On March 18th, 2025, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) launched a “focused ground operation” in central Gaza with elements of three army divisions.[1],[2] Israel has been there, in Gaza, doing what it is currently doing, multiple times in the past. Israel’s past operations—Cast Lead (2008), Pillar of Defense (2012), and Protective Edge (2014)—failed militarily because they focused on reducing Hamas’ capacity rather than destroying its capability. [3],[4],[5],[6],[7] More broadly, Israel failed because it used a military instrument and military strategy to obtain objectives beyond any military end-state. It’s the classic case of square peg-round hole. If Israel wants to solve the problem of Hamas, it needs to change its approach.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s stated policy is to ensure that a future Gaza won’t present an existential threat to Israel with subordinate policy objectives to destroy Hamas and to free the hostages.[8] Additional policy objectives include security control of Gaza, demilitarization before reconstruction, deradicalization of the population, and administration in postwar Gaza run by non-Hamas nonhostile local elements.[9] These are multi-generational objectives requiring a multi-generational approach.
Hamas, Gaza and Israel are charged topics, and it is difficult to separate emotion from cognition. The acts of October 7th, 2023 were a civilizational challenge to Israel. In their aftermath, the tendency to demonize the enemy is natural, but unhelpful. In their aftermath, Hamas, an absolutist armed violent political-sectarian movement with Israeli hostages and a subject population in Gaza demonstrated that it will not be deterred by the death of its members, the death of its’ subject population or the physical destruction of Gaza. Negotiating with Hamas serves Hamas’ goals not Israel’s, not Gaza’s. Hamas is not the point. Gaza is. There is no alternative to Hamas’ destruction.
Hamas’ genocidal ambitions have collapsed Gaza into destruction, forfeiting its right to independence. The political polity that facilitated Hamas must be completely removed to prevent future threats to Israel. Simply reducing Hamas’ capacity while returning Gaza to stateless vulnerability ensures it becomes a proxy for external actors seeking Israel’s destruction. ‘Occupying Gaza’ is an open admission of transience which is self-defeating. As the war’s victor, Israel must be the sole source of civil authority and political legitimacy in Gaza. Israel must declare Gaza a protectorate and temporarily strip it of all political self-determination as part of a comprehensive, revolutionary and multi-generational transformation of its political-economy. In the short run, the protectorate structure is designed to serve Israel’s security needs. In the long run, the protectorate will evolve into a commonwealth upon meeting harmonization standards or fully integrate with Israel upon meeting integration standards and through mutual agreement.
This can be done with 6 strategic objectives:
Strategic Objective 1: Local Physical Destruction of Hamas: This means that Hamas is rendered incapable of fielding armed, organized offensive or defensive operations. Local physical destruction does not mean Hamas is destroyed everywhere, just locally in Gaza. Local physical destruction does not mean all the material and non-material elements of support for Hamas’ armed organized violence are exhausted, interdicted or destroyed in Gaza, just its material tactical instruments of armed power projection: its leadership, fighters, arms and ammunition. Local physical destruction, by itself, is temporary not permanent. Hamas can be resupplied with fighters, guns and money to restart operations.
Strategic Objective 2: Prevent Resupply of Hamas: The objective of preventing Hamas’ resupply is so it cannot contest ongoing IDF operations or deliver an armed response at scale. Objectives 1 and 2 combined represent the military end-state.
Strategic Objective 3: Preclude Reconstitution of Hamas: This strategic objective lays the groundwork for subsequent strategic objectives to permanently interdict, intervene and reorient Gaza’s political-economy. Physical destruction of fighters and seizure of weapons and funds cannot permanently eliminate Hamas, as the organization maintains capital, labor, and resources outside Gaza enabling long-term reconstitution. Israel must therefore transition from immediate local physical destruction, disruption and interdiction to systematically attacking Hamas’ material and non-material support, recognizing that the organization can draw upon foreign resources and interface with the local political-economy to reconstitute itself over time.
Strategic Objective 4: Establish a Protectorate: The Gaza of October 7th must permanently cease to exist. Israel will formally declare Gaza a protectorate. The past political-sectarian framework which drove conflict will be discredited and removed. The material and ideological support systems that created and sustained Hamas will be dismantled and deconstructed. Revolutionary transformation of Gaza’s political-economy will be introduced reorienting it for integration with Israel’s political-economy.
Strategic Objective 5: Establish Permanent Political-Economy Without Armed Capability: Like Japan after World War II, the transitional government of Gaza must fully and formally renounce violence as a sovereign right.[10] The 18 and under youth cohort will be enrolled in mandatory onsite coeducational programs. Arabic-to-Hebrew transition will be initiated in educational and administrative functions. Access to external resistance support networks will be completely severed. Self-regulating systems aligned with Israeli founding principles are established.
Strategic Objective 6: Permanent Political-Economic Orientation: Gaza’s political-economy will integrate with Israel’s providing stability and opportunity. Customary society will eliminate transcendent motivations for violence and the foundations for genocide. Commonwealth status is achieved or the pathway to full integration initiated. Success in Gaza will demonstrate that genocidal wars result in complete political extinction
Critics will challenge this framework on legal, moral, and practical grounds. These objections, while predictable, rest on flawed premises that have produced 58 years of strategic failure.
- International Law Violations: The protectorate framework operates under legitimate self-defense principles following Gaza’s declaration of genocidal war and systematic targeting of civilians. Collective
- Punishment Claims: This framework targets political-legal systems, not ethnic identity.
- Cultural Impossibility Arguments: Gaza’s own historical transition from a Christian to an Islamic society demonstrates cultural malleability when political-economic incentives align with institutional change.
- Regional Destabilization Concerns: The current paradigm of cyclical violence and proxy warfare has already catastrophically destabilized the region. Regional stability requires eliminating—not managing—the conditions that produce genocidal movements.
- International Opposition: International acceptance follows demonstrated success, not prior approval.
This opinion piece leaves much unsaid. The means, methods, operational design and campaign execution to achieve these objectives are available but will require an approach beyond military victory.
David J. Katz is president and CEO of DARACOM, a strategic competition advisory firm. During his tenure at US Special Operations Command, he designed, advised and assisted on the execution of the largest counter-PRC strategic competition operation since the Cold War. A West Point graduate, he served in the US Army as an infantry officer and Green Beret captain. He also worked as a private equity institutional investor and advisor before founding his own firm that provided advanced analytics on more than $3 billion of clients’ private equity investments.
Footnotes
[1] Office of the Prime Minister of the State of Israel, “Prime Minister’s Office Announcement”, March 18, 2025. Accessed on the internet at https://www.gov.il/en/pages/spoke-idf180325 on July 6, 2025
[2] Seth Frantzman, “Israel steps up ground ops in Gaza, threatens Hamas it will take more areas.”, Long War Journal, March 21, 2025, accessed on the internet at https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2025/03/israel-steps-up-ground-ops-in-gaza-threatens-hamas-it-will-take-more-areas.php on July 6, 2025
[3] “Operation Cast Lead (2008).” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Government Official Website. https://www.gov.il/en/departments/general/operation-cast-lead
[4] “Israel under fire-November 2012.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Government Official Website. https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/israel-under-fire-november-2012
[5] “Operation Protective Edge: Israel under fire, IDF responds.” Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Israeli Government Official Website. https://www.gov.il/en/Departments/General/rise-in-rocket-fire-from-gaza-3-jul-2014
[6] “Operation Protective Edge – Update No. 8.” Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, July 26, 2017. https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/20679/
[7] “Gaza – Operation Protective Edge – 2014.” Israel Legal Advocacy Project, December 24, 2024. https://www.lawandisrael.org/library/historical/israels-wars/gaza-operation-protective-edge-2014/
[8] Netanyahu, Benjamin. “Statement by PM Netanyahu following the conclusion of his second meeting with US President Donald Trump.” Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Israel, 9 July 2025, https://www.gov.il/en/pages/statement-by-pm-netanyahu-following-the-conclusion-of-his-second-meeting-with-us-president-donald-trump-9-jul-2025
[9] “Netanyahu presents post-war plan to cabinet, aims for ‘local officials’ to govern Gaza.” The Times of Israel, 22 Feb. 2024, https://www.timesofisrael.com/presenting-post-war-plan-to-cabinet-pm-aims-for-local-officials-to-govern-gaza/.
[10] Constitution of Japan, Article 9 (May 3, 1947), promulgated under Emperor Hirohito and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida.
