Event Date: Fall 2025
Conventional explanations of state-against-state war are misleading and erroneous, despite their widespread embrace. Wars rarely begin by accident or result primarily from one side’s aggressive impulses. Instead, combat is almost always a choice that nations make.
There always exists some desire to redefine interstate relations. A nation may believe neighboring countries are unstable or that its dependence upon foreign suppliers makes it vulnerable, or one nation’s borders are too porous. Some nations have elements that believe they are superior people – morally, intellectually, or physically – and accordingly should control their neighbors.
But are they the causes of war? Historically, these motivations can endure over very prolonged periods of peace. For example:
Shatt-al-Arab
The Shatt-al-Arab separates Iran and Iraq and is coveted by each. In 1639 in a broader agreement between the Ottoman and Persian empires, the Shatt-al-Arab was first formally addressed, although the border was nonetheless left vague, ill-defined. In the 1800s hostilities broke out, culminating in a second treaty in 1847, but there were still unresolved territorial issues, leading to yet another agreement in 1913. The outbreak of World War I, however, disrupted its implementation. After the war, Britian established border delineations, with a commission formed to establish borders. But little progress was achieved. In the 1950s, Iraq experienced a revolution, and intermittent hostilities again took place. By 1970, Iran was in a clearly superior military and tactical position. Yet war between the two states was averted by the 1975 Algiers Agreement, which, under Iranian pressure, imposed a border at the middle of the waterway.
Clearly, desires for control of water or other resources can exist for prolonged periods without war.
Resource Wars
War for resources has intermittently been a widely embraced theme. “Water wars,” tied to climate change issues emerged in the 1990, specifically in relation to the Middle East. But none of the many Middle East wars were caused by water scarcity. Turkey’s huge GAP project altered water in the Tigris and Euphrates, to the detriment of Syria and Iraq. There had been harsh words, some “mock” warfare in terms of airplanes scanning the disputed areas, but no war. And none of the Arab-Israeli wars centered on water, though Syria’s attempt to divert Jordan River sources from Israel contributed to pre-1967 Six-Day War tension.
For Americans, certain imports are considered “must haves,” both to keep our economy going and to provide access to critical military resources. Indeed, the Clinton administration implied that the US would kill for oil. Without those exact words, of course, but with these: the US may “utilize our military forces in order to maintain the free flow of oil at reasonable prices.” (May 1997, National Security Strategy for a New Century, p. 26.)
But war is a choice, and a very bad one if it is resources that nations seek. Regarding oil in particular, the US will always get oil, sometimes cheaper, sometimes more expensive, but oil will always flow. It is the lifeblood of the oil producers – what else will they do with it, drink it? No, they must sell it, and they will. Iraq’s Saddam Hussein hated the United States, but in the 1990s was America’s seventh largest supplier.
Resource wars are only a subset of the broader category labeled the “economic causes of war,” popularized by Marx and Lenin and almost the dominant global explanation for a time. Marx was an economic determinist who believed that internal contradictions in the capitalist economic system would create war. Lenin added the theory of imperialism. Capitalist states would wage war with each other over foreign markets. None of this has occurred, despite the global rise of capitalist, market-oriented economies.
Scapegoat Theory
The outbreak of war often is attributed to unpopular regimes that launch combat to redirect domestic criticism onto neighboring states.
Scapegoat rhetoric is easy to dish out. Castro railed for decades against the United States, blaming it for almost all of Cuba’s problems; the Iranians do it all the time, railing against the Great Satan, yet neither launched a war against the US.
And for democracies, disunity at home is hardly cured by foreign adventurism. Indeed, internal disunity is exacerbated and the ability to successfully prosecute a war is weakened. The American experience in Vietnam is a prime example.
Poverty/Economic Distress
It is often suggested that relatively poor nations with great needs develop jealousy and uncontrollable desires, inevitably leading to attempts to seize the wealth of their more affluent neighbors. But there are few examples, in large measure because poor countries cannot afford formidable militaries.
Economics, however, does count. A concern with sufficient finances to generate war-fighting capabilities is historically very common. In 18th and 19th century Europe, war-finance considerations always weighed heavily on military deliberations.
The Hero Theory
The hero theory of history claims that remarkable individuals intermittently appear on the human stage and leave a tremendous imprint – wars caused by evil leaders including Hitler, Stalin, Saddam and Kim Il Sung – and periods of peace are attributed to Lord Palmerston of England and Chancellor Bismark of Germany.
This is suspect. Those who kept the peace were probably only able to do so because they had the power to do so. Palmerston had the world’s most powerful navy; Bismark could deploy the world’s most powerful army. Hitler was willing to go to war because he believed Germany was more powerful than any of its intended victims and that external assistance to those victims would not be forthcoming.
Other Explanations
Many stories purport to explain the causes of war. “Misunderstanding” was once a popular one. The prima facie logic of this argument soon fades with both reasoning and historical experience. English-speaking nations have fought each other, the American North and the American South, German-speaking nations have battled each other, as have Arabic-speaking states. While it is certainly true that nations have differing perspectives/desires, there is no reason to believe that they fail to understand each other’s positions. It is unlikely that the Iraqis and the Iranians misunderstood each other and thus had an eight-year war. Does anyone believe that Palestinians and Israelis are in conflict due to misunderstanding?
The Real Cause of War
War derives from conflicting perceptions of national power, specifically, contradictory assessments of war-fighting capabilities and broadly defined national power. Anwar Sadat went to the peace table not because Egypt suddenly saw Israel in a new, favorable light, but because he recognized that the scales of international power were such that conquest of Israel would not and could not occur.
Previously, Arab leaders assessed that they had sufficient power to quickly destroy Israel. Israel, on the other hand, believed it could survive. It is under such conflicting assessments of national power that war becomes likely. Since the Israelis kept winning, while wars were both expensive and embarrassing, Sadat recognized that the Arabs had miscalculated. Having restored Egyptian honor with the 1973 Yom Kippur War, he opted for peace, which was another means of attaining several important ends, most specifically a return of the Sinai.
In Vietnam the French believed they could defeat the Viet Cong; the Viet Cong had the opposite assessment. The French ultimately left, being replaced by the US, which believed it would defeat the Viet Cong with the aid of Vietnamese allies. Here too the Viet Cong had an opposite assessment and war ensued.
Inconsistent power assessments are the real cause of war.
It merits noting that in addition to military capabilities, an important element in relative power assessment is the commitment of allies as well as possible third party influences. Sadat’s 1973 war was not waged to defeat Israel nor to be prolonged. He correctly counted on his Soviet allies and likely American influence on Israel to force a relatively early war termination.
1936 Britain & Germany
If one nation perceives a significant advantage in relative power and believes it can quickly and easily achieve its aims via war, it may be inclined to try. However, if both nations perceive that same war outcome, the weaker side is likely to grant concessions or surrender, as Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxemburg did after the Nazi Luftwaffe flew over their borders. No war: they surrendered.
But when perceptions differ significantly, war becomes likely. While it may be that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain really hoped that conceding Czech territory to Germany in 1938 would appease Hitler and end German adventurism, it is also very likely that he assessed that the Allied powers either could not or would not stop Germany. So, Hitler believed he could win, and Chamberlain agreed. Accordingly, no war occurred then – the chosen policy response was appeasement.
In the early 1980s Saddam Hussein attacked Iran under the assumption he would quickly achieve his aims, but he clearly underestimated the tenacity of Iran’s resistance. Recognizing this, he several times offered to end the war, but was rejected because the Iranians, having mobilized nearly everyone, including children, believed Sadam could be defeated. That assessment, too, was in error, so the war dragged on for eight years until the Ayatollah Khomeini realized that he could not win. And Saddam recognized that he could not win. Accordingly, congruent power assessments led to a cessation of hostilities.
Hezbollah and Israel
Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah, had been shelling Israel’s northern cities for years and employing other forms of harassment, to include a July 2006 killing of eight Israeli soldiers and kidnapping two others. He apparently believed that Israel would continue to be passive, either lacking the stomach for war or the ability to stop him. His assessment, however, conflicted with that of Israel, which by that time had literally “had it.” Israel unleashed its armed forces, and great damage was done to Lebanon as well as to Hezbollah. The 2024 “pager war” resulted from the same miscalculation.
Calculation of National Power
Military power, while hardly the only means whereby nations transact their mutual affairs, is nonetheless an often-used tool, either passively (deterrence) or actively (use of war-fighting capabilities). Such power, however, cannot be objectively measured. It can only be approximated, and all such estimates are not only influenced by objective, quantifiable conditions, such as numbers of divisions, air wings, submarines, etc., but also colored in their subjective assessments by a wide array of other factors such as the capabilities and reliability of allies.
The degree of subjectivity cannot be overemphasized. Given adequate intelligence – of course, all intelligence is subjective and imperfect – one can try to compare armies, navies, and air forces, but even such “objective” factors require subjective assessment. Critical assumptions concerning the behavior of third-party states must be made – will they remain neutral or participate? Perceptions of national will are also critical – will the people support the war? Ideology, state of the economy, and previous war experience can be listed as coloring power assessment lenses.
For example, if it is perceived that economic conditions or internal strife have seriously weakened the relative power of an adversary nation, new power assessments by rivals may result in selection of the military option.
Historically, most such assessments have been wrong. Most wars have taken longer than expected, with confident nations often finding themselves on the losing or non-winning side, as in America’s involvement in Vietnam and Saddam’s of Iran. This may also become the case with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Why? There is an almost irrepressible optimism which often characterizes the assessment process. Optimistic leaderships tend to go to war; pessimists tend to negotiate. The historical frequency of war attests to an over-abundance of optimists.
How is this explained? In large measure, optimism derives from the nature of most military and many political organizations. In each there is a strong desire for an individual to demonstrate his or her capabilities. A “can do” philosophy pervades both political and military institutions. Individual excellence is often demonstrated by returning with positive, not negative, answers. It is in this assessment process that economic conditions play their biggest role. Nations enjoying prosperity and a large national treasury are already in the throes of optimism. Similarly, beguiling ideologies – racial supremacy, “G-d is on our side,” etc. – also tint relative power conclusions.
Conclusions
If nations perceive essential parity in international power, as was likely in the Cold War case of the United States and the Soviet Union, while they may maneuver against each other, they avoid direct military confrontation, instead opting for negotiation, espionage, technological leaps, delay tactics or other non-military tools. Motivation should not be confused with, or equated to, remedial actions, for which there is always a menu of policy choices, only one of which is war. Accordingly, traditional explanations confuse ends with means and fail to recognize that the alleged causes of war can also be pursued within a peaceful framework. War is only one of several means of attaining ends.
While there may be many motivations, the issue remains as to how best to achieve desired goals. If war is selected, it will ultimately be based on relative national power assessments. A country feeling immensely stronger than a rival becomes more inclined to the war option. But even so, for war to actually take place, it takes two. War need not result if the weaker rival agrees with that assessment, thus eliciting concessions or surrenders. On the other hand, if the rival does not share that assessment, war becomes a real possibility.
Russia’s February 2022, invasion of Ukraine was based on an assessment that Ukraine would quickly fall or release significant territories. Clearly, the Ukrainians had a contradictory assessment, hence war became inevitable. Ukraine chose war rather than submit –no doubt counting on Western help.
The war continues because the belligerents’ power assessments remain contradictory. Wars always reveal multiple motivations, but their true cause derives from contradictory estimates of relative national power.
Donald L. Losman, PhD, worked 37 years in professional military education, finishing his teaching career at the George Washington University where he taught political economy of the Middle East.
