Editor’s Note: One of the key takeaways from Israel’s wars is the importance of missile defense, which grew out of President Ronald Reagan’s understanding of the threats the West faced from growing Russian missile capabilities. He was mocked by some “experts,” but the Strategic Defence Initiative became an extraordinary success. Dr. Stanley Orman was director of the project in the UK. He takes us back in time to outline how much progress has been achieved and what still needs to come to fruition.
And a note from Dr. Orman: Omitted from this historical overview is the considerable role Israel has played in missile defense. It was the first ally to recognize that it faced an existential threat from Iran in 1988, after the Iran/Iraq war during which both sides used missile attacks. The much later events of 2024 and ’25, proved Israel correct. With the help of America and others they nullified significant missile attacks from Iran and its surrogates using a range of missile defenses, many home produced. The contribution of Israel to missile defense capabilities warrants a separate article.
Living with Deterrence
Having been chased out of London in 1944 by the German V1 & V2 raids, then spending 10 months as an evacuee in the Leicestershire countryside, it seemed appropriate for me later to be involved in developing British nuclear systems deterring any future attack on the UK. What follows are my personal views on how deterrence has changed during the nuclear age and why I consider nuclear defense adds significantly to nuclear deterrence.
The bombing of Hiroshima in 1945 introduced the nuclear age to the world, and ever since citizens of many nations have remained concerned about the risk of nuclear annihilation and the effectiveness of deterrence. It may not be coincidental that my whole professional career has been associated with the two topics nuclear offense and defense, that comprise the competing components of nuclear deterrence.
Historically for centuries deterrence was viewed as the buildup of sufficient defenses to deter a potential adversary from initiating an attack on national territory. The whole emphasis was to enhance defenses to a level that made an attack too costly and unlikely to succeed. This all changed after the end of WW2 when more nations acquired nuclear warhead capabilities.
By early 1950s the permanent members of the UN Security Council, America, Britain, China, France, and Russia all acquired nuclear warheads. Governments quickly recognized the risk associated with the spread of nuclear capabilities leading to the establishment of a Non-Proliferation Treaty which came into effect by 1970, when over 25 countries had signed to abide by the restrictions. Over the years, more than 150 nations have signed the NPT making it the largest arms limitation and disarmament agreement.
There are significant holdouts. India, Israel, and Pakistan have never signed. North Korea (signed but later withdrew. Iran has been a member since 1970 but has periodically threatened to withdraw since 2005, when the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) found it noncompliant. It is now universally acknowledged that Iran enriched uranium close to the level needed for making bombs, and that Israeli and American attacks in 2005 prevented actual construction of weapons in the near future.
Israel has throughout maintained a low profile, neither agreeing nor denying they possess nuclear capabilities. Internationally, it is assumed Israel does have a stockpile of nuclear warheads that provide them with a deterrent against nations openly hostile to them.
Failure of the NPT
It should not have been a surprise when nations that had not signed the NPT later acquired nuclear warhead capabilities. They undoubtedly had significant help from scientists and engineers many of whom were working in nations that were signatories of the NPT. Even as a young scientist working in the field of nuclear warheads, I was amazed at the hopes expressed for the success of the NPT when it was initiated. While it was clear why governments tried to prevent the spread of nuclear technology, it was equally clear that the NPT would slow rather than prevent the spread. By one means or another, through bribery, blackmail or conviction, those working in the field would pass information to those determined to possess it. Another belief of mine at the time was that nations seeking the capabilities wanted to use it as a deterrent against being forced to accept policies imposed by other nuclear nations. In other words they recognized the total change that had occurred in deterrence.
With the advent of nuclear warheads delivered by ballistic missiles it seemed the whole concept of deterrence by effective defense could no longer apply, thus was born Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD). War would be avoided through MAD, not by making it too difficult to attack, but by making the repercussions of any attack totally unacceptable. This concept of relying fully on MAD developed over time, as repeated attempts by America and the Soviet Union, then then dominant nuclear warhead powers, made efforts to develop and deploy defenses. They were not significantly successful, so more effort was directed to ensure the capability of the offensive systems to deter possible opponents from starting an attack.
Historically it is noteworthy that although The American attempts to deploy such defenses in the 1960s were dismantled, the Soviets kept their system in the expectation it could nullify the effectiveness of the much smaller deployments of the British and French independent deterrent systems. The America, with considerably larger forces, would have been able to overwhelm the limited defenses allowed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. The ABM Treaty had been developed In an attempt to prevent another arms race between the then two nuclear powers. Agreement was reached in a Treaty signed in 1972, modified in 1974 to limit the location and numbers of defensive interceptors either side could deploy. Cynical observers noted that the Treaty would do nothing to prevent civilization being destroyed, but would control the number of interceptors that might blunt such attack.
Throughout the period that the MAD policy dominated international affairs, those possessing and acquiring nuclear warheads continued to enhance their capabilities and their delivery systems. The possession of nuclear warheads alone was not considered sufficient to avoid conflict, each side had to convey to the other that they had high confidence in the effectiveness of their systems, and possessed the willingness to use them if required.
Deterrence had become a psychological exercise.
It was during this period that I became actively involved in ensuring the UK retained an effective independent nuclear deterrent. The Soviet defenses mentioned earlier, although unable to repel a significant attack might, have provided some defense against the more limited UK capabilities. I became the design and development director modifying the then British Polaris system, eventually becoming Chief Engineer and putting the new improved system, Chevaline into service in 1982. We had high confidence it could defeat the Soviet defenses until the aging missiles were replaced by Trident in 1996.
Ronald Reagan and “Star Wars”
Shortly after Chevaline entered service President Reagan shook friends and allies alike with his now famous Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) speech in March 1983. He proposed that advances in technology would enable much more effective defenses to be developed granting a leader more time before launching counter strikes in the event of a limited attack. His proposal arriving unannounced led to almost universal condemnation.
The Soviets went into panic mode, concerned that some of the capabilities would be available shortly. They concluded such a system might provide America with an effective defense, thereby having the opportunity of a First-Strike option. Allies, on the other hand became alarmed that America with an effective defense might affect the future of extended deterrence, under which they had felt secure for generations.
The broad opposition generated by the lack of prior disclosure of the concept was eventually overcome, but the program that started a year later remained controversial and has never been fully pursued as originally intended. The original objective was to develop a missile defense that could engage attacking missiles from wherever they are launched at all stages of their flight. Such a system would require ground-based interceptors to protect target areas, forward-based and mobile systems such as ship-based for mid-course interceptions, and space-based to achieve boost and post-boost kills. Political and financial support for such a comprehensive system was never forthcoming, and despite the expenditure of over $350 billion in the 42 years since Reagan introduced the concept, no really effective defense has been deployed for the US.
Prime Minister Thatcher was the only world leader at the time who appreciated the broader implications of Reagan’s SDI proposal. As an individual who had spent several years developing a system to defeat a Soviet defense, I was tasked to lead a British MOD review of the SDI concept and advise the Cabinet of the prospects. The conclusion reached was that emerging technology would enable a defense that could protect against a limited attack that might be mounted by newer nuclear powers, and could avoid the need for instant retaliation. Looking to the future, defense could aid deterrence, but not replace the basic concept of MAD with regard to the major powers such as the Soviets with thousands of missiles. The PM decided that the UK would support the concept and Britain became the first nation to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to cooperate in the SDI Research.
The Opposition
I was appointed the Director General for British support for SDI and quickly encountered significant opposition from within government and academic circles. Throughout the world there has always been significant opposition to nuclear weapons, and for many of those opponents SDI seemed to represent another attempt to prolong reliance on them. Despite previous attempts to persuade governments to eliminate these warheads, opponents remain reluctant to accept that the genie cannot be put back in the bottle. The leaders of several British university research departments announced they would not accept any MOD contracts associated with SDI. Another batch of science professors, all Fellows of the Royal Society, came to see me to explain why they were totally opposed to SDI. After they made their presentation, I noted it was pure emotion without any scientific or engineering content. A conclusion that was not well received. Another example was a group of Oxford Professors that formed an organization called Just Defense, a play on words meaning “only justify defense with no offensive capabilities.” They were so strongly opposed to any form of nuclear conflict that they refused to acknowledge that senior staff leading nuclear laboratories were equally against nuclear war.
Other groups in America, such as the Union of Concerned Scientists, were similarly opposed to SDI, all on the grounds that it supported the reliance on offensive nuclear warheads. None were willing to agree that such systems had helped to avoid conflicts between the major powers for over half a century.
Despite the opposition, the program proceeded and the realization that North Korea and Iran were both progressing towards nuclear weapons convinced President George W. Bush that sufficient progress had been made to deploy the first elements of a limited defense. First he had to withdraw from the limitations of the ABM Treaty, which was accomplished in 2002, followed by preparations for a homeland defense. Defensive missiles would be placed in Fort Greely, Alaska and in Vandenberg AFB in California.
Repeated suggestions that the Fort Greely site, which received the first missiles in 2004, should be designated as a test site to explore the capabilities of the system were rejected. The designation mitigated against using it in trials which it might fail. As a result the Alaska facility has yet to fire a single missile. The Vandenberg facility has been used periodically to test capabilities.
A major problem throughout has been the refusal of successive administrations to support a space-based interceptor option. By relying on ground and sea-based interceptors, the defense is denied early boost-phase interception, that could significantly enhance its capability. This is particularly annoying because Russia and China have been actively developing anti-satellite programs, indicating they view space activities as a normal extension of warfare.
On to Golden Dome
This brings us up-to-date as the Trump Administration recently announced the intention to develop and deploy a Golden Dome to protect the US against missile attack. Such a system will incorporate the present system augmented with space-based components, all operated by an integrated command and control system. The concept is precisely what has been required since SDI was first conceived. The shame is that the space based elements will now have to be developed from scratch, because of the reluctance of previous governments to face the stark reality of the need for enhanced national security.
The basic fact remains that nuclear weapons are with us for the foreseeable future. America has to retain sufficient offensive capabilities to deter any nation from attacking us, while also enhancing defensive systems to counter any attack that might come from any unexpected source. With a Golden Dome augmenting the existing and improved deterrence systems, America will be significantly more secure it this ever uncertain environment.
Personally, what was unexpected was for me to become so heavily involved in the development of SDI, coupled with my failure to convince successive American administrations that without a space-based element, no defensive system would sufficiently support nuclear deterrence. It is ironic, but satisfying that a more effective defense to enhance our deterrent posture is now on the drawing board. I would love to see it deployed while I am still around.
