This article explains why and how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is assisting the Houthi terrorists in Yemen against the US, Israel, Europe, and world trade.
Three Wars Strategy
The Three Wars Strategy (TWS) is different from the 2003 People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) Three Warfares (lawfare, media warfare, and psychological warfare).
Beginning in 2018, Long Kaifeng, a Chinese academic writing for the Kunlun Policy Research Institute (privately-run pro-CCP commentary platform advocating an extreme Maoist ideology), wrote four articles recommending that the PRC use TWS to globally stalemate the US and its allies. He developed his TWS with three additional articles during April–June 2023.
Kaifeng argued the CCP should foment at least three wars throughout the world to disperse US forces and to use up US weapons, especially those assigned to protect Taiwan. He describes TWS in his June 2023 article: “The three major battles refer to the European, Middle Eastern, and East Asian battles, each targeting the US’s strategic foci: Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. The US’s European dominance hinges on NATO, so the goal of the European Battle is to dismantle NATO; the Middle East underpins the US dollar, so the Middle Eastern Battle seeks to dethrone the US dollar; and the Island Chain Strategy is central to US’s grip on Asia, making the East Asian Battle’s aim to shatter this strategy.”
Two of three wars have already started: (1) Russia invaded Ukraine, and (2) Iran and its proxies attacked Israel. The third war is yet to start.
In an April 2024 article for the Jewish Policy Center, “China’s Support of Hamas: Evidence and Actions,” I demonstrated why and how the CCP directly supports Hamas, further elaborated in other articles and interviews.
In a Taipei Times article, “Implications of PLA soldiers fighting for Russia in Ukraine,” I provided evidence of the CCP’s direct military support to Russia. On April 9, 2025, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy accused PRC of providing direct support to Russia, citing the PRC’s provision of war supplies, the capture of two Chinese nationals fighting with Russian soldiers, and that more than 150 Chinese citizens were fighting with the Russians.
The above examples illustrate Kaifeng’s TWS.
What are the Houthis Doing?
From October 19, 2023, until May 5, 2025 (the ceasefire date between the US and the Houthis), Houthis attacked commercial vessels and Navy war ships with missiles, drones, and speed boats. The Houthis continue to attack Israel with drones, cruise missiles, and ballistic missiles.
Houthi attacks on international shipping have imposed costs on regional states and beyond:
Red Sea shipping throughput decreased by 75%.
The safety detour around Africa adds 10 to 14 days to the traditional 30 to 40-day voyage from Asia to Europe and involves higher fuel costs and insurance premiums. Delays and additional shipping costs translate into higher consumer costs on shipped goods.
The Atlantic Council reports costs to Egypt and Saudi Arabia dating from September 2024: “transshipment traffic at Saudi Arabia’s King Abdullah Port [has] nearly vanished, and Jeddah Port operations more than halved in the first half of the year … [and] the Suez Canal also lost more than half of its shipping operations.” The loss of tax revenues collected on Suez commercial traffic (high of $10.25 billion in 2023 to a low of $4 billion in 2024) pose a severe challenge to Egypt.
Israel’s southern commercial Port of Eilat closed to commercial traffic due to Houthi attacks.
Commercial costs between October 19, 2023 and April 18, 2025 include two ships sunk, two ships hijacked, 140 ships attacked, and at least 30 ships damaged even with all the allied warships and Israeli missile defense systems in the region.
US military equipment losses include more than 22 MQ-9s ($30 million per drone) and one F/A-18 Super Hornet (due to friendly fire).
The map nearby shows the attacks from October 19, 2023 through June 6, 2025 from the Armed Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED) set. Between April 29, 2025 and May 29, 2025 (after the US-Houthi ceasefire), the Houthis attacked Israel 20 times.
Between October 19, 2023, and May 6, 2025 (US-Houthi ceasefire agreement), the US Navy launched more than 220 missiles to protect Red Sea commercial shipping and US and allied navy ships. Depleting stocks of these missiles lowers assessed risk in the CCP’s attack planning calculus against Taiwan. Replacing these missiles has a large cost asymmetry.
In January 2025, the US Navy reported that during 15 months of fighting it had expended 120 SM-2 missiles ($2.1 million per missile), 80 SM-6 missiles ($3.9 million), 20 Evolved Sea Sparrow Missiles (ESSM) and SM-3 missiles (ranging from $9.6 million to $27.9 million) against 380 attack drones, ballistic and cruise missiles. The cost of US missiles launched against Houthi targets is more than $1.8 billion. This expenditure does not include the costs associated with offensive operations, such as Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles (TLAMs) strikes ($2.4 million each) against Houthis targets, US strikes against almost 1,000 targets from March-May 2025 (estimated to cost more than $1 billion), deployment costs, and pulling naval assets from the Indo-Pacific.
The costs of Houthi weapons are lower than US systems employed to defeat them. For example, Houthi drones cost between $5,000 and $20,000. US Navy missiles used to shoot them down cost more than 100 times more!
Houthi Weapons Against Israel
The Houthis have a wide variety of weapons including surface-to-surface missiles, artillery rockets, loitering munitions, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and Russia, China, or Iran produce most of these. The Houthis have missiles and UAVs capable of reaching Israel, such as:
Cruise missiles: the Iranian Soumar family with strike ranges of about 1,200 mi.
Naval surface drones: 23-foot-long unmanned surface vessels (USVs) laden with explosives.
Quds-2 missiles: with a range of 840 miles and designed to strike Israel.
Samad-3 and Samad-4: UAVs/loitering munitions with ranges of at least 1,100 miles.
Toufan: a surface-to-surface ballistic missile, with a range of 1,100 miles.
Wa’id drones: like Iran’s Shahed 136, loitering munition with a range of 1,600 miles.
Between October 7, 2023, and June 7, 2025, the Houthis launched more than 200 ballistic missiles and more than 170 drones at Israel. Since significant fighting in Gaza restarted on March 18, 2025, the Houthis increased their frequency of attack against Israel firing 43 ballistic missiles and 10 drones at Israel through June 7.
Although Israel’s Iron Dome and David Sling missile defense missiles cost significantly less than US missile defense systems, Israel’s Arrow II/III are several million dollars each and consequently face the same challenges of expending expensive missiles against cheaper adversary systems. Furthermore, as both Iran and the Houthis persist in launching attacks against Israel, there will come a point at which Israel’s ability to defend itself will be impaired and the Israeli political leadership will no longer be able to hold back a more aggressive deterrent response.
China’s Houthi Support
On April 17, 2025, the US State Department accused China and Russia with militarily aiding the Houthis. Sanctions degraded Iran’s ability to help Yemen, while Russia and China stepped up their assistance.
State Department spokesperson Tammy Bruce said: “It is clear that Beijing and China-based companies provide key economic and technical support to regimes like Russia, North Korea, and Iran and its proxies… The CCP continues to enable these regimes, whether it be through the provision of dual-use items Russia needs to sustain its war in Ukraine, North Korea’s ballistic missile development, or Iran’s support of terrorism across the Middle East,” she said, referring to the Chinese Communist Party.
The CCP has provided military hardware and intelligence to support Houthis aggression during the current conflict. For example, the US Treasury sanctioned two China-based companies in 2024 for providing “dual-use materials and components needed to manufacture, maintain, and deploy an arsenal of advanced missiles and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) against US and allied interests.”
A report by the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) stated that the Houthis were using weapons made in China for their attacks on shipping in the Red Sea in exchange for safe passage. Houthi leaders visited China in 2023 and 2024 to establish a supply chain to obtain “advanced components and guidance equipment” for their missiles. These Chinese components would allow the Houthis to produce hundreds of missiles capable of striking Arabian Gulf states, Israel, and shipping. In fact, Chinese shipping through the Red Sea has increased above previous levels enhancing its competitive pricing to other countries that had to travel around Africa. The Washington Institute also reported that maritime data confirms that “China-associated” ships continue to transit the Red Sea without being targeted, even though a China-linked oil tanker was mistakenly struck in March 2024.
The US Department of State asserts that Chinese state-owned Chang Guang Satellite Technology Corporation (CGST) provided geospatial intelligence (targeting information) to the Houthis to strike US Navy ships and international vessels in the Red Sea. In 2023, the US sanctioned CGST for allegedly providing high-resolution satellite imagery to Wagner Group that participated in Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. According to The Financial Times, BluePath Labs, a US government consulting firm, noted that CGST had 100 satellites in orbit and its plans to have 300 in orbit by the end of 2025 “would enable it to take repeat images of any location in the world every 10 minutes.”
In addition to the CCP, Russia is helping the Houthis. According to The Wall Street Journal, Russia reportedly provided targeting intelligence to the Houthis against commercial ships, following Long Kaifeng’s TWS of distracting US and NATO forces in other conflicts around the world. The Middle East Eye also reported that Russia had sent GRU military intelligence personnel to support Houthi efforts to attack commercial shipping in the Red Sea.
Summary
The CCP is setting the world on fire: It starts fires all over the world and helps terrorists like the Houthis, Hezbollah, Hamas, other groups in Gaza, and state sponsors of terrorism like Iran, North Korea, and Russia. Collaboration with China in TWS against the US reflects the common goal of removing the US as the guardian of free and open trade.
The CCP is reducing US forces available for Taiwan: Each time the US draws military assets away from the Indo-Pacific, the likelihood increases that the CCP could order the PLA to attack Taiwan. For example, one outcome of the Vinson Carrier Strike Group (CSG) leaving the Western Pacific to steam to the Middle East, only one CSG – George Washington CSG home ported in Japan—is available for the Indo-Pacific. The US Navy may assign another CSG to replace the Vinson CSG. The Nimitz CSG eventually replaced the Vinson CSG in late April but there was at least a 30-day gap in coverage of the Indo-Pacific region.
The CCP is depleting US sea-based missile defense assets: US missile stocks shrink as the US expends missiles against Houthi airborne threats, and US production capabilities lag behind the rate of operational use.
CCP’s TWS: Finally, we should understand that drawing the US into other conflicts around the world is a classic example of divide and conquer. The Greeks, Romans and the Chinese Communists used it extensively. Currently, we have Russia-Ukraine, Middle East with multiple terrorist groups active against Israel. A third war could be brewing with North and South Korea or a Southeast Asian Sea flare up to deplete forces available to assist Taiwan. So, Taiwan should be on guard whenever US moves military forces out of the Western Pacific, and whenever there are gaps of forces during rotations or exercises.
Elbridge Colby, Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, said it succinctly in October 2024 on “X”: “Why would China help us address the Houthis problem when it obviously distracts and depletes us?”
An Atlantic Council’s January 2025 article noted that “as the shipping industry adjusts to the disruptions, Beijing can absorb some losses, as long as the United States and its allies lose more.” Cleo Paskal said it best in her testimony to Congress: For China it’s not a zero-sum game – it’s a negative sum game. They will win if the other side loses more.
Lt. Col. Guermantes Lailari, USAF (ret.), is a visiting researcher at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research in Taipei, Taiwan.
