On 8 April 2026, President Trump discussed in an ABC interview a joint venture with Iran in the Strait of Hormuz: “We’re thinking of doing it as a joint venture. It’s a way of securing it — also securing it from lots of other people.” When asked whether he would permit Tehran to charge transit fees through the strategic waterway, he said “It’s a beautiful thing.” He also stated that “We are, and will be, talking Tariff and Sanctions relief with Iran.” How can the U.S. create the conditions that would allow such a joint venture, be successful, and that it would persist beyond Trump’s administration? Presented below is one idea based on a few relevant historical precedents.
The modern concept of a tariff traces its lineage back to the Spanish port of Tarifa, which became a strategic stronghold following the 710 AD occupation led by Berber commander Tarif ibn Malik. Situated at the narrowest point of the Strait of Gibraltar, the town served as the epicenter of a sophisticated toll system where merchant ships were intercepted and required to pay a fixed-rate charge for passage.
The Catholic Kingdom of Castile seized Tarifa in 1292 after a six-month siege led by King Sancho IV. This victory was a strategic turning point in the Reconquista, as it severed the vital link between North African reinforcements and the Muslim Kingdom of Granada. The town’s defense became legendary in 1294 when the governor, Guzmán el Bueno, famously chose the sacrifice of his own son over surrendering the fortress, solidifying Tarifa as a permanent Christian stronghold at the gates of the Mediterranean.
Under Catholic rule, the Spanish crown institutionalized and expanded the local “tariff” system into a sophisticated state revenue stream. They formalized the Moorish custom of charging ships based on tonnage and cargo, using the funds to finance ongoing military campaigns. By the 16th century, this system evolved into a protectionist tool; the crown imposed steep duties on foreign goods to favor Spanish industry, effectively transforming a medieval toll at the Strait of Gibraltar into a foundational pillar of modern international trade policy.
The British seized Gibraltar in 1704 during a massive naval attack. An Anglo-Dutch fleet bombarded the “Rock” with thousands of cannons, forcing the small Spanish garrison to surrender in just a few days. While it began as a wartime move to control the Mediterranean, the takeover became permanent through the Treaty of Utrecht in 1713.
The Treaty of Utrecht forced a weakened Spain to cede Gibraltar to the British “forever,” a move that shattered Spain’s centuries-old monopoly over the Mediterranean’s only gateway. This shift ended the era of unchallenged “racketeering” at Tarifa, where Spanish rulers had long extracted tolls from every passing hull. By introducing a permanent British naval presence, the Strait was transformed from a private Spanish toll road into a contested international corridor. This historical precedent suggests that when a single power weaponizes a chokepoint, the introduction of a permanent, sovereign third-party “anchor” can fundamentally reorder the regional economy.
In the modern context, the Strait of Hormuz has seen similar exploitation, with Iran leveraging its geographic position to impose “transit fees” on friendly nations while using military threats to blockade rivals. Applying the “Gibraltar Model” here would involve the United States acquiring sovereign territory—perhaps by settling the long-standing dispute over the Abu Musa and Greater and Lesser Tunbs islands both claimed by Iran and the UAE—to establish a permanent legal and military foothold. By converting these contested islands into sovereign U.S. territory similar to Guam, Washington could move beyond temporary patrols and implement a formalized “specific services rendered” in coordination with regional partners like the UAE, Oman, Iran, and possibly others.
Such a strategy would aim to replace Iran’s unilateral extortion with a multi-lateral taxation scheme that pays for the high cost of maritime protection. Just as the British presence at Gibraltar created a “free port” that competed with Spanish customs, a U.S. sovereign base in the Gulf could ensure that trade flows remain uninterrupted by military aggression. This would effectively transform a volatile “battleground” into a regulated international gateway, using the 18th-century lesson of the Strait of Gibraltar to provide a 21st-century solution for global energy security.
Under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) framework, the legality of maritime fees hinges on shifting from a “tax” on passage to a reimbursement framework for “specific services rendered.” While UNCLOS Article 26 forbids charging foreign ships simply for using a strait, it explicitly permits charges for tangible safety and navigation benefits. By restructuring the proposal as a cost-recovery mechanism for active protection—covering the operational expenses of anti-mine sweeps, 24/7 drone monitoring, and rapid-response escorts—the system aligns with international norms that allow providers to recoup costs for maintaining the safety of high-risk transit zones.
This transition transforms the 18th-century “Tarifa model” of arbitrary tolls into a modern, service-based utility. Just as the Suez and Panama Canals justify fees through infrastructure maintenance, this framework justifies charges through the maintenance of a “secure corridor.” By documenting security as a direct navigational service rather than a general public good, the U.S. and its regional partners could legally stabilize the Strait of Hormuz, ensuring that the commercial entities benefiting from a protected passage directly fund the “insurance policy” that keeps the global energy market afloat. The same model could be applied to the Bab al-Mandeb Strait which narrows to about 18 miles at its tightest point.
This all sounds possible and logical, however, there are some concerns.
In the 18th century, “forever” cessions like Gibraltar were common outcomes of war. Today, the U.S. acquiring the Iranian controlled Abu Musa or Tunb Islands would likely be framed by critics and adversaries as 21st-century colonialism or illegal annexation. This could trigger a massive diplomatic backlash within the UN and potentially unify disparate Middle Eastern factions against what they might perceive as a permanent Western “occupation” of the Gulf’s heart.
To address the optics of “annexation,” the U.S. could pivot from a model of direct ownership to a Multilateral Trust Territory or a long-term Strategic Lease. Rather than becoming “U.S. soil,” the contested islands could be managed under a joint mandate between the U.S., the UAE, Iran, and Oman. This preserves local sovereignty while providing the legal “anchor” needed for a permanent security headquarters. By framing the presence as an International Maritime Security Zone rather than a colonial outpost, the project shifts from a perceived territorial land grab to a collaborative effort to safeguard a global common.
To maintain the UNCLOS “reimbursement” status, the U.S. and its partners would need to provide transparent, audited proof of the services rendered. Shipping companies might dispute the fees if they don’t perceive a direct threat on a specific day, leading to legal battles over whether a “quiet” day in the Strait justifies a high escort fee. Defining the line between a “general military presence” and a “billable service” is a logistical and legal minefield.
While a secure corridor might lower war-risk premiums from insurers like Lloyd’s, the new “protection fees” could inadvertently raise the overall cost of oil. If the reimbursement fees are set too high, they could drive global energy prices up, potentially leading to a “protection inflation” that hurts the very global economy the system is meant to stabilize.
To resolve the two auditing and insurance concerns discussed above, the reimbursement framework must be tied to tiered risk levels. When the threat level is low, fees would be minimal, covering only basic “digital” monitoring; when threats rise, fees would scale to cover active “physical” escorts. By integrating this system with global insurers, the “protection fee” can be offset by a guaranteed reduction in War Risk Premiums. This ensures the total cost to shipping remains neutral or lower than the current volatile market rates, transforming the security fee into a predictable business expense rather than a fluctuating tax.
The model includes Iran as a potential partner in the taxation/reimbursement scheme. However, if Iran is the primary source of the threats being mitigated (mines, fast-attack boats), paying them to “not attack” or to “participate in security” could be viewed as a formalized version of the very extortion that we are trying to replace. Balancing Iranian participation without rewarding aggression is a central diplomatic hurdle.
The “Iran Problem” could be addressed through financial incentivization. By including Iran in a multilateral revenue-sharing scheme—conditioned strictly on verifiable non-aggression—the framework offers Tehran a path toward legal economic integration. If Iranian forces interfere with trade, their share of the transit revenue is automatically diverted to the protection fund to pay for the increased escort costs. This turns the Strait from a theater of extortion into a performance-based economy, where all regional players, including Iran, profit more from a stable corridor than a closed one.
In summary, the historical evolution of the “tariff”—from its roots as a 13th-century Spanish toll in Tarifa to a permanent British naval anchor in Gibraltar—offers a blueprint for resolving modern maritime volatility. By applying this “Gibraltar Model” to the Strait of Hormuz, the U.S. and its partners could settle island disputes between Iran and the UAE to establish a permanent, sovereign “security anchor” in the Gulf. This would replace Iran’s current unilateral extortion with a sophisticated reimbursement framework for “specific services rendered,” such as anti-mine sweeps and rapid-response escorts. By aligning with UNCLOS standards and tying fees to tiered risk levels, the system transforms a volatile military chokepoint into a transparent, performance-based utility that rewards regional stability while ensuring global energy security.
