In December 2023, South Africa surprised and dismayed supporters of Israel – as well as Western diplomats and strategists around the world – by bringing a case against Israel before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in The Hague. But perhaps observers should not have been surprised. For more than two decades, ties between Israel and South Africa have steadily deteriorated, while Pretoria has increasingly aligned itself with anti-democratic global actors and agendas opposed to the US-led international world order.
To fully understand South Africa’s current posture toward Israel, it is necessary to zoom out and consider its broader international outlook.
Many Western diplomats came of age during the so-called “end of history” period that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. They believed the triumph of liberal democracy had ushered in a new era in which hard power and deterrence could give way to diplomacy and engagement.
In South Africa, the African National Congress (ANC) rose to power during this time with the end of apartheid. With its primary ally – the Soviet Union – gone, many Western observers assumed the ANC would pivot toward liberal democratic values. This, however, was a miscalculation.
Despite its carefully curated image in Western capitals, the ANC was never a committed champion of global democracy. Since the 1960s, it had accepted financial and logistical support from authoritarian regimes – most notably the Soviets and East Germany. After taking power, it continued these relationships, receiving backing from autocrats such as Suharto (Indonesia), Sani Abacha (Nigeria), Muammar Gaddafi (Libya), Saddam Hussein (Iraq), and the Qatari state. Yasser Arafat often facilitated these arrangements, introducing the ANC to benefactors across the Arab world that helped it overcome its chronic political funding challenges.
In return, South Africa offered diplomatic support and symbolic legitimacy, leveraging its global moral standing that came in the wake of the defeat of the apartheid regime. Authoritarian leaders facing domestic or international criticism were able to buy good PR, including policy positions, state visits, or backing at multilateral forums by writing checks. This practice was especially easy to achieve when aligned with the ANC’s long-standing ideological commitment to “anti-imperialism,” and “third world solidarity,” a Cold War relic that continues to shape its foreign policy.
Support for Global Extremism
Over time, the ANC increasingly positioned itself, and by extension South Africa, as an opponent of global democratic norms. In 2005, the country blocked discussion of human rights abuses in Zimbabwe at the UN Human Rights Council. In 2008, Hugo Chávez visited South Africa, strengthening its ties with his autocratic Venezuela regime. In 2009, the government denied the Dalai Lama a visa to attend a peace conference. It abstained from UN General Assembly votes condemning North Korea’s human rights violations in 2014 and consistently declined to support resolutions on human rights in Syria in 2015, 2016, and 2018. That same year, US Ambassador Nikki Haley noted that South Africa ranked among the ten countries most likely to vote against the United States at the UN.
By 2022, civil society groups had to take the South African government to court to prevent it from transferring R50 million in public funds to Cuba – without clear justification.
Iran
Among all its international relationships, South Africa’s ties to the Islamic Republic of Iran are particularly close. Iran loudly supported the ANC during the anti-apartheid struggle (despite secretly trading oil for arms with the apartheid government). After 1994, Tehran’s continued anti-Western stance deepened the relationship. In 2004, South African telecoms giant MTN – chaired at the time by current President Cyril Ramaphosa – secured an operating license in Iran, ousting Turkish competitor Turkcell. The deal was dogged by allegations of bribery and diplomatic manipulation. Unsurprisingly South Africa was a key ally of Iran at the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The MTN scandal continues to unfold. Turkcell has pursued legal action internationally for over a decade, and a recent ruling by South Africa’s Supreme Court suggests domestic litigation may soon proceed. Meanwhile, a U.S. lawsuit accuses MTN of links to the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The ANC has continued to push to deepen ties with Iran and advocated its inclusion in BRICS (the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa economic bloc).
The Western Response
The West’s response to South Africa’s evolution into the world’s “rogue democracy” was largely muted. Pretoria was seen as a minor player, and its enthusiastic endorsement of Western-sponsored climate change initiatives further dissuaded any diplomatic unpleasantness.
It took Russia’s invasion of Ukraine to upend that complacency. South Africa abstained from UN resolutions condemning the invasion, sent “goodwill delegations” to Moscow, and spoke of “recalibrating the global order.” Naval exercises were conducted with the Russian military – timed to coincide with the anniversary of the invasion – and US diplomats were publicly rebuked for highlighting South Africa’s weapons trading with Russia. For the first time, the West was forced to confront the reality of South Africa’s foreign policy regression.
Israel
Nowhere was this situation more clearly illustrated than in its relationship with Israel.
In the early post-apartheid years, relations were cordial, buoyed by the optimism of the Oslo Accords and ANC caution over not upsetting Western allies. So, despite Israel and the ANC being on opposite sides for much of the Cold War, bilateral agreements were signed in 1996. Nelson Mandela made a high-profile visit to Israel in 1999 (although no longer officially as president) and met senior officials including Prime Minister Ehud Barak and received an honorary doctorate from Ben-Gurion University. This was a move that upset some ANC members.
Relations began to sour after the 2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban, which descended into an antisemitic farce. That same year, senior ANC figures began labeling Israel an “apartheid state.” In 2004, South Africa formally opposed Israel’s case regarding the Judea and Samaria security barrier at the ICJ. In 2010, the government temporarily withdrew its ambassador following the Mavi Marmara Gaza flotilla raid incident. In 2011, it attempted to label goods from Judea and Samaria as originating from “illegal settlements in the Occupied Palestinian Territories” – only relenting under legal pressure. In 2012, the ANC formally endorsed the Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) campaign as one of its official policies.
By 2013, South Africa’s foreign minister announced a policy of curtailing high-level engagement with Israel. In 2015, the higher education minister urged universities to cut ties with their Israeli counterparts. That same year, Hamas leaders made an unannounced visit to South Africa and signed a cooperation agreement with the ANC – drawing criticism not only from pro-Israel groups, but also from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the ANC’s traditional ally. Hamas officials were welcomed again in 2017 at the ANC conference that elected Ramaphosa party leader. That same conference passed a resolution to downgrade diplomatic ties with Israel.
Claims of Genocide
In 2018, following violent Gaza protests over the US embassy move to Jerusalem, the ANC compared Israel Defense Force (IDF) actions to those of Hitler, saying, “All South Africans must rise up and treat Israel like the pariah that it is.” South Africa recalled its ambassador from Israel and he has not returned.
At times, the government’s fixation on Israel bordered on the absurd. In 2021, the minister of the Arts and Culture Department decided to pick a fight with a beauty queen and launched a weeks-long public pressure campaign to try and force Miss South Africa to boycott the Miss Universe pageant because it was being held in Eilat. She refused – and proceeded to place second runner-up in the competition.
After the October 7 Hamas attacks, President Ramaphosa issued a statement blaming Israel for the violence but failing to mention a word about the hostages. Shortly after, his international relations minister made an unannounced trip to Tehran and also held a phone call with Hamas leadership. Upon the minister’s return, Pretoria escalated its long-standing apartheid accusation against Israel to a charge of genocide – submitting the case to the ICJ.
The US Responds
This was the final straw for Washington. Frustrated with the Biden administration’s pusillanimity regarding South Africa, members of Congress introduced HR-7256, a bipartisan bill calling for a review of the US–South Africa relationship to ascertain whether Pretoria’s actions threaten American security interests.
The arrival of the second Trump administration further accelerated this trend. A series of executive orders targeted South Africa for undermining property rights, enabling racial preferences in business, and supporting America’s adversaries abroad. Programs involving aid to South Africa as well as military cooperation have been suspended. South Africa’s ambassador to Washington – who had longstanding ties to Hamas – was declared persona non grata after labeling the MAGA movement “white supremacists.” A newly-appointed “special envoy” to the US, has come under intense scrutiny because he is currently chair of MTN (though not during the Iran deal) and for negative remarks made about President Donald Trump during his first term.
The situation means that South Africa-US relations are worse than they have ever been and have the potential to jeopardize US-Africa trade agreements such as the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), from which South Africa risks expulsion. The administration has also threatened to invoke the Magnitsky Act to sanction South African officials implicated in corruption.
Ramaphosa Comes to Washington
This all came to a head when President Ramaphosa led a high-level delegation to the White House in May 2025. The meeting turned adversarial when President Trump raised the issue of attacks on white farmers. In the runup to the meeting, 59 South Africans from that community arrived under a United States-sponsored refugee program.
While claims of “genocide” may be hyperbolic, rural safety and farm attacks, which sometimes include elements of torture, are a real and long-standing concern in South Africa. The government has done little to address them. Furthermore, new legislation that empowers the state to expropriate property below market value – or even without compensation – has raised alarm. Additional proposed laws aim to redistribute land based on racial criteria. The blood-curdling chants of a small but militant opposition party at their rallies of “kill the Boer, kill the farmer” shown in a video by President Trump have further added to anxiety around the situation.
Hope from the People?
Yet, it would be a mistake to conflate the ANC’s foreign and domestic agenda with the values of the South African public at large.
In 2024, the Social Research Foundation (SRF) found that 74 percent of South Africans oppose race-based preferences – at odds with Western critical race ideology. Two-thirds favor job creation and tax cuts over welfare and redistribution. Nearly 60 percent oppose property expropriation without compensation. Most South Africans – regardless of race – are socially conservative, value family and faith (80 percent identify as Christian), and seek a better economic future.
On foreign policy, a narrow majority prefer alignment with the West over China and Russia. Regarding Israel, Pew (2007) found more South Africans supported Israel (28 percent) than the Palestinians (19 percent), a trend echoed in a SRF survey from 2023. Views on the “apartheid analogy” remain evenly split, despite decades of aggressive government and media messaging on the topic. Pro-Israel advocacy – both Jewish and non-Jewish – remains vocal and resilient and resonates with the population.
After October 7, the South African Jewish community, like many others around the world, put up posters of the hostages taken by Hamas. I was present when a group began pasting them along Johannesburg’s Nelson Mandela Bridge, a thoroughfare of chiefly poor and working-class people. In many Western capitals, these posters were torn down by pro-Hamas protesters, but in South Africa that was not the case. Passersby were taken aback; some stopped to read and ask questions; others offered a moment of prayer. The respect on display was a far cry from the shameful scenes that played out on American university campuses and in many Western cities.
ANC: Losing the Public
These sentiments were tested in South Africa’s May 2024 national election. Misreading the mood, the ANC doubled down on racial quotas, redistribution, and anti-Israel rhetoric. Palestinian flags overshadowed South African ones at rallies. Ramaphosa, wearing a keffiyeh, declared: “Palestine will be free from the river to the sea.”
Voters recoiled. After years of rolling blackouts, corruption, and stagnation, the ANC suffered a historic 17-point drop and lost its parliamentary majority for the first time. A coalition government was formed with the pro-Western Democratic Alliance and other smaller parties. The Islamist-leaning foreign minister lost her seat and was excluded from the new cabinet. The presence of so many groups sharing power is unprecedented in more than 350 years of South African history and offers a new path forward.
South Africa has immense potential to become a key ally of the US, Israel, and the broader Western world. Its strategic geography guards access to the southern Atlantic which is a backdoor into the Western hemisphere coveted by the Chinese. It is also host to an abundance of critical minerals, easy access to African markets, and a population that broadly supports democratic values. Such factors all position it well for a diplomatic reset which would include better relations with Israel.
The ANC’s grip on power may have weakened but lasting change will require sustained democratic pressure, both at home and from abroad. The Trump administration has put this agenda at the forefront and South Africa’s government has begun to respond – for example, by considering reforms to racially based procurement laws in the telecom sector. Yet deep reforms and realignment in foreign policy remain distant goals.
The Trump administration’s assertive stance must be supported, and pressure must be continued as this period offers a rare opportunity in South Africa to support democracy, the rule of law – and a chance to turn around South African–Israeli relations.
Benji Shulman is the Director of the Middle East Africa Research Institute.
