Central Asia, the vast geographic region bordering both Russia and China, is a Washington policy stepchild, often assigned low priority on the American strategic agenda, regardless of which party is in power in the White House. Washington’s attention has fluctuated with the tide of geopolitical events, such as America’s long war and eventual withdrawal from Afghanistan. Similarly, immediately after the fall of the Soviet Union, post-9/11, and after Russia’s 2022 invasion of Ukraine, American interest briefly focused on Central Asia only to slide away again. Result: Washington has little to show in terms of lasting engagement with this resource-rich region despite its strategic position as the heartland of the Eurasian landmass.
Recently, President Donald Trump played a key role in facilitating peace between Azerbaijan and Armenia in the South Caucasus, another strategic region, located between Turkey, Iran, and Russia. The Trump Route for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), briefly explained in a White House memorandum issued August 8th, will create a nexus to normalize economic activity in the region, provide America a frontier from which to pressure Iran, and signal America’s growing strategic edge in the area. If successful, it will help keep Russia and Iran out of the South Caucasus. US policy aimed at expanding the Abraham Accords to include Azerbaijan and possibly Central Asian countries suggests a bold diplomatic vision that develops a Eurasia-Middle East land bridge under American aegis.
Now America’s national security posture, defined by the competition with China, has compelled the Trump administration to focus on strategic minerals. China’s dominance gives it critical advantages across many high-tech sectors crucial to national security, including IT, aerospace, and advanced weapons systems. Additionally, improving the US trade balance and striking trade deals have become the White House’s top priorities.
Central Asia can address both imperatives. It has abundant critical minerals and other energy resources, and largely secular societies willing to cooperate with the US and the West while maintaining cordial relations with their former imperial powers, Russia and China. The region is landlocked by China, Russia, Afghanistan, and Iran, making it vital for future engagement between Washington and its rivals, Beijing and Moscow. Concerning critical minerals, simply put, either the uranium and other key resources that Central Asia can provide will go to the US and the West, or they will go to Beijing. What they will not do is remain underground. The Central Asian economies are under too much pressure to grow, and Beijing is too eager to buy.
After his second term inauguration, one of the first world leaders that President Trump called was Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev. US Secretary of State Marco Rubio emphasized the importance of the region during his confirmation hearing and has followed up on this in several meetings with Central Asian officials. Rubio called Uzbekistan’s foreign minister, Bakhtiyor Saidov, in February and met him in April to discuss anti-terrorism and economic cooperation. He met with Murat Nurtleu, Kazakhstan’s Deputy Prime Minister-Foreign Minister, this past June to discuss expanding bilateral ties, and with Turkmenistan’s Foreign Minister Rashid Meredov in August to promote regional integration and commend Turkmenistan’s assistance in repatriating Americans during the Iran-Israel conflict. At the July 2025 State Department Senate budget hearings, Rubio and Senator Steve Daines (R-MT) had a direct exchange about diplomatic priorities in the greater Caspian region – an encouraging sign.
Security Above All
Geographically and historically, Russia and China have had the strongest influence over Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan – also known as the C5), which is why the C5 seeks Western investment and support. For the US, investing in Central Asia can weaken Sino-Russian cooperation and even increase competition between Beijing and Moscow. It is a key region where the West should consistently work to limit Russian and Chinese power.
China currently dwarfs American trade in the region. The volume of US-C5 trade was approximately $4.1 billion in 2024; the volume with China reached $94.8 billion. The China-C5 relationship is based mainly on trade and investment. The Belt and Road Initiative, now at its second iteration, is a key vector of Beijing’s global influence. Kazakhstan was the starting point for the Belt and Road Initiative, setting the stage for China to become the chief regional economic power. Projects ranging from the China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway to electric vehicle factories are set to expand Beijing’s clout. Meanwhile, the US has removed sanctions exemptions for Iran’s port of Chabahar, a key transit destination in India’s International North-South Transport Corridor that would allow Central Asian countries to export to the Indian Ocean. By eliminating such options, American policy has jeopardized cooperation with India on Central Asia, and lent China even more power over regional trade.
Russia’s trade with Central Asia has also, to a minor extent, helped Moscow hedge against loss of revenue from sanctions incurred after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Russian companies such as Gazprom, Rosatom, and Lukoil are major commercial presences in C5 states, particularly Uzbekistan. Only Western involvement in the region’s economies and the threat of further sanctions prevent Central Asian trade from becoming an unchecked method of sanctions evasion.
The Kremlin’s leadership of several regional intergovernmental organizations, like the Eurasian Economic Union, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Commonwealth of Independent States, enables it to maintain a high level of diplomatic presence and strengthen defense ties, even if only aspirationally. Russia also has the most significant military presence in the region, stationing troops on the Tajik-Afghan border, training officers, maintaining foreign military bases, and being responsible for the largest share of weapons imports.
Central Asia also borders Iran, an actor that ratcheted up tensions with the US in recent months, culminating in Israeli and American airstrikes on Tehran’s nuclear facilities. While these attacks diminished the immediate nuclear threat, Tehran still projects power by funding Islamist proxy groups. Intelligence cooperation between the US and the C5 can be mutually beneficial to mitigate the spread of these and other extremist groups. The presence of the Afghan Taliban to the south further underscores the need for partners to combat terrorist encroachment through diplomatic engagement and intelligence cooperation.
US Economic Opportunities in Central Asia
To thrive in peace or win in war in the 21st century, rare earths are essential. However, thanks partly to Western obliviousness and partly to Chinese mastery of playing the long game, over 60 percent of mining and 80 percent of global refining of strategic minerals are in the hands of the CCP. The 2025 US Department of Interior report prioritizes the following strategic minerals based on the modelled impact of potential disruption: samarium, rhodium, lutetium, terbium, dysprosium, gallium, germanium, gadolinium, tungsten, and niobium.
As America seeks to reduce its dependence on Chinese supply chains, the most pressing need Central Asia can help satisfy is for critical minerals from sources outside China (“friend-shoring”). The C5 hold 38.6 percent of global magnesium reserves, 30.07 percent of chromium, 20 percent of lead, 12.6 percent of zinc, and 8.7 percent of titanium, as well as significant reserves of rare earth elements such as scandium, yttrium, and lanthanides. Kazakhstan, the regional leader in mining since the 1930s, is a major producer and exporter of many of these.
The US has already taken steps to engage Central Asian states in critical mineral production. In 2024, following a dialogue the US signed memoranda of understanding with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan to diversify mineral supply chains. Under President Trump, America’s need for secure critical minerals supply chains has become paramount. Washington’s efforts to secure these recently included the US-Ukraine minerals deal, mediation between Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and expanded funding for the Lobito Corridor in Central Africa.
Relations between the US and the C5 also have room for development in the energy sector. As the world’s leading uranium producer, representing 14 percent of the world’s reserves and responsible for over 40 percent of global production, Kazakhstan can help meet America’s demand for uranium, especially as big tech looks to nuclear power to fuel AI-driven data centers and the country cuts off Russian supplies. Uzbekistan, holding one percent of global reserves and accounting for seven percent of the world’s production, is also interested in working with the US.
Turkmenistan, with some of the largest natural gas reserves on the planet, is a key supplier of to China. However, as the European Union (EU) seeks to eliminate its dependence on Russian natural gas, which fuels the Kremlin’s war on Ukraine, American help to introduce Turkmen gas to the European market, in addition to its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) supply, would create a friction point between China and Europe in the region and help ensure Brussels and Washington remain aligned. This would require a relatively short undersea pipeline from Turkmenistan to Azerbaijan’s Trans-Anatolian pipeline (TAP) via the Caspian Sea, a venture that could benefit both American and European companies.
Central Asia is also a lynchpin in the modern transportation landscape. The Trans-Caspian International Transport Route (TITR), or Middle Corridor, links China to Europe overland while avoiding Iran and Russia. Its role as an alternative to Russia’s Northern Corridor expanded in the wake of Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine. American investment in the Middle Corridor could promote American interests on multiple fronts, bolstering a trade route allowing for better access to energy resources and minerals for global markets while competing with robust Chinese investment in the region’s transportation infrastructure. Connecting TITR to the newly announced TRIPP in the Caucasus could expand the throughput of the combined transportation arteries and further economic development of both the Caucasus and Central Asia.
The fact that this geoeconomic competition is happening in an arena amenable to Western investment is a huge boon. The region’s cultural tolerance is a model for the Islamic world. Successful cooperation between the US and any state actors would be invaluable. The region convenes the Congress of Leaders of World and Traditional Religions, is a destination of pilgrimage for the Chabad Lubavitch branch of Hassidic Judaism, and is home to a variety of ethnic groups practicing multiple faiths.
Obstacles to Cooperation
To reap the benefits of engaging with Central Asia, the Trump Administration must address issues souring relations with countries in the region and fostering mistrust toward the US. None of these involve vital American interests; all are eminently solvable.
First is the Jackson-Vanik amendment, a Cold War-era relic originally legislated to punish nonmarket economies for limiting the emigration of Jews and other religious minorities. Still on the books without reason, it is denying states like Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan from Permanent Normal Trade Relations status. While waivers are granted annually to these countries, the lack of political will from American leadership to grant PNTR is neglectful and breeds distrust.
Though Secretary of State Marco Rubio has voiced support for repealing Jackson-Vanik, referring to it as a “relic of the past,” the power to do so lies with Congress. Currently, two bills, H.R.1024 – US-Kazakhstan Trade Modernization Act and H.R.2329 – Uzbekistan Normalized Trade Act, have been introduced to remove all Jackson-Vanik restrictions on Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, with 22 and two cosponsors, respectively. They have been stuck in the House Ways and Means Committee for several months. There is no reason to delay.
Next, Trump’s levy of tariffs impacted the Central Asian states, with Kazakhstan receiving a 25 percent tariff and the other countries receiving the baseline 10 percent tariff. While 95 percent of Kazakhstan’s key exports, like uranium, ferroalloys, and oil, are tariff-exempt, this measure only plays to Beijing’s advantage and creates unnecessary uncertainty surrounding trade with the US.
Finally, the US is being overly intrusive in domestic C5 policies as states in the region combat the threat of radical Islam. Terrorist jihadist groups like ISIS-Khorasan have been growing in the area. Yet, the US Commission for International Religious Freedom published a report in December of 2024 criticizing the C5 for enforcing policies meant to combat these threats within their borders. Accusing the C5 governments of restricting religious freedoms and human rights while failing to consider the dangers that extremists pose to these same human rights and liberties, to say nothing of their threats of violence, is short-sighted and thwarts efforts to build relations and establish business ties.
Central Asia Engagement
The repeal of Jackson-Vanik restrictions would signal receptivity to C5 concerns while indicating US readiness to expand trade.
Additionally, the US needs to pursue a comprehensive economic and business strategy to invest in the region. President Trump’s trade deals thus far have been effective in securing commitments for resources like natural gas and critical minerals, while changing tariff rates on trade partners. Mixed signals don’t work well.
Actively pursuing deals across the region and in more economic sectors beyond energy can provide American companies with investment opportunities across the transportation, mining, and energy sectors while making progress toward limiting Russian and Chinese influence and solidifying new sources of critical minerals outside of China. This can play a vital role in engaging the region following the freeze of USAID funding; and collaborative platforms like the B5+1, in which Secretary Rubio has expressed interest, can help redefine American investment relationships. American international financial institutions, such as the US International Development Finance Corporation and EXIM Bank, supported by the US Trade Representative, the US Department of Commerce, the US Chamber of Commerce, and the respective industries, can and should expand American economic engagement in the region.
To tackle terrorism in Central Asia, the US can provide counterterrorism support through intelligence sharing, education and training, and contributing to practical solutions to fight extremist rhetoric and recruitment, rather than just criticizing measures the C5 take to address threats. This also presents an opportunity to collaborate with Central Asia on security, an area traditionally dominated by Moscow.
The region can also be integrated into broader American diplomatic efforts. Expanding the Abraham Accords to Central Asia, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, would create more outside parties with a stake in peace in the Middle East while simultaneously building a structure for more routine multilateral cooperation between the US and Central Asian states. Expanding the Accords would also encourage congressional action in the US as the strategic importance of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan becomes clearer.
To establish a new chapter in the US-Central Asia relationship, a visit by President Trump would demonstrate a commitment to invest in the region and make history as the first visit from a sitting American president.
Reaping the benefits of deeper C5-American relations is well within reach, especially as steps such as a presidential visit and repealing Jackson-Vanik are low-hanging fruit – high-dividend measures that would demonstrate America means business.
The Trump administration has the opportunity to usher in a new era of relations with Central Asia, making significant progress toward its strategic and economic goals in a region the US has neglected for too long, and sending a message that Moscow and Beijing cannot ignore.
Ariel Cohen, Ph.D., is a Senior Fellow with the International Tax and Investment Center and Managing Director of its Energy, Growth and Security program. He also serves as a nonresident Senior Fellow at the Atlantic Council.
