationship with Israel. With characteristic clarity and urgency, Prof. Meirowitz broke down the labyrinth of regional alliances and rivalries, calling the situation “literally mind-boggling” and comparing Syria to a “petri dish for chaos.”

HTS, Al-Shara, and the Shake-up in Syria

The ousting of Bashar Assad by the jihadist group Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), led by Ahmed al-Shara (also known as al-Jolani), marks a significant shift in Syria’s power structure—and possibly the region’s. Once associated with al-Qaeda and ISIS, al-Jolani now wears suits and promotes a veneer of moderation. “Maybe the Turks provided him with some of these outfits,” Meirowitz quipped, questioning the authenticity of his transformation.

Al-Jolani was “boosted by” Turkish support, Meirowitz explained, calling him a Turkish client rather than an independent actor. HTS’s limited control—bolstered by foreign fighters like Uyghurs—has led to violent, sectarian repression, particularly against Alawites, Druze, Christians, and Kurds. “We’re with al-Shara, and a lot of people are depending on him,” Meirowitz said ominously.

Turkey’s Interests: Stabilizing Syria to Serve Domestic Needs

Turkey’s involvement, Meirowitz stressed, is strategic. With over 3 million Syrian refugees inside its borders, Ankara is pressuring Damascus to stabilize and repatriate them. “The Turks want them back to Syria,” he said, noting the domestic strain and political sensitivity of the refugee crisis.

Turkey has walked a fine line—signing infrastructure and defense agreements with HTS-controlled Syria while avoiding giving it full military autonomy. “Turkey’s position is that Al-Shara is the go-to person… Let al-Shara unify the country,” Meirowitz explained. But internal Kurdish dynamics—particularly involving PKK, now in peace talks with Erdogan’s government—make full alignment with HTS and Syrian Kurds tenuous.

Will Turkey’s NATO Membership Complicate It All?

One of the more sobering insights from Meirowitz was the hypothetical scenario of Turkey, a NATO power, declaring a no-fly zone over Syria—potentially triggering Article 5 protections if hostilities break out with Israel. “That, to me, is the number one worry… that Israel and Turkey would come to conflict,” he warned.

He emphasized the ongoing “deconfliction meetings” between Israel and Turkey, and Israel and Syria—possibly triangulating with al-Jolani himself. But of all the moving parts, Meirowitz emphasized Turkey’s NATO status remains a critical leverage point: “Let’s be realistic here. If there was a skirmish…Article 5 could be on the table.”

Humanitarian Crises and Jihadi Control: Who is Really Running Syria?

The ongoing massacres of minorities, particularly the Druze in Suweida, raise urgent questions about al-Jolani’s power. “Has he lost control over the jihadis in his own ranks?” Meirowitz pondered, highlighting the grim possibility of Syria spiraling toward becoming a full-blown jihadi state.

“The optics are totally opposed to [the idea of moderation],” he said, noting public executions and forced beard-shaving of Druze men as disturbing parallels to Nazi visual propaganda. “Clearly, this is reprehensible. The United States isn’t going to stand for it,” he added, referring to conditional American Congressional support for lifting sanctions on Syria.

 Erdogan’s Domestic Calculations: Kurds, Elections, and Power

Turning inward, Turkey’s President Erdoğan is eyeing ]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/czNmcy1wcml2YXRlL3Jhd3BpeGVsX2ltYWdlcy93ZWJzaXRlX2NvbnRlbnQvZnJ0dXJrZXlfdHVya2lzaF9mbGFnX2NvdW50cnktaW1hZ2Uta3liYWYzYzYuanBn.webp Turkey, Syria, and Israel – Now What? false no 1:04:44 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/07/24/upcoming-webinar-title-the-murder-of-the-druze/ Thu, 24 Jul 2025 14:30:46 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=27242 Hussein Abdel Hussein, a distinguished research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, joined us today to share his expertise on Middle Eastern politics, particularly focusing on the Druze community and regional dynamics. As a leading authority on the subject, Hussein brings extensive knowledge about the complexities of Syrian politics, inter-community relations, and the broader geopolitical landscape of the Middle East. His insights have been particularly valuable in understanding the current situation facing the Druze community, their defensive mindset, and the intricate relationships between various regional powers. Hussein’s deep understanding of Middle Eastern sovereignty challenges and his experience in analyzing regional conflicts makes him uniquely qualified to address the complex issues facing Syria and its minority communities.

Druze Community and Israeli Intervention

The meeting focused on the situation in Syria, particularly the Druze community and Israel’s intervention to protect them. Hussein Abdel Hussein, a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies, explained the unique characteristics of the Druze, including their defensive mindset and loyalty to their host countries. He emphasized that the recent violence in Syria was not initiated by the Druze, who were instead defending themselves against invaders. The discussion highlighted the complexities of Middle Eastern politics and the challenges of prioritizing democratic elections and individual rights in a region with a different cultural and societal focus.

Druze Plight and Shara’s Leadership

Hussain discussed the situation in Syria, focusing on the Druze community’s plight and the actions of the new leader, Ahmad Shara, who previously had ties to Al-Qaeda. He criticized the approach of giving Islamists financial support, citing past failures, and emphasized the need for conditions to be set for Shara to gain trust. Hussain praised Israel’s intervention to protect the Druze and expressed frustration with Western countries, particularly the UK and France, for not supporting the Druze and for their previous role in backing Shara. He also highlighted the importance of shared power and concessions from Shara to ensure the safety of minority groups in Syria.

Syria Post-Assad Governance Strategy

Hussain and Shoshana discussed the situation in Syria, emphasizing the lack of a concrete plan for post-Assad governance. Hussain argued that the U.S. and its allies could support non-Islamist factions like the Druze, Kurds, and Christians without direct military involvement, focusing on diplomatic and economic support. They highlighted the roles of Turkey, Qatar, and Iran in supporting Sunni Islamists and the need to exclude these countries from any reconstruction plan. Hussain proposed aligning with allies like the UAE, Kuwait, Morocco, Israel, and Cyprus to create a stable, inclusive Syria under Assad’s presidency, with concessions made to him in exchange for cooperation.

Druze Attacks: Turkish-Israeli Proxy War

Hussain discussed the brutal attacks on the Druze in Syria, highlighting the involvement of two major clans from the northeast, Gaddat and Naim, which he believes were orchestrated by Syrian intelligence and Turkish interests, rather than being a simple tribal revenge. Shoshana raised questions about whether Al-Shara was directing these attacks and expressed skepticism about the possibility of a lasting peace if the attackers are true Islamists. Hussain explained that the main driver of the conflict in Syria is the competition between Turkey and Israel, and he suggested that the attack on the Druze was part of Turkey’s strategy to establish a foothold on the border with Israel.

US-Turkey-Qatar Relations: Strategic Challenges

Shoshana and Hussain discussed the complex dynamics between the US, Turkey, a]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/3BYB7TJ-scaled.jpg The Murder of the Druze, with Hussain Abdul Hussain false no 57:11 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/07/11/upcoming-webinar-hebron-and-the-broader-middle-east/ Fri, 11 Jul 2025 15:14:49 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=27228 The Jewish Policy Center hosted a webinar featuring Professor Harold Rhode, an expert in Middle Eastern history and culture, to discuss the recent developments involving the Hebron sheikhs, tribal dynamics in the West Bank, and the broader Middle Eastern context, including Syria and the Druze.

Key points from the discussion include:

Hebron Sheikhs and Tribal Dynamics

• In Middle Eastern society, loyalty is to family, clan, and tribe, not nationality or land.
• The Hebron sheikhs, representing local clans, have proposed creating an autonomous “Hebron Emirate” in cooperation with Israel, recognizing it as a Jewish state.
• These sheikhs view the Palestinian Authority (PA) as foreign and illegitimate, imposed on them by outsiders through the Oslo Accords.
• The PA is perceived as weak in Hebron, and the sheikhs have governed themselves effectively for generations.
• Clan structures dictate marriage, loyalty, and governance, making Western political models like individual rights hard to apply.

Implications for the Palestinian Authority

• The PA has dismissed the Hebron initiative as Israeli propaganda.
• However, the reality on the ground suggests strong opposition to PA rule from local clans.
• Efforts to crush or dismiss these tribal leaders could backfire, weakening the PA further.

Broader Regional Dynamics and Gaza

• Similar clan-based governance could be applied in Gaza, provided Israel supports and protects cooperative families.
• Past Israeli failures to protect allies (e.g., during withdrawal from southern Lebanon or early Gaza operations) undercut potential partnerships.
• To succeed, Israel must demonstrate strength and reliability, which are critical virtues in the Middle East.

Violence and Power in the Region

• Peace, as understood in the West, doesn’t exist in Middle Eastern political culture. The best outcome is enforced calm through strength.
• Groups like Hamas and PA operate as power players, and only decisive action garners respect and compliance.

Syria, the Druze, and Israel’s Strategic Posture

• Recent attacks on Syria’s Druze drew a strong Israeli response, cementing Israel’s role as a protector of Druze communities.
• Israel’s reaction contrasted with its silence on atrocities against the Alawites, underscoring its selective engagement based on alliances and strategic interests.
• The conversation also referenced differences between various Muslim sects and longstanding historical grievances.

Western Misunderstandings

• U.S. and Western policy tends to prioritize democratic elections and individual rights, which do not align with the group-based logic of Middle Eastern societies.
• Examples include the unintended consequences of forcing elections in Gaza (leading to Hamas’s rise) and undermining allies through misplaced idealism (Jimmy Carter and the Shah of Iran).
• American notions of goodwill are seen as weakness in the region.

Solution Framework

• Peace in the region comes through strength, respect for local power structures, and enforcing order rather than imposing Western democratic ideals.
• Israel can work with tribal structures to create security and economic cooperation, as long as it respects their methods and provides firm support.

Recommendations for Further Reading

•  Professor Rhode highly recommends Bernard Lewis’s work, especially “The Return of Islam” (Commentary, 1976), for understanding the deeper cultural and ideological foundations of Middle Eastern thinking.
• He also wrote a short book, “Modern Islamic Warfare,” available for free at harold-rode.com.

The webinar underscored the need for nuanced understanding of local structures, the power of triba]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/07/Hebron_with_menorah_on_hill_cropped-scaled.jpg Hebron and the Broader Middle East false no 1:00:21 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/07/03/upcoming-webinar-kurds-under-appreciated-regional-players/ Thu, 03 Jul 2025 04:14:13 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=27153 Kurdish people span a broad area in the Middle East – across parts of Turkey, Syria, Iraq, and Iran. They constitute one of the largest ethnic groups without a state of their own, but have worked with the US – and with Israel – to create stability and security in the places they live. A longtime supporter of the Kurdish people, BG Audino recently spent time traveling in the region.

Join us as he explains how American interests can be enhanced by cooperative relations.

• What happened?
• Why now?
• What is next?
• Winners and losers

Join us Monday for a conversation with Dr. Stephen Bryen, former Deputy Under Secretary of Defense and an expert in security strategy and technology.

Tomas Sandell, founder of the European Coalition for Israel in 2003, summarizes the battle. “It is pivotal that we do not give up our streets in Europe to those groups who call for the destruction of Israel and death to the Jews.”

Is the battle being won or lost? Join us for an important conversation.

]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2025/05/19267726335_ff532c188b_b.jpg Don’t Give Up the Streets of Europe false no 58:52 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2025/05/29/upcoming-webinar-the-changing-us-israel-alliance/ Thu, 29 May 2025 05:17:32 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=27069 President Donald Trump changed the format for American policy in the Middle East. He announced the capitulation of the Houthis in their war against AMERICAN shipping; invited Qatar and Syria – terror ties notwithstanding – to join the Abraham Accords along with Saudi Arabia; and made (limited) overtures to Iran. At the same time, he has ensured American weapons deliveries in full to Israel; has not commented on Israel’s new offensive in Gaza; and is participating with Israel in the movement of food. Israel remains firmly ensconced in USCENTCOM.

How is the US-Israel relationship changing? Join us for a conversation with Dr. David Wurmser, a Senior Analyst for Middle East Affairs at the Center for Security Policy as he tracks the shifts and their implications for Israel and for regional security.

Aside from a few schools like Brandeis University  and Yeshiva University, scholars who are sympathetic to Israel are marginalized and forced into the shadows virtually everywhere else. Abrahms told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Thursday. Professors say privately that to be a faculty member, you need to be  “anti-Zionist” and that if you dissent from this orthodoxy your career advancement opportunities will be limited.

Abrahms said  he supports the Trump administration’s efforts to use the threat of withholding federal aid to force schools to expel students who engage in violence and intimidation. But he expressed concern that the hostility to Israel is so ingrained that the federal pressure may not be sufficient to bring about reform.

Abrahms believes that  university administrators, not students, are chiefly to blame for the situation, calling them “an integral part of what’s wrong.” These administrators, he said, “create this atmosphere” where anti-Semitism can flourish.

So-called Diversity, Equity and Inclusion (DEI) plans aimed at helping victimized groups are “inherently anti-Semitic,” according to Abrahms. He said that when he attempted to meet the chief diversity officer at his own school, he was informed that they do not view anti-Semitism “as one of the things they are fighting.” Later, Abrahms learned that the head of the school’s Chabad organization had been told the same thing.

He believes that, by leveraging their financial support,  Jewish donors could create a powerful incentive for reform. According to Abrahms, professors sympathetic to Zionism currently  “face an incentive system geared toward keeping them silent.”

Donors “need to place conditions” on academic institutions they support, Abrahms said.   “That’s the only way to change things.”

Today, however, those schools  are more like indoctrination factories where students are taught to see themselves as  victims in need of “safe spaces” and entitled to respond violently if they are forced to confront people who dissent from progressive orthodoxy.

Recently, we’ve witnessed disturbing scenes where Jewish students are terrorized by Hamas backers at Columbia University and hundreds of other colleges across the United States,  At Stanford U.,  a mob of students –  egged on by the school’s  associate dean for diversity, equity, and inclusion – blocked US Appeals Court Judge Stuart Kyle Duncan from speaking. At Yale, the war against free speech became so disruptive that more than a dozen federal judges announced they would no longer hire law clerks from that school.

Most university administrators are “spineless cowards,”  Shapiro told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Thursday. He added that these administrators opt to “capitulate to the mob” rather than lose opportunities to move up the career ladder in academia.

Shapiro emphasized that while hate speech is protected by the First Amendment, terroristic threats and physical violence are not.  He noted in Florida, Gov. Ron DeSantis was able to show that Students for Justice in Palestine,  a group that has been linked to much of the virulent pro-Hamas, anti-Semitic activity on US campuses in recent years, has provided “material support” to a terrorist organization, Hamas in violation of the Florida and US codes.. As a result, SJP has been disestablished on Florida public university campuses.

Ankara and Damascus are negotiating a “peace treaty” that would allow Turkish troops to operate inside the country, and Turkey has begun efforts to take control of an airbase known as T-4, including the deployment of air defenses. Turkey claims it is “stabilizing” Syria.

Israel has a different view.

Join us for a discussion with Hazem Alghabra, a former US State Department official with roots in Syria. We will look at Turkey’s increasing control in Syria, the Syrian government’s acquiescence, and the Israeli government’s response. And there is always time for Iran.

Summary: The International Criminal Court (ICC), established in 1998, was intended to prosecute the worst violations of human rights when national governments fail to act. Like many other international institutions, the ICC was created based on the highest ideals, says Eugene Kontorovich, a professor at George Mason University Law School. But ICC officials have come to realize that going after Israelis is easier than making a difference for global justice, he told a Republican Jewish Coalition webinar on Tuesday.

Last year, the ICC indicted Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and then-Defense Minister Yoav Gallant on war-crimes charges in connection with Israel’s prosecution of the war against Hamas after October 7. And, in an effort to purportedly show “balance,” the court indicted three senior Hamas terrorists – Ismail Haniyeh, Muhammad Diff and Yahya Sinwar. All three are deceased.

In more than two decades of existence, the ICC, with an annual budget of more than $200 million, has prosecuted only six people. Numerous high-profile cases have collapsed, and dictators including Vladimir Putin of Russia have just ignored ICC indictments.

Efforts to impose sanctions against the ICC have been blocked by Democrats led by former Senate Majority Leader and current Minority Leader Chuck Schumer.

Kontorovich was sharply critical of the Egyptian government’s refusal to open its border to Palestinians seeking to flee Gaza. He said Cairo is violating a legal obligation to open the border to refugees. He also discussed the legal concept of Uti Possidetis Juris and its application to the borders of Israel.

Many of those who  vandalized and destroyed property and buildings and   blocked access to classes and dormitories, were neither American citizens nor even students.  In reality, they were engaged in pro-terrorist activities, roaming  throughout the country to mobilize support for Hamas, which the United States  designated a terrorist group in 1997.

Yet, for more than a year, President Biden’s Justice Department refused to prosecute any of these cases, Von Spakovsky told a Jewish Policy Center webinar on Thursday. The Justice Department, he added, has authority to act against pro-Hamas thugs on campus under the Enforcement Act of 1870. That measure, passed by Congress and signed into law by President Ulysses Grant,  gave federal prosecutors authority to target the Ku Klux Klan and its masked marauders who were terrorizing, assaulting  and killing Black Americans.

Today, this law is  codified at 18 USC  Section 241, and is particularly applicable to Hamas backers because of their proclivity for hiding behind masks. All of the masked Hamas terror supporters infesting US college  campuses were  “in disguise”  and therefore subject to prosecution for hindering other students from getting an education.

Under Section 241, violators are subject to heavy fines and up to 10 years in prison. The Trump administration has begun identifying these people and revoking their visas.

“All foreign students should have their visas revoked,” von Spakovsky said. “They should also be criminally prosecuted for threatening, dangerous behavior.”

Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), is the coalition of Sunni Islamist insurgent groups which overthrew President Bashar al-Assad in December, toppling a Baathist dictatorship which ruled Syria for more than half a century. Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani, who previously served as head of the Nusra Front, al-Qaida’s branch in Syria, is head of HTS as well as Syria’s new president.Jawlani is his nom de guerre; these days, he goes by his given name, Ahmed Hussein al-Sharaa.

Jawlani/Sharaa “doesn’t talk for Syria,” Rhode told a JPC webinar Thursday. “He talks for his terrorists.”

Rhode, who served as an advisor on the Islamic world in the Office of the Secretary of Defense from 1982 to 2010, characterizes HTS as “”al-Qaida in another form.”

There are two groups inside Syria’s complicated ethnic/political mosaic with a history of good relations with Israel: First, there is the Druze community, mostly in southern and western Syria near the Golan Heights and Lebanon, which is establishing, in large part, closer ties with Israel. Second are the Syrian Kurds, in particular the Syrian Democratic Forces SDF), a Kurdish-dominated militia that signed a peace treaty with the HTS government earlier this month.

A critical question is what the SDF will do with thousands of ISIS prisoners it has been guarding for almost a decade in the wake of the US-led military campaign against that group:Specifically, would the Kurds release a large number of violent, dangerous prisoners to curry favor with HTS?

Rhode doubts that would happen.

Ella’s lecture does not focus on the pain of October 7th but rather on the incredible inner strength that emerges in times of crisis – inner strength that emerged among the people of Israel.

Join us for an extraordinary conversation.

After a burst of negative reaction from Jordan and Egypt, they, along with Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, and Oman met in Riyadh to talk about Gaza.

Join Jonathan Schanzer of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies to learn whether the Arab states have a plan – and, if so, how it works with Israel’s security needs and the determination of the US and Israel to uproot Hamas from the region.

Join us as Dr. Mark Meirowitz, Professor of Humanities at SUNY Maritime College, and expert on Turkish foreign policy, discusses the complex elements of an evolving regional crisis that has rarely made it into the American media.

In his book, Troy explains in detail how Rockefeller tried to keep the federal government at arm’s length, only to President Theodore Roosevelt break up his Standard Oil Company. Ford worked to persuade President Woodrow Wilson to stay out of World War I, lobbying so aggressively that at one point Wilson ejected him from the White House.

Ford, a fervent isolationist, fought hard to keep the United States out of World War II. But after the Japanese surprise attack on Pearl Harbor, Ford became a strong supporter of the war effort even though he detested FDR. 

Speaking to a Jewish Policy Center webinar Thursday, Troy provided vivid images of a visit to a Ford plant by FDR and First Lady Eleanor Roosevelt to see firsthand how the company was contributing to the war effort. At one point, Ford found himself in the back seat of one of his vehicles, sandwiched uncomfortably in between FDR and Eleanor. 

In his book, Troy provides plenty of interesting stories and colorful detail about prominent business figures like Time magazine founder Henry Luce and Hollywood icon Lew Wasserman, a Democratic Party donor who nonetheless developed strong ties to Republican leaders as well.

While his book was published before Elon Musk’s all-out plunge into the 2024 campaign on behalf of Donald Trump, Troy said he was surprised by the “level of hatred” directed at Musk by the ideological left. He added that the “woke whiners” at The Washington Post who complain about efforts by the paper’s owner, Jeff Bezos, to distance it from the hard left, don’t seem to understand something important: that Bezos is tired of losing millions of dollars as a result of his paper’s plummeting circulation.

Is the continuing upheaval news or bad? Will it bring stability or more war?

David Daoud, Senior Fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies will join us on what is – accidentally but fortuitously – Lebanon’s presidential election day.

But then, the next round of worry started. Who does the “interim government” represent? (Hint: HTS and its leader are on the US & UK terror lists.) What role does Turkey play? How will Iran respond? What will happen to Israel’s friends, the Kurds? Or to Syria’s Druze community – family to Israel’s Druze citizens? Or to Jordan?

Join us for a conversation with Barry Shaw, Senior Associate for Public Diplomacy at the Israel Institute for Strategic Studies as he explores the actors and the actions in post-Assad Syria.

Join us for a conversation with EJ Kimball, Director of Policy and Strategic Operations for the non-profit US-Israel Education Association as we look forward.

]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/07/16-264-hezbollah.jpg The Ceasefire – Survival Isn’t Victory false no 59:58 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2024/11/21/video-who-is-coming-across-our-borders/ Thu, 21 Nov 2024 19:36:56 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=26610 Last month, an identifiably Jewish Chicago man was shot while walking to synagogue on the Sabbath. While attacks against American Jews have generally been prosecuted as “assaults” or “hate crimes,” this time the assailant was charged with “terrorism.” A native of Mauritania, he had been “encountered by US Border Patrol at the California border in 2023,” according to ICE, but then entered the country.

• Was this a “one-off” or part of a pattern?
• How much do Federal authorities actually know about would-be terrorists crossing America’s insecure borders?
• What steps are they taking to secure our country?
• With the new administration, what changes are likely along the borders – and have we already seen some?

Join us for a conversation with Todd Bensman, Senior National Security Fellow at the Center for Immigration Studies to discuss the current state of America’s borders – north and south.

Join us for a wide-ranging conversation with Dr. Jonathan Schanzer, senior vice president of research at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies.

How is that possible?

Avi Mayer, Co-Chair of the Advisory Board of Global Jewry, and immediate past Editor-in-Chief of The Jerusalem Post, will discuss the astonishing resilience of the people of Israel.

Israel pre-empted.

The battle is moving fast – but there is an almost unmentioned element of this war: Lebanon is a multi-ethnic, multi-religious country. Not all of its people are comfortable with Hezbollah’s occupation of the southern part, and not happy with the provocations that lead to Israeli preemption or retaliation. And all know that they are being used as human shields and human sacrifice by Iran.

Hussain Abdul Hussain, is a research fellow at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD). Born in Beirut, he’s been listening to the people.

The military and political battles were front page news… until they weren’t.

As the war has stagnated, Ukraine has been relegated to the back pages of the New York Times and Washington Post – if you find them at all.

Join us as Ukraine and Russia analyst Stephen Bryen, a former Undersecretary of Defense, explains what is happening on the ground and in the capitals of the countries most involved.

Don’t be distracted.

The Supreme Court is there to ensure that the laws passed are consistent with the Constitution. Each term provides rulings about the role – and limitations – of government, and protections for We the People.

The real questions are, “What were the key rulings of the 2024 Court” and “How well did it respond to the crucial issues lawmakers and citizens put before them?”

Join Ilya Shapiro, senior fellow and director of constitutional studies at the Manhattan Institute, and JPC Fellow, for a review of key cases of 2024 and the implications for our American future.

]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/09/2022_Roberts_Court_Formal_083122_Web.jpg The Supreme Court – 2024 Decisions and their Impact false no 52:50 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2024/09/04/upcoming-webinar-on-the-ground-in-gaza/ Wed, 04 Sep 2024 15:18:08 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=26387 “No case represents a bigger perversion” of the law than the violence committed by  Iranian-allied groups like Hamas, a retired U.S. general said Wednesday.

While the war in Gaza is clearly difficult for civilians, assertions like those made by the  International Criminal Court that Israel is starving Gazans  did not match what he witnessed during a recent visit to both sides of the border, retired three-star Gen. David Deptula said at a Jewish Policy Center webinar.

Deptula, whose extensive military leadership experience ranges from tsunami relief in South Asia to senior roles in U.S. combat operations  in Iraq and Afghanistan, visited Gaza in late July. He described an area of Gaza near the Keren Shalom border crossing that was lined with dozens of trucks, most of them carrying food.  The road had been built by the IDF to make it easier to resupply Gaza’s civilian population with fuel, food, water and other essential supplies.

The amount of food supplies entering Gaza is over 3,000 calories a day – more than sufficient for the average man or woman to maintain a stable diet. But food often fails to reach the civilian population because it is frequently stolen by Hamas fighters and criminal gangs, said Deptula, who emphasized that Hamas fighters deliberately conceal themselves among the civilian population. 

He called the killing of Palestinians “a cruel and illegal” part of Hamas’ strategy to drive the IDF out of Gaza before it destroys the group  as a military force.

Deptula faulted the Western media for failing to tell the public about the IDF’s fact-finding efforts to hold its military accountable –– which include a judicial arm that is separate from the military chain of command.

The IDF “probably does more than any military in the world to safeguard civilians,” said Deptula. He added that it was essential that Israel retain control of the Philadelphi Corridor – which runs along the border between Egypt and Gaza and is used as a weapon-smuggling route by Hamas. .

Deptula slammed Vice President Kamala Harris  and other politicians for failing to understand that there can be no “moral equivalence” between Israel and Hamas, adding  that blame for civilian casualties lies squarely with the terror group.

Mark Mills of the Texas Public Policy Foundation and Director of the National Center for Energy Analytics will bring us the latest innovations in nuclear technology and plans for the future.

Simone Ledeen is former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Middle East (DASD) and a Venture Partner at Texas Venture Partners.

]]> https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2024/07/RU27GJAG4JFTXHD4MJSTQAND7A.avif The Wide Potential of Israel’s Defense Firms, Featuring Simone Ledeen false no 59:56 No no https://www.jewishpolicycenter.org/2024/06/20/upcoming-webinar-strategic-threats-in-the-red-sea/ Thu, 20 Jun 2024 16:19:31 +0000 https://jewishpolicycenter.local/?p=26041 The war in the Red Sea appears to have receded. Don’t be fooled. The Houthis are active pawns of China, which has a base in Djibouti, as well as of Iran. They attack shipping they claim is going to Israel as well as US naval vessels. In the first two months of 2024, traffic into the Suez Canal dropped 50% from a year earlier; forcing international trade to take the long way around Africa drives up costs. More importantly, says our guest Dr. David Wurmser, it “undermines one of the primary functions of the United States Navy, which is to be the guarantor of freedom of the seas.”

Dr. Wurmser is Senior Analyst, Center for Security Policy and Director of its Middle East program. He is a retired naval intelligence officer.