An abridged version of this article appeared in the print edition inFOCUS Quarterly.
An Conventional explanations of war are misleading and erroneous, despite their widespread embrace. This analysis focuses on traditional state-on-state, uniform-on-uniform warfare and not on terrorism, insurgencies or civil wars, although some analogies may well be appropriate.
The “take-aways” are:
- War is almost always a choice that nations make. War is a purposely selected option, sometimes reluctantly, sometimes enthusiastically, and often tragically.
- Because war is a choice, there are few, if any, accidental wars.
- Most of the popularly embraced causes of war – bad economic conditions, desires for resources, jealousy, misunderstandings, the scapegoat theory, historical wrongs—are vacuous and lead to errors in analysis and costly policy mistakes. These are merely desires or frustrations, which perhaps can be satisfied via war, but are likely to be achievable via other means as well.
Such misconceptions derive from a fundamental confusion regarding ends and means, a confusion over what is desired versus how those desires are best attained. There is really only one fundamental cause of interstate wars.
Whatever the particular characteristics of any international relationship, there always exists some desires to redefine or exercise that relationship on somewhat different terms, such as President Donald Trump’s first go-round desire to change the parameters of US-Canadian and US-Mexican economic relations. Second term, Trump is doing the same. There is, in fact, no end to motivation to modify the conditions of any relationship, even among the best of friends.
Accordingly, a nation may believe that neighboring countries are too unstable or that its dependence upon foreign suppliers makes it vulnerable. Or perhaps one nation’s borders are deemed too porous. Some nations may have elements which believe that they are superior people—morally, intellectually, or physically—and accordingly should control their neighbors. Certainly, this was the case with Nazi Germany and Fascist Japan. Sometimes these motivations or desires are deemed the causes of war, such as “we want or need their water, their oil, their agricultural land, their access to the sea, etc.” Such views have been loudly voiced and very widely embraced.
But are they really the causes of war, the decision to take up arms? Often, they are verbal excuses—public figures must always provide explanations. And many historians have also described these motivations as the causes of war. However, all these exact motivations can endure over very prolonged periods of peace.
Shatt-al-Arab
Take the Shatt-al-Arab, for example, a waterway separating Iran and Iraq, coveted by each. In 1639 in a broader agreement between the Ottoman and Persian empires the Shatt-al-Arab was first formally addressed, although the border was nonetheless left vague, ill-defined. In the 1800s hostilities broke out, culminating in a second treaty in 1847, but there were still unresolved territorial issues, leading to yet another agreement in 1913. The outbreak of World War I, however, disrupted its implementation. After the war, Britian established border delineations, with a commission formed to establish borders. But little progress was achieved. In the 1950s Iraq experienced a revolution and intermittent hostilities again took place. By 1970 Iran was in a clearly superior military and tactical position. Yet war between the two states was averted by the 1975 Algiers Agreement, which, under Iranian pressure, imposed a border at the middle of the waterway.
Clearly, desires for control of water or other resources can exist for prolonged periods without war.
However, since there is widespread belief in the explanatory capabilities of the traditionally alleged causes of war, it is prudent to evaluate their explanatory usefulness.
Resource Wars
This has intermittently been a very widely embraced theme. In the early 1990s Joyce Starr wrote a piece entitled “Water Wars” in Foreign Affairs. She demonstrated that water, so precious to human life and material progress, was increasingly disappearing and suggested that water wars were just around the corner, particularly in the Middle East. She was certainly correct about water’s increasing scarcity, but none of the many Middle East wars were caused by water scarcity. Turkey has a huge project—the GAP—which altered water in the Tigris and Euphrates, to the detriment of Syria and Iraq. There had been harsh words, some ‘mock’ warfare in terms of airplanes scanning the disputed areas, but no war. And none of the Arab Israeli wars centered on water. The Arabs believe that Israel should not be there, that it is on Arab land, that it is Muslim land, and that the Palestinians have been wronged. They have had many wars, but water has never been a main feature.
Nonetheless, a 2002 book, entitled Water Wars, once again predicted that they were imminent. This is the Joyce Starr argument ten years later, with the recognition that they have not yet happened, but are surely ‘just around the corner.’ Alas, the author’s proof was far from convincing, writing that “if, as The Economist says, ‘wars are fought over much stupider things,’ it seems plausible that in nations under stress, water can be the push that carries vexatious neighbors over the brink.”
Michael Klare had a similar book in 2001, entitled Resource Wars, again listing a wide array of geographic areas and resource tensions on the precipice of war. And the April 2009, National Defense Magazine featured an essay entitled “Oil Dependency: Energy-Related Security Crises Coming Sooner than Expected.” Clearly, such fears are very real, but the predicted wars are always around the corner!
Alas, the United States has acted on such fear. Americans widely believe that certain resources, certain imports, are ‘must haves,’ both to keep our economy going and to provide access to critical military resources, commonly labelled strategic goods. Indeed, the Clinton National Security Strategy documents repeatedly stated, at least in essence, that we would kill for oil. Of course, those exact words were never used, although clearly implied by the statement that we may “utilize our military forces in order to maintain the free flow of oil at reasonable prices.” (May 1997 National Security Strategy for a New Century, p. 26.)
If economic downturn or high costs for resources are casus belli, America would be in all sorts of wars on a very frequent basis.
But war is a choice, and a very bad one if it is resources that nations seek. Regarding oil in particular, the U.S. will always get oil, sometimes cheaper, sometimes more expensive, but oil will always flow. It is the lifeblood of the oil producers—what will they do with it, drink it? No, they must sell it, and they will. Saddam Hussein, who hated the US, was in the 1990s America’s seventh largest supplier.
Interestingly, even during wartime, blockades, and sanctions, desired resources keep coming. And the higher the resource price, the greater the supply, overt or covert. Yes, resources can be very expensive, but they can always be obtained. Will higher oil prices hurt an importing economy – certainly, somewhat. But people get killed in wars; treasuries are drained. Wars are not cheap. And why stop with oil? If disruption to our economy is a casus belli, what about semi-conductors, universally embedded in just about everything? And what about titanium, rare earths, and other materials so critical to military as well as civilian use? They, too, are even more concentrated in their supply sources than oil is. Yet it must be recognized that the military is a very expensive tool for obtaining resources. And if every time the price of desired imports elevates out of some desired range, an importing state chooses to employ the military, inter-state conflict would be far more common.
Further, there are many alternatives to war. Regarding oil,
- Nations can diversify supply sources, as the Chinese have been doing.
- There can be sharing arrangements with allies.
- Resources can be stockpiled. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) is one example.
- Nations can also economize–no Sunday driving or frivolous use. Gasoline taxes can be increased and more tolls put on roads.
- Greater domestic efforts to produce desired commodities at home. “Drill, baby drill,” comes to mind.
War is a choice, and for resources it is a very bad one.
Scapegoat Theory of War
Of course, resource wars are only a subset of the broader category labeled the “economic causes of war.” Theories which at one time, popularized by Marx and Lenin, were almost a predominant global perspective. Marx, of course, was an economic determinist who believed that internal contradictions in the capitalist economic system would create war. Lenin added the theory of imperialism. Capitalist states would wage war with each other over foreign markets. But none of this has occurred, despite the clear global rise of capitalist, market-oriented economies.
War is often attributed to unpopular regimes which, failing to provide properly for their populations, undertake wars to direct criticism and frustration to neighboring states. Historically, the Crimean War has been attributed to the internal troubles of the French regime. So was the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. This was another popular explanation of World War I and of the intermittent armed violence between Sukarno’s Indonesia and the Federation of Malaysia in the 1960’s.
However, both logic and historical experience work against this hypothesis. For example, some two years prior to the Franco-Prussian War Napoleon III told a British Minister that no internal troubles would be mitigated by an external war. Indeed, military conflict and its accompanying high taxes are likely to heighten domestic discontent, as will war deaths and casualties.
America’s Vietnam War is a classic example. This same concern was expressed in a 1914 meeting of Russian Ministers who debated preparations for war, but feared that Russia, already facing worker discontent and other internal problems, could not bear an additional burden. Those fears proved quite prescient years later when Soviet troops—poorly equipped and knowing there was famine at home—deserted the battlefield in massive numbers during World War I.
Scapegoat rhetoric, of course, is easy to dish out. Castro railed for decades against the United States, blaming it for almost all of Cuba’s problems; the Iranians do it all the time, railing against the Great Satan, yet neither launched a war against the US.
And for democracies, disunity at home is hardly cured by foreign adventurism. Indeed, internal disunity is exacerbated and the ability to successfully prosecute a war is weakened. Again, the US experience during the Vietnam War is a classic example.
Poverty/Economic Distress Theories
It is often suggested that relatively poor nations with great needs develop jealousy and uncontrollable desires, inevitably leading to attempts to seize the wealth of their more affluent neighbors. Here again there are very few examples, in large measure because poor countries cannot afford formidable militaries.
Economics, however, do count. A concern with sufficient finances to generate war-fighting capabilities is historically very common. In 18th and 19th century Europe war-finance considerations always weighed heavily in war deliberations. And when Japanese leaders in 1873 discussed an invasion of Korea, the main architect of their modernization, Okubo Toshimich, opposed the undertaking, listing seven arguments, five of which were economic.
Clearly, the successful prosecution of war, particularly against a richer neighbor, requires substantial sums. If anything, both poverty and business cycle downturns serve to minimize adventurism and the initiation of military conflicts.
The Hero Theory of History—Leadership
The hero theory of history claims that it is remarkable individuals who intermittently appear upon the human stage and leave a tremendous imprint. Some suggest that the cause of war rests with the evilness of particular leaders – Hitler, Stalin, Saddam and Kim Il Sung – while periods of peace have been attributed to Lord Palmerston of England and Chancellor Bismark of Germany.
This too, however, is suspect. Those who kept the peace were probably only able to do so because they had the power to do so. Palmerston had the world’s most powerful navy; Bismark could deploy the world’s most powerful army. Hitler was willing to go to war because he believed Germany was more powerful than any of its intended victims and that external assistance to those victims would not be forthcoming. Accordingly, he perceived short and successful wars, pursuing a blitzkrieg strategy. Had Germany not had the military power, however, Hitler is unlikely to have been so adventuristic. North Korea’s Kim Il Sung certainly had territorial and strategic ambitions, but nonetheless did not make war after the early 1950’s. Nor has his successor, although Kim Jung Il has often employed harsh rhetoric and engineered provocative events.
Other Explanations
There are lots of other stories which purport to explain the causes of war. Misunderstanding was once a popular one. Indeed, in my youth there was a push for a universal language – Esperanto – which would allow everyone one in the world to talk to each other so as to avoid the misunderstandings that would lead to war.
The prima facie logic of this argument soon fades with both reasoning and historical experience. With regard to ignorance of foreign languages, it explains almost nothing. English-speaking nations have fought each other: the American North and the American South had a war; German- speaking nations have waged war against each other; as have Arabic-speaking states. While it is certainly true that nations have differing perspectives/desires, there is no reason to believe that they fail to understand each other’s positions. It is unlikely that the Iraqis and the Iranians just misunderstood each other and thus had an eight-year war. Does anyone believe that Palestinians and Israelis are in conflict due to misunderstanding?
Further, it is the very job of international diplomacy and negotiation to bring to the surface and iron out any such misunderstandings. They do not lead to war.
Arms races, historical experiences with war, religious animosities, hates, and national ‘moods’ are often also offered as causes for war, but they too are mere motivations, not triggers.
The Real Cause of War—Contradictory National Power Assessments
The real cause of war derives from conflicting perceptions of national power, specifically, contradictory assessments of war-fighting capabilities and broadly defined national power. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat went to the peace table not because Egypt suddenly saw Israel in a new, favorable light, but because he recognized that the scales of international power were such that conquest of Israel would not and could not occur. Previously, Arab leaders assessed that they had sufficient power to quickly destroy Israel. Israel, on the other hand, believed it could survive. It is under such conflicting assessments of national power that war becomes likely. Since the Israelis kept winning, while wars were both expensive and embarrassing, Sadat recognized that the Arabs had miscalculated. Having restored Egyptian honor in 1973, he opted for peace, which was another means of attaining several important ends, most specifically a return of the Sinai and an end to Egyptians needlessly dying in costly wars.
Vietnam again stands as a classic example. The French believed they could defeat the Viet Cong. The Viet Cong had the opposite assessment, hence war. The French ultimately left, being replaced by the U.S., which believed it would defeat the Viet Cong with the aid of Vietnamese allies. Here too, the Viet Cong had an opposite assessment and war ensued. It is inconsistent power assessments that are the real cause of war.
The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan provides another example. Weighing the scales of international power, the Soviets believed they could successfully attain their desired ends—maintenance of the Soviet backed government and extended Soviet influence – via military campaigns against that very low income and poorly equipped nation. But why did Soviet expansionism not push out from East Germany or at least a sweep through Iran? Again, it is most likely that the Soviets perceived that the relative scales of international power were not sufficiently favorable to undertake actions. They perceived that international forces, led by the United States, would probably either defeat them, lead to a stalemate, or to a nuclear holocaust, hence the war option was not selected. Afghanistan, however, seemed easy pickings.
It merits note that in addition to military capabilities, an important element in relative power assessment is the commitment of allies as well as possible third party influences. Sadat’s 1973 war was not waged to defeat Israel nor to be prolonged. He correctly counted on his Soviet allies and likely American influence on Israel to force war termination relatively early.
If one nation perceives a significant advantage in relative power and believes it can quickly and easily achieve its aims via war, it may be inclined to do so. However, if both nations perceive that same war outcome, the weaker side is likely to grant concessions or surrender, as the Benelux countries did after the Nazi Luftwaffe flew over their borders. No war, they surrendered. But when perceptions differ significantly, war becomes likely. While it may be that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain really hoped that conceding Czech territory to Germany would appease Hitler and end German adventurism, it is also very likely that he assessed that the Allied powers either could not or would not stop Germany. So, Hitler believed he could win, and Chamberlain agreed. Accordingly, no war occurred—the chosen policy response was appeasement.
Similarly, Germany and Japan ultimately surrendered in World War II because their assessments of international power came to be congruent with those of the Allied powers, namely that the Allies would win and they would lose. It was this congruence of power assessments that led to the war’s end.
Similarly, in the early 1980s Saddam Hussein attacked Iran under the assumption he would quickly achieve his aims, but he clearly underestimated the tenacity of Iran’s resistance. Recognizing this, he several times offered to end the war, but was rejected because the Iranians, having mobilized nearly everyone, to include children, believed Sadam could be defeated and made to pay for his evil aggression. That assessment too was in error, so the war dragged on until the Ayatollah Khomeini realized that he could not win. And Saddam recognized that he could not win. Accordingly, congruent power assessments led to a cessation of hostilities.
Another example is illustrative. Hezbollah, led by Hassan Nasrallah, had been bombing Israel’s northern cities for years and employing other forms of harassment, to include a July 2006, kidnapping of two Israeli soldiers. He apparently believed that Israel would continue to be passive, either lacking the stomach for war or the ability to stop him. His assessment, however, conflicted with that of Israel, which by that time had literally “had it.” Israel unleashed its armed forces, and great damage was done to Lebanon as well as to Hezbollah. In August 2006, Nasrallah, in what appeared to be an apology to the Lebanese people, publicly stated “If I had known on July 11 that the operations would lead to such a war, would I do it? I say ‘no, absolutely not.’”
The 2024 Israel/Lebanon (aka Hezbollah) war resulted from the same miscalculations, the inconsistency of relative power assessments resulting in a brief war which, as wars always do, demonstrated which side’s calculations were most correct.
The 1982 Falklands/Malvinas war displayed the same pattern. In their study, Furlong and Albiston noted that “Seldom is any war declared in haste…. Each side believed that they could win with few concessions, first at the bargaining table and then through the use of military force.”
Contradictory power assessments were again the true cause of war.
Optimism in the Calculation of National Power
Military power, while hardly the only means whereby nations transact their mutual affairs, is nonetheless an often used tool, either passively (war deterrence) or actively (use of war-fighting capabilities). Such power, however, cannot be objectively measured. It can only be approximated, and all such estimates are not only influenced by objective, quantifiable conditions, such as numbers of divisions, air wings, submarines, etc., but also colored in their subjective assessments by a wide array of other factors such as the capabilities and reliability of allies.
The degree of subjectivity cannot be overemphasized. Given adequate intelligence – and, of course, all intelligence is subjective and imperfect – one can try to compare armies, navies, and air forces, but even such “objective” factors require subjective assessment. If one navy has more submarines, but fewer aircraft carriers, or if one has more destroyers, but fewer total surface vessels, no simple addition or subtraction can possibly produce a perfect net assessment. The capabilities of each “package” must be estimated. So too the critical assessments concerning leadership, fighting-man toughness, likely number of sorties, effectiveness of radar, etc. And how supportive will allies and coalition states be? In short, calculating relative national power is tricky business, fraught with subjectivity, and likely to evoke widely divergent, yet defensible, estimates.
In addition, critical assumptions concerning the behavior of third-party states must be made—will they remain neutral or participate? Perceptions of national will are also critical—will the people support the war? Many other factors, such as ideology, state of the economy, and previous war experience can be listed as coloring power assessment lenses.
For example, if it is perceived that economic conditions or internal strife have seriously weakened the relative power of an adversary nation—if a once clearly more powerful state is seen to have had its margin of military superiority or internal cohesiveness meaningfully diminished, new power assessments by rivals may result in selection of the military option. This seems to clearly have been the case in the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, begun by Saddam Hussein after Iran was seriously weakened economically and militarily by the 1979 Khomeini revolution and subsequent confrontation with the United States.
Interestingly, most nations have gone to war optimistically, even when reluctant. States about to launch an attack tend to believe that the war will be short and they will be victorious. Their rivals often feel likewise. Given such conflicting assessments, if the issue is important, war becomes likely. Its outcome, of course, will give ultimate affirmation to the more appropriate of these conflicting assessments.
Historically, most assessments have been wrong. Most wars have proven longer than expected, with confident nations often finding themselves on the losing or non-winning side, as in America’s involvement in Vietnam and Saddam’s invasion of Iran. This may also become the case with Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. Why have these assessments been so frequently wrong? The answer lies in an almost irrepressible optimism which often characterizes the assessment process. Optimistic leaderships tend to go to war; pessimists tend to negotiate. The historical frequency of war attests to an over-abundance of optimists.
In large measure, this optimism derives from the nature of most military and many political organizations. In each there is a strong desire for an individual to demonstrate his or her capabilities. A “can do” philosophy pervades both political and military institutions. Individual excellence is often demonstrated by returning with positive, not negative, answers. Further, there is an almost ubiquitous effort to appeal to the apparent desires of superiors. Such characteristics impart an optimistic bias. Interestingly, it is in this assessment process that economic conditions play their biggest role. Nations enjoying prosperity and a large national treasury are already in the throes of optimism. Large defense establishments are affordable, and financing is less likely to be a constraint on military success or national will. Hence there is a bias toward robust power assessments, much like the favorable coloring of economic assessments during the early stages of a financial bubble.
Similarly, beguiling ideologies—racial supremacy, “G-d is on our side,” etc.—also taint relative power conclusions.
These verities are hardly new, but apparently easily forgotten. Winston Churchill, in his 1930 memoir, “My Early Life,” noted the following:
Never, never, never believe that any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on that strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter….Antiquated War Offices, weak, incompetent or arrogant Commanders, untrustworthy allies, hostile neutrals, malignant Fortune, ugly surprises, awful miscalculations all take their seat at the Council Board on the morrow of a declaration of war.
Importantly, he continued. “Always remember, however sure you are that you can easily win, that there would not be a war if the other man did not think he also had a chance.”
Conclusions
If nations perceive essential parity in international power, as was likely in the case with the United States and the Soviet Union, while they may maneuver against each other to try to seriously alter relative national power, until they feel confident that they have done so, they avoid direct military confrontation, instead opting for negotiation, espionage, technological leaps, delay tactics or other non-military tools.
This is also the reason why alleged “accidents,” such as the 1983 Soviet downing of a Korean Airlines plane, did not lead to war. Nor did the 1988 American downing of an Iranian commercial airplane, which cost 280 lives. In each, negotiation, not war, was the option selected. Even the purposeful Syrian downing of a Turkish air reconnaissance plane over the Mediterranean in June 2012, did not lead to war. Similarly, the January 1968, North Korean capture of the USS Pueblo and its crew did not evoke an American military response, despite enormous American angst and humiliation. Given ambiguity as to China’s role/reaction, power assessments were very ambiguous, hence the military option was not employed. Negotiations eventually released the crew after almost one year of captivity.
Were the traditional explanations of war really plausible, how does one explain the non-occurrence of an open Sino-Soviet war during the lifetime of the USSR? Meaningful wealth differences existed, there were racial, ideological, and historical sources of tension, and disputed borders—yet no armed conflict.
Another example relates to a very wealthy country which has a long, but porous border with an ethnically different neighbor whose per capita income is more than 80 percent lower. Further, the rich country is partially dependent on oil imports from its neighbors and very frustrated by illegal immigration and criminal elements crossing the border. Conversely, the poor country is 80 percent dependent on natural gas from its rich neighbor, which in a past war seized and incorporated sizeable territories from it. According to today’s well-embraced conventional wisdoms these are all the makings for military conflict – resource dependencies, ethnic rivalries, extreme wealth differences, historic wrongs, etc. Yet there will be no war between Mexico and the United States. Instead, there are agreements, joint law enforcement efforts, immigration understandings, and almost constant discussions/negotiations on a wide variety of mutual issues, each side regularly trying to change some of the parameters of the bilateral relationship.
In November 2015, Turkey downed a Russian attack aircraft at or near the Turkey-Syria border. Yet the Russian response was not war, but diplomatic and economic measures, a choice no doubt influenced by Turkey’s NATO membership.
Going back in history, the Berlin airlift of 1948-49 took place after Soviet leader, Joseph Stalin, imposed a blockade on West Berlin. In response, U.S. President Harry Truman ordered that supplies be airlifted. While many feared a U.S.–Soviet war would break out, that never happened. War fears also abounded in the October 1962, Cuban missile crisis when President Kennedy ordered a blockade around Cuba and U.S.S.R. leader, Nikita Khrushchev, sent ships to break the blockade. It was a very tense situation, but neither party felt confident that choosing war would be worth the cost. Given such congruent power assessments, negotiation, not war, was the tool chosen to settle the dispute.
In late 200,3 Lawrence Korb penned an op-ed in the Washington Post entitled “A War of Choice or of Necessity?” He attempted to delineate wars of choice as opposed to necessary wars. Alas, he missed the basic point—all wars are wars of choice. Decision-makers will interpret situations differently, with advocates claiming, “we have no choice,” while dissenters maintain “this war is unnecessary.” But such phrasing is always subjective and used to advocate for one position or another. As Furlong and Albiston have noted, “seldom is a war declared in haste.”
Choices and options are hotly debated. If war is selected, it is a choice by the national leadership and when bilateral power assessments are contradictory that the war option is often chosen. Motivation should not be confused with, or equated to, remedial actions, for which there is always a menu of policy choices, only one of which is war.
Accordingly, traditional explanations for war are unconvincing and misleading. They confuse ends with means and fail to recognize that the alleged causes of war—desire for resources, protection of nationals in foreign countries, hate, etc.—can also be pursued within a peaceful framework. War is only one of several means of attaining ends. While there may be many motivations, the issue remains as to ‘how best to act’ to achieve desired goals. If war is selected as the best policy tool, it will ultimately be based on relative national power assessments. A country feeling immensely stronger than a rival becomes more inclined to the war option. But even so, for war to actually take place, it takes two to tango. War need not result if the weaker rival agrees with that assessment, thus eliciting concession or surrender.
On the other hand, if the rival does not share that assessment, war becomes a real possibility. Russia’s February 2022, invasion of Ukraine was based on an assessment that Ukraine would quickly fall or release significant territories. Clearly, the Ukrainians had a contradictory assessment, hence war became inevitable. Ukraine chose war rather than submit—it no doubt counted on Western help. The war continues because the belligerents’ power assessments remain contradictory.
Wars always have motivations, but motivations do not mandate war – there are other options, hence war is a choice. But it takes two. The true cause of war derives from contradictory estimates of relative national power.
Donald L. Losman, Ph.D., worked 37 years in professional military education, finishing his teaching career at the George Washington University where he taught political economy of the Middle East.
